

AMERICA AMONG
THE NATIONS-*POWERS*



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AMERICA
AMONG THE NATIONS



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AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS

BY

H. H. POWERS

Author of "The Things Men Fight For"

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TO MY WIFE

MY ABLEST AND MY KINDEST CRITIC



AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This book is in some sense a sequel to the work published last year, *The Things Men Fight For*. In that work was considered the problem of war as related to modern nations, and more particularly to the nations then engaged in the great conflict. The United States was mentioned but briefly at the close.

Since that book appeared the United States has entered the war, thus completely abandoning its traditional policy and necessitating a psychological reconstruction such as no nation has ever undergone in like time. The war is to the old-world nations the logical outcome of a familiar situation. They have but to adjust their thought to new magnitudes and new methods. To us the change is revolutionary. We were outsiders before, critical, indifferent, and unsympathetic. Of a sudden we became members of the European family and must get the family point of view. The task is difficult.

I would like to help in this task if I can. I am encouraged in the attempt by the insistence of friends and by the reception which the earlier work has met, both at home and abroad. Particularly gratifying is the long and sympathetic article by the late Earl of Cromer (*Yale Review*, January, 1917), perhaps the last of his many publications, in which, despite certain misunderstandings and a few pardonable manifesta-

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

tions of British susceptibility, I was honoured with his general and emphatic approval. So important is any word from this most distinguished of British administrators that I have ventured to give brief consideration to his article in the Appendix.

As the historic facts referred to are for the most part commonplaces of popular knowledge, I have thought it unnecessary and undesirable to encumber the book with footnotes. Those who care to go into these questions of historic detail with more thoroughness, will find them admirably presented in Johnson's *America's Foreign Relations* (The Century Co., 1916) a work of singular clearness in its statement of facts, though proffering little by way of interpretation, especially in the later chapters.

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AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

When of old the pilgrim to Delphi went to inquire of the oracle concerning the things of the future, he was confronted at the entrance to the sacred precinct by the admonition, "Know thyself." To the American people, as they turn, in this momentous hour, to inquire what Destiny has in store for them, this injunction is peculiarly fitting. Perhaps no great people ever reached so advanced a stage of development under the influence of such complacent prepossessions. Isolated, during the earlier stages of our development, from the fierce rivalries of Europe and confronted in our own domain with no opposition worthy of the name, we have reached our present sprawling growth without any real experience of race competition, and with the consequent comfortable conviction that we are a peaceable and reasonable people, strangers to the fierce hate and the wicked concupiscence of unregenerate Europe. With everything that we need lying before us and to be had for the taking, we are shocked at those who would get what they need by fighting. Opulent in lands and mines and harbours, the impulse

to encroach upon a neighbour's territories seems to us peculiarly reprehensible.

Our theory of international morality is thus as easy as it is simple. Nations should live content within their boundaries. Normal and legitimate relations between nations are relations of friendship. To maintain such relations is perfectly easy, given only the most elemental good will. That nations can live peaceably without encroachment or sinister designs on one another's territory needs no other proof than the fact that we do so. With due modesty and absolute sincerity we offer ourselves as a pattern to a jarring and misguided world.

That the world, despite our example and demonstration, continues to be misguided and quarrelsome, is a fact which naturally calls for explanation. The explanation lies ready to hand. We are a democracy, a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Other nations are ruled by kings, or have but recently escaped from their malign control. Autocracy with its resulting slavery, and dynastic ambition, arch enemy of peace, of these we know nothing, while Europe is still the victim of their baneful sway or the heir of their blighting tradition. The coincidence furnishes an explanation altogether congenial to our habits of thought. Autocracy is the cause of war and democracy its cure. Our task as friends of humanity is to destroy autocracy and "make the world safe for democracy." It is true that in our moments of self criticism, when no comparison with other peoples is involved, we are wont to question the reality of this government by and for the people, and are

disposed to assign to untitled potentates among us all the baneful power which we decry in the rule of kings. Equally, when occasion suits, we are fond of asserting that kings are but figureheads quite unable to withstand the force of popular opinion. But such slight inconsistency as these minor diversions involve, is seldom allowed to disturb our confidence in the major propositions. "For the human mind is hospitable and will entertain conflicting views and opinions with grave impartiality."

Even less are we influenced by the fact that other nations do not wholly share our view either of ourselves or of our institutions. Our Latin American neighbours, though sharing our preference for democracy and modeling their governments as closely as possible on our own, persist in regarding us with mingled suspicion and fear. Neither our protestations of friendship, nor our democracy, nor our history as they read it, reassures them. They are not convinced that peaceableness and content are our inherent characteristics or that other nations are safe from our aggression. The nations of Europe can hardly be said to judge our claims more favourably. So far from being convinced that we are considerate and unaggressive, they attribute to us rather unusual pretensions, and have been known to characterize our claims as "international impertinence." The fact that we are at peace at a given moment, is no proof to them that we are peaceable. The most belligerent nation in the world can honestly claim to have kept the peace longer than we ever did. Nor does the world credit us with magnanimity as a victor. We are conscious

of special and justifying reasons for our spoliations. The world remembers only the spoliations, and remains unconvinced that we are pledged to maintain the world's peace. By way of compliment quite as much as by way of reproach, they refuse to credit the naïve simplicity which we seem to affect. The friendly greet our complacent pose with a smile, the cynical with a sneer, but both with incredulity, refusing to recognize in us a different type of humanity, or in our institutions a different political principle from those with which they are familiar. Just as the engineer sees in the half filled but filling tank no different hydraulic principle from that in the tank that is filled and running over, so they see in the uncrowded population of our half filled land men of like passions with themselves, and men who are certain, when similarly circumstanced, to assert themselves in like manner.

Nor do the nations of Europe concede to us that pre-eminence among the exponents of democracy which we are wont to assume. A majority of them have long been fully committed to the democratic principle, and some have devised means of registering the popular will more promptly and accurately than we can do. Kings have disappeared or have become docile instruments of democracy. Even where kings still reign, democracy is potent and monarchs are circumspect. It is a very limited autocracy that survives in Europe today. And equally, it is a very imperfect democracy to which we have now attained. Other nations may be pardoned, therefore, if they refuse to recognize our democracy as having talismanic virtue, the more so as they are unable to discover in us those pe-

culiar virtues which we had invoked democracy to explain.

If our self analysis leaves something to be desired, it is at least as satisfactory as our estimate of other nations. Having never known the needs which constrain the older nations to unwelcome action, we see that action only in its unlovely outer aspects, and pronounce it unnecessary and perverse. "If the people have no bread, why don't they buy cakes?" was the reproachful query of the unstarved queen. With that promptitude of opinion which is our national characteristic, we unhesitatingly assign the most unpalatable reasons for foreign action and propose the most impractical remedies for foreign ills. Our cocksureness is neither ingratiating to them nor enlightening to us. It is not too much to say that the prevalent American opinion of every foreign country is not only false but uncomplimentary, a veritable caricature of the reality.

As America assumes her new position among the nations, or more exactly, as she suddenly becomes aware of her actual position and realizes that she must work in intimate co-operation with nations which she has been wont to disparage and which have seemed to disparage her in turn, the importance of a juster estimate becomes apparent. These doubtful amenities do not contribute to mutual helpfulness and efficient co-operation. Yet that co-operation is a necessity of the moment and probably of the entire future. It is true that we do not intend our present alliance with nations from which we have hitherto held aloof, to be permanent, but a year ago we did not intend to

enter even a temporary alliance. Intentions count for little in the face of unexpected situations. There is no telling how long this alliance will last or how comprehensive it may become. There will be less of shock and less of inconsistency in staying in, than there was in going in. And even if the alliance is but temporary, it constitutes a precedent which is almost sure to be followed by this or other combinations as future exigencies may require. All signs point to an increased co-operation among nations. National isolation is past and national independence is passing. Confronted by combinations and unable to avoid collision, there is much reason to apprehend that we shall adopt a policy of co-operation and strive for more or less permanent friendships with those with whom we find that we can make common cause. This will involve difficulties and dangers, abandonment of our traditional policy, and all that. It may be more a subject of regret than of congratulation. But our opinion in the matter counts for little. It is not a matter of our choosing. Science and invention have destroyed the barriers between nations, and whether we like it or no, we must come to terms. Whether the nations group themselves in rival camps in one of which we find our place, or try to maintain a more difficult equipoise as individuals, matters little. Closer relations have become inevitable, and these relations can not be satisfactorily based on mutual disparagement and misunderstanding.

In the following studies two principles have been borne constantly in mind. First, nations reveal their character by what they do rather than by what they

say. With them as with individuals, there is often a wide divergence between practice and profession, each individual deviation, of course, having its special explanation and excuse, but entering none the less into the permanent structure of character as into the record by which posterity will judge that character. Professions which contradict this record count for very little. They may and ordinarily do represent ideals which react upon conduct, but in that case they find recognition in the record of conduct. To the practical man it matters not what a man *thinks* he stands for. The question is simply, what does he *do* when put to the test? And what he has done, especially what he has done repeatedly, he is likely to do again. That, at least, is the only safe guess. So with nations. Every nation has certain political principles which it reiterates until they become shibboleths. It has an astonishing power, too, to take these shibboleths seriously as reflecting its real convictions and character. "Equality before the law," "consent of the governed," "non-intervention in the affairs of other nations," "the Monroe Doctrine," we can point proudly to an unvarying profession of these principles throughout our history, and can easily persuade ourselves that this credo has represented our true position. The writer has no intention of proving or refuting this dogma. He would rather, if possible, forget these time honoured formulas and arrive at an independent estimate of national character from the homely facts of our national history. Equally, he would if possible discard the time honoured prepossessions and epithets which have too long done duty with

us as estimates of foreign nations, and arrive at a juster conclusion based on their action.

In short, this is a modest attempt at a historic interpretation of our national character and our relation to other nations. Not that the writer professes to adduce new testimony or to unearth facts hitherto unknown. With all deference for those who are engaged in this important task of historical research, the writer ventures to doubt whether their labours will seriously modify the data for historical judgments. Doubtless many minor obscurities remain to be cleared up, but the main facts of history for the period with which this study deals, are known. Those which are here cited are commonplaces of popular knowledge. But knowledge is one thing and interpretation another. Interpretation can never keep pace with knowledge. The facts of our first hundred years as a nation are known, but their meaning is scarcely appreciated and is being progressively revealed by the things that come after. Interpretations require continual revision. It is to this task that the author ventures his slight contribution.

The second point to be emphasized is the basic principle that nations act from self-interest. A like assumption regarding individuals underlies the science of economics, and without it no such science is possible. This does not mean that nations never do the generous thing,—generosity often furthers self-interest, especially if spontaneous and sincere,—but it means that nations know their own needs better than others know or can know them, and that they are necessarily charged primarily with the duty of pro-

viding for those needs. This would seem to be even more true of nations than of individuals, for nations have much less of that kind of acquaintance of one another which makes sympathy and consideration possible. With a horizon of national consciousness extending but little beyond their own boundaries and a struggle to provide the necessities of national existence, usually of a nature to tax their powers, anything like deference or actual concession becomes exceedingly difficult, and must be the rare exception. It is a popular fallacy that friction between nations is due to injured sensibilities, and the frequent allusion to the vague entity known as "national honour" lends colour to this belief. The writer has repeatedly been asked, on returning from visits to Japan: "How do the Japanese feel toward Americans?" Were it possible to answer this question, it would hardly be worth while to do so. If there is ever trouble between Japan and America, it will not be because Japan's feelings have been hurt, but because her interests are endangered. No doubt in a strained situation where conflict of interests has brought nations to the breaking point, an affront may serve as a precipitating cause. It did so in the present war, as in the Franco-German War of 1870. The value of an affront in such connections is such as to make it eagerly sought by the would-be aggressor. But to attribute the war to the affront is like attributing the rifle shot to the trigger,—true in a way, but in a way that obscures the real forces at work. The precipitating cause of the present war was the murder of the arch-duke; the real cause was the conflict of interests be-

tween the Central Powers and their eastern and western neighbours.

It is the danger of all such inquiries as the present that they should stop short with proximate causes. These causes are infinitely varied and defy all classification. Interpretation in terms of these surface accidents never gets us anywhere or gives us a true basis for ameliorative action. For instance, the Kaiser signed the order for mobilization and so precipitated this war. To remedy the world calamity, send the Kaiser to St. Helena. Japan is reported to be in a menacing mood because we have wounded her pride. To remove the menace, study courtesy toward Japan. Wars are precipitated by secret diplomacy, therefore abolish secret diplomacy. There is often a modicum of truth in such suggestions, but it is never the significant truth. The Kaiser would not and could not have signed the order for mobilization if the nation had not previously become convinced that its vital interests were at stake. There would have been no discourtesy toward Japan and no sensitiveness on her part if interests had not been in conflict. No secret diplomacy ever causes war if there are not serious issues which refuse peaceable adjustment.

In contrast with the precipitating causes, these deeper interests of national life have a singular uniformity. It goes without saying that they may be misconceived and unwisely defended, but they are the stern reality underlying all relations between nations. When a nation conceives its interests to be vitally affected, it will, if possible, take action to protect them.

The problem of interpreting international relations

and of forecasting their development reduces therefore to a few simple — but difficult — inquiries. What are the vital interests of the nations involved? What is their capacity to perceive those interests? What is their habitual method of protecting or asserting those interests?

For the answer to such inquiries history is our only reliable guide. We must judge the future by the past. The future will not be quite like the past, and we shall necessarily err somewhat in our forecast. But if we can get beneath the accidents of the past and discover its essence, our error will not be fatal. In its essence there is a continuity in national character, as in human nature generally, which offers an adequate basis for prophecy and for constructive endeavour.

Finally, the writer wishes strongly to insist that this is an inquiry, not a propaganda. If the conclusions reached are somewhat positive and startling, the wish has none the less nowhere been father to the thought. The writer is neither an optimist nor a pessimist. In some mild sense of the word he may perhaps be described as a fatalist, by which is meant merely that history seems to him less a matter of voluntary choices and more a matter of cosmic forces than is commonly assumed. The great decisions of nations have seemingly been unconscious. Men are free to choose among the alternatives which present themselves, but they have little power to determine what those alternatives shall be. Their choices, even within the limits allowed, have a significant uniformity. There is nothing depressing in these facts. We need a very stable and dependable world about us if choice is to

have any significance. If choice could determine the greatest things, who knows what some other man's choice might do?

Be this as it may, one who sees in history principally a record of cosmic forces and of subconscious human decisions, has little temptation to be a Peter-the-Hermit. Poor Peter! How much he thought he was accomplishing! How little he realized that he was but a bubble borne along on the surface of a resistless cosmic current!

This book is written with a paramount consciousness of this current. Upon it ride the frail craft which bear the destinies of men. It bears us, we know not whither. We have no reason to believe that it threatens us with destruction. We may fairly hope that it is more spacious and more placid as it nears the great sea. Nor are we helpless or deprived of a worthy task. The navigator's task is still a man's task, though he does not make the river or determine its current.

PART ONE
AMERICA AT HOME



CHAPTER I

THE FIRST AMERICANS

THE history of the American people as such begins with the founding of the English colonies of North America. There were other colonies and earlier colonies of Europeans planted within the limits of the United States, and these colonies have not been without important influence on the history and character of the American people. But these earlier colonies have not themselves survived, and their chief contribution to American character was the hardihood engendered in their political extermination. As individuals they of course survived, and their descendants are easily recognized in the Spanish families of our southwestern states, the French of Louisiana, and in the Dutch aristocracy of Manhattan. But their numbers being insignificant and their political independence early extinguished, they have necessarily merged in the larger body of English speaking population, and have accepted or are accepting its civilization. It is therefore with the English colonies that we have to deal. The struggles with earlier and later rivals, like the struggles with the Indians, are merely incidents in the history of the English colonies. They were very important incidents, however, and must receive due attention at the proper moment in any inventory of American achievement and character.

It is a truism of history that the success of the English colonies was due in large measure to the stern natural selection by which the colonists were recruited. With slight exceptions the colonies were the result of dissensions in the homeland and the colonists the most irreconcilable of the dissenting minority. A dissenting minority is almost of necessity more assertive and belligerent than the opposing majority. The majority may contain individuals quite as assertive as any, but its average can hardly be so. The imitative and quiescent temperament instinctively seeks countenance in traditional and majority opinion. Dissent from accepted opinion, therefore, while seldom characterized by reasonableness and equity, is a pretty sure guaranty of independence and aggressiveness. That it was so in the English dissensions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, no one familiar with the history of that time will doubt.

It was from this picked stock that a second and much severer test culled those stern spirits which were to form the nucleus of the American commonwealths. The hardships of those early settlements were tremendous, and though but imperfectly anticipated, they were still such as to deter all but the sternest and most aggressive. If dissent had not completely eliminated the adherent of conventional and concessive temper, colonization almost certainly did so, especially at first. It was a Gideon's band that planted the Anglo-Saxon standard on these shores.

The character of the early colonist, as seen in the

juster perspective of history, with all the trivial details of personality eliminated and the generic features brought out into bold relief, quite confirms this *a priori* conclusion. The portrait reveals a stubbornness of conviction and a relentlessness of purpose which seem unbeautiful to a softer and more tolerant age. Whatever his weaknesses, sentimentality and forbearance were not among them. He seems fearfully opinionated, the more so since his estimate of moral values has not stood the test of time, but he had the courage of his convictions and a vigour in their defence which we can not but admire, even when we do not emulate.

It will be recognized, of course, that we are sketching primarily the portrait of the New England Puritan, and it may be objected that he was but one of many and widely divergent types among the early settlers of America. But apart from the fact of his undoubted primacy in this early delegation, he was more representative than is usually recognized. These pioneers were catholic and protestant, conformist and non-conformist, pacifist and militarist, but they were one and all confronted by the same necessities and selected by the same tests. The single exception of government aid to Virginia was not continued, and the English colonies were saved from the demoralizing government patronage which ruined the colonies of France. Even the Quaker seems to have adapted himself to the stern necessities of this fighting time, and while avoiding war in the conventional form which he had foresworn, appears pretty uniformly in an attitude of belligerent assertion.

This ancestral stock, though constantly diluted by the indiscriminate admixture of later years and softened by the lesser exactions of an easier time, has left an enduring impression upon American character. Heredity accounts for much, while the long continuance of frontier conditions has done not a little to counteract relaxing tendencies. Above all there has been a legacy of intellectual and spiritual ideals which has perpetuated the Puritan type in the face of an inundation of alien thought and sentiment. Aliens have been dealt with piecemeal, and constrained, one by one, to forswear their old allegiance, until they find themselves, even when in majority, committed to the ideals of a dwindling minority. The passing of Puritan New England is sometimes deplored. The wonder is that it did not pass sooner and more completely. New England is still Puritan in a substantial degree, and with it, our nation as a whole, the offspring and heir of New England.

This initial character of the American people was accentuated and maintained by the situation in which they found themselves and the tasks which confronted them. The mere task of exploration and the subduing of nature was one calling for enterprise and hardihood in the highest degree. Even yet, after three hundred years of occupation, the work of the pioneer is not finished, and it is in the memory of men now living that he has achieved his greatest triumphs. Continued stimulus and uninterrupted selection have thus tended to maintain original characteristics.

In this struggle the Indian has played an important part. Always a feeble antagonist, he from the out-

set forfeited his claim to compassion by his own inevitable savagery. The Indian could be annoying from the first, even dangerous, but to become civilized and useful required time and an amount of coddling and forbearance which the colonist could hardly afford. The inevitable relation was one of conflict, conflict which might have been different in its incidents, but hardly in its essence. And if the conflict was unavoidable, its outcome was even more predetermined. Even without conflict it is probable that the Indian must have disappeared before the white man. No possible considerateness of treatment could have compensated for the inherent disparity between the two races. As it was, no such considerateness was shown. White superiority asserted itself rather ruthlessly, impatient of obstruction by a conspicuously inferior race, and the Indian suffered the inevitable consequence of his inferiority. Nor did the later grudging recognition of obligation on the part of the more efficient race, with its perfunctory and demoralizing tutelage, greatly help the situation or modify the outcome.

Whether the world has lost by the disappearance of the Indian is not the question. We are concerned only to note his influence upon American character. The struggle was little calculated to develop military science on our part, but it was even less calculated to make us pacifists or to encourage theories of human brotherhood. Such theories may be accepted as of universal application, but as an actual working program, they are apt to fare badly when we are dealing with savages. Considerations of practical utility are

equally at a disadvantage in this case. The savage seems to be a cumberer of the ground. The matter-of-fact competitor for his place in the sun is little affected by ideal considerations. You can make a man of him in time, no doubt, but not half so easily as you can displace him with a better man already made. Such considerations as these,—felt rather than reasoned,—make the competition between civilized and savage races, especially in regions suited to either, a very ruthless one, and deepen the instinct of race assertion and race aggression. They have done so in the American people.

But far more important than the conflict with the Indians was the conflict between the English and the earlier colonists to whom reference has already been made. This struggle was, of course, only the reflection of the age-long conflict between the parent peoples in Europe. Those who see in war only a struggle for trade or the pressure of congested population will find it difficult to account for many things in these conflicts. At a time when France and England had to seek each other in America across almost impassable barriers of unoccupied territory, when seemingly from sheer lonesomeness, they should have welcomed each other, they compassed land and sea to destroy each other, anticipating friction which if realized, could be realized only after centuries of development. In this struggle they sank a capital which no profits from the trade they foresaw could ever repay. The struggle seems to have been instinctive rather than calculated, the spontaneous manifestation of race competition.

This fundamental antagonism was sharpened by certain differences of lesser import which performed the important service of furnishing the pretexts of which our unreasoning instincts always have need. Spaniard and Frenchman, Frenchman and Briton, instinctively grudged each other a place in the vast territory which they were so long unable to fill, but neither quite knew why. It was therefore with peculiar satisfaction that they recognized, each in other, the exponent of a sinful heresy, and in themselves the chosen instrument of God, for its extermination. This situation has its counterpart in the experience of every nation and of every individual when account must be given to an importunate reason for action in deference to an inscrutable instinct.

When the great competition began, England and France were in revolt against the intellectual bondage of Roman Catholicism, while Spain was intensely loyal. Geographical situation first brought Spain and France into conflict, the earliest French settlements like the British having been founded by dissenters. The ruthlessness of the resulting struggle has few parallels in ancient or modern warfare. It was no war of subjugation but a war of extermination deliberate and complete. The actors seem to have viewed their work with complacency, and if they ever felt remorse, the fact is not recorded.

When later French and English came into conflict, reaction had triumphed in France, Coligny and the Protestant cause had perished at St. Bartholomew's, and with them their ill starred colonial schemes. Colonies fostered by state aid, under the supervision

of the church, and soon under the direction of the Jesuits, supplied abundant and mutual justification for a relentless war against the tenacious heresies of colonies even more heretical than the heretical land from which they came. Other differences added asperity to the conflict.

The struggle which followed lasted for a century, and left no generation without experience of warfare. If less pitiless than the earlier struggle between Spanish and French, it was still a war of savage ferocity. Conquest, to be sure, was followed by subjugation rather than by extermination, but such incidents as the exile of the Acadians by the English and the employment of Indians by the French, with its accompaniments of massacre, torture, and cannibalism, have given to the memory of this war a peculiar horror. The final issue was settled in 1759 between Montcalm and Wolfe on the plain of Quebec, and in the great competition of civilizations, the vast potential weight of America was thrown into the scale of Britain.

But what concerns us is the reaction of these events upon the character of the American people. From the first settlement of the English in America to the final British triumph at Quebec,—a period of a hundred and fifty years,—the colonists may be said to have lived in an armed camp. They had gone armed to church as a protection against the treacherous native. They had participated in innumerable campaigns, often puny and inefficient, but not the less bitter and positive in their reaction. They had fought an unsparing foe and had learned to be unsparing.

The colonists had no need of land. They could have given a province to every household. When at last the continent was assured to them, they were scarcely sufficient to police its eastern border. Nor does it appear that the vision of a countless posterity prompted them to so colossal a provision. To the alien, unless heretical, they accorded the heartiest welcome, as to a fellow soldier in the fight against nature. That the land should ever be insufficient both for themselves and for him was unthinkable.

Nor do these colonies seem ever to have contemplated, like the Spanish and French, the enforcement of uniform religious beliefs. Many of them had intense convictions and were exceedingly jealous of their right to be religious in their own way,—even jealous of all dissenting opinion within their midst. But the notion of forcing other colonies to their own opinion does not seem to have been entertained. Religious liberty in the modern sense of tolerance for all opinions was certainly not their ideal, but as between their several isolated settlements they exhibited passive tolerance at least. Whatever may be true of the French, the English did not fight these wars in the interest of religious propaganda.

Nor yet for trade, though the traders of the two peoples, penetrating the remote wilds in quest of furs, were in continual clash and were the advance guards of settlement and of the pernicious Indian alliance. But the obligation of a nation to protect its citizens beyond its boundaries was not recognized then as it is now, and it is difficult to believe that the colonies would ever have consented to vast expenditure of

blood and treasure, and would have risked their very existence in perpetual wars in the interests of traders' profits. The recent much heralded discovery that war does not pay, could hardly find better illustration than in such an outlay for such an end.

For what then, if not for land or faith or trade? There is but one possible answer, and that, perhaps, a new riddle to explain the old. It was an age-long struggle for supremacy, for dominion. The individual was provided for in either event. Under the one flag as under the other he could sow and reap and gather into barns. Under either allegiance he could trade and get gain. If his individual interests were menaced, it was primarily because of his allegiance. With this stone of stumbling removed, his path was clear. But far from purchasing individual well being by the surrender of allegiance, he was willing to maintain his allegiance at the expense of individual well being. The Englishman wanted the new world to be British; the Frenchman wanted it to be French. Neither knew, nor yet greatly cared to know, why. It was enough that his own was familiar and the other strange, enough that he had inherited fealty to the one and not to the other. Perfectly irrational, do you say, this blind loyalty to an unproved good? Yes, no doubt; as irrational as the love of life. Who ever yet proved that life was worth living? What healthy man ever tried? This is all merely a way of saying that we are dealing with instinct, not with reason, and it is not to reason but to instinct that nature has committed the guardianship of our vital interests.

This struggle of civilizations of course did not originate on our continent. It grew up in Europe under very different conditions and was transferred to our shores as a part of the colonist's heritage. It might have been expected that under the very different conditions here prevailing, it would lose its bitterness and perhaps disappear. Europe was land hungry, America land-surfeited. Changed conditions might reasonably be reflected in a changed attitude. But there was no change of attitude. Hostility between the two civilizations continued unrelenting, and the empty land found no room for the two. This uncompromising assertion of race instinct under conditions that afforded it none of its usual pretexts is peculiarly illuminating as to the nature of the force with which we have to deal.

This blind instinct of race assertion we have no occasion either to challenge or to defend. There are pros and cons in plenty, but we are studying history just now, and are concerned to know the American people rather than to correct them. The broad fact is that throughout the colonial period they were absorbed in a ceaseless struggle for race ascendancy. Harassed rather than endangered by the Indian, they were never allowed to forget him or let him alone. The tolerance that they might have shown him was made impossible by his alliance with an implacable rival. With this rival in turn they were compelled to wage a relentless and far more desperate warfare until victory at last compelled submission. How different would have been the history and the schooling of the American people if, like Spain in South Amer-

ica, their occupation had met no challenge from foemen worthy of their steel. It was a Spartan discipline that the colonists underwent in the century that closed with Britain's triumph before the walls of Quebec.

But this was not all, nor yet the most important. Throughout the long conflict the colonist was never wholly unconscious that he was playing a minor rôle in a vast drama which had the world for its stage and the most powerful nations of the world for its actors. During a period of a hundred and thirty years ending with the Battle of Waterloo, England and France fought seven great wars, the aggregate covering a total of sixty-seven years, or more than half of the entire period. The prize of victory was nothing less than the privilege of leading the world that was, and of peopling the world that was to be. All that men care most for was involved in the issue, their race, their speech, their institutions, and their ideals. In all these wars except the last the English colonies were actively engaged. They won for their race the leadership of the nations, and for themselves the right to become the American people.

CHAPTER II

THE LOGIC OF ISOLATION

IT would be strange if a people so sired, so selected, and so schooled as were the American people, had not developed characteristics consonant with their origin and their experiences. They had been compelled to fight for everything, and they had developed the fighting temper. Their antagonists had been too unintelligent or too implacable to make compromise possible, and they had become uncompromising. They had prospered in war, and were the easier persuaded to resort to it. They had known its sacrifices, but never its humiliations, and therefore did not feel its chief deterrents. On the other hand there was much in these early experiences to mislead them, for war as they knew it was not the war of organized and disciplined Europe, and they quite overestimated their ability to deal with a serious antagonist. Aggressive, over-confident, undisciplined, and incautious we should expect them to be, and such we find them. The events of the years immediately following the great colonial triumph might have been predicted.

Unfortunately for Britain, her political evolution had not kept pace with her territorial expansion. This was inevitable. A great deal of undeserved acrimony has been expended upon the British policy

of this period, and especially upon the misguided monarch who had the misfortune to be conspicuously associated with it. It is all so very plain now, what ought to have been done. The great principles are so obvious,—“no government without consent of the governed,” “no taxation without representation,” and the like,—so very obvious, except (as always) in contemporary applications. It is barely possible, too, that a supreme genius in place of George III might have perceived these principles and persuaded his people to recognize them in their dealings with the colonies. It would have been a supreme achievement, however, one for which history scarcely furnishes a precedent, for it is not usually the dominant partner who first discovers the rights and needs of the weaker party. It can not be too strongly insisted that the relation which the colonies sought to establish with the mother country was one for which history furnishes no counterpart. Much has happened since to prove their contention to be reasonable and wise, but it did not and could not seem so then, especially to the more responsible party. This point is so vital to all our subsequent discussion that we may well make a little effort to see how the world looked to an Englishman of the eighteenth century.

The problem of empire, the management of complex states, is a very old one. When the king of Egypt relinquished the time honoured privilege of plundering the Syrians against the payment of an annual tribute, he laid the foundations of empire. He seems to have done nothing, however, to help his tributaries, unless by protecting them from other

marauders. He taught them no arts and sent them no administrators. He left them to their own rulers and their own devices, so long as the required tribute was paid. The conquered territory was like a hunting preserve in which the proprietor had learned to hunt discreetly, giving the hunted the benefit of a closed season. Its justification, like the justification of all things historic, lies in the fact that it was a way station on the road from worse to better things.

The Roman Empire marks a great advance upon the empires of this primitive type. Rome still subdued peoples and exacted tribute, but she created the wealth that she took and much more. She made roads, bridges, and harbours, protected life and property, administered justice, and defined the relation between man and man. The hunting preserve now became a cultivated estate whose proprietor reaped harvests of his own sowing instead of depending on the scanty yield of nature. If material well-being counts for anything, Rome has put the world very much in her debt.

This system was such an immense advance over anything that the world had previously known, and its success was so imposing that the world has sometimes forgotten its limitations. Yet Rome failed, and failed because she was unable to meet the requirements which her very success created. The system worked admirably for a conquered and alien people who were not Roman and who might plausibly be placed in tutelage. But as these countries gradually became Roman in culture, intelligence, and feeling, their status as protected inferiors became both less ac-

ceptable and less appropriate. Yet there was no adequate means for their participation in the direction of affairs. The whole empire was governed essentially by the citizens of the imperial city. Citizenship, to be sure, became more widely distributed, but as the Roman could exercise political functions only by coming to the City of Rome, citizenship of non-residents counted for little outside of personal prestige and protection.

As the Republic expanded to vast proportions with corresponding increase of tribute, it became too much for any city to manage, while at the same time the pampered city became hopelessly demoralized and incapable of exercising its functions. The provinces, on the other hand, were still sound, and their competency had steadily increased. But there was no way of calling them to the aid of the state. Rome had developed arteries by which she sent her creative authority out to the uttermost parts of her dominion. But she had no veins through which she could bring back the life current to the wasted centre. With the breakdown of the municipal control, she could think of nothing better than to reinforce it with a military despotism which was based on the same defective principle and had only the merit of being temporarily more efficient.

Yet it is tantalizing to note how near Rome came to taking the next great step and solving the problem. When Julius Cæsar appointed Gauls and other barbarians to seats in the Roman Senate, he recognized in essence the great principle of representative government, and Rome seemed near to adding the crowning glory to her achievement by devising an adequate

means for creating and maintaining the authority back of her administration. But the reception which these rustics met at the hands of those born to the toga effectually deterred them from exercising their new prerogative, and as the policy did not command the sympathy of Augustus, the experiment passed with its originator, and the principle which it involved remained unnoticed. Probably it was incapable of application at that time. So military autocracy had its day, while authority maintained a precarious existence by the initiative of genius and the momentum of heredity.

And now the world hibernated for a thousand years and waited for Britain. Outside this single little area the world recognized the traditional method of constituting authority which had received the sanction of imperial Rome, autocracy founded by chance and perpetuated by birth, the whole under the awful sanction of divine right. Britain recognized the same authority and was hardly conscious of standing for a different principle. But Britain had found the talisman that Cæsar had sought. She had her Parliament, her institution for "parley" between people and king. It was crude and weak as yet, still fighting for its doubtful prerogative, but it involved the precious principle of *representation*. Through delegates the people spoke with the king concerning the matters that were of concern to them, without the necessity of coming to the capital city. Slowly and painfully the English schooled themselves in the difficult task of creating, renewing, and supervising the authority to which they subjected themselves.

It is impossible to exaggerate the difficulties that attended this task, continued, as it was, without the guidance of precedent and against the determined opposition of the monarch. Success would have been impossible in any but a small and well defined area with a fairly homogeneous people whose interests were so uniform that all could understand them. Race differences, natural barriers, or diverse interests would have wrecked it in its earlier stages, may conceivably wreck it even yet.

It was while this struggle was in progress that the colonies were founded. Indeed they were in part an incident of the struggle, for it was the malcontents who saw no hope that their views could be made to prevail and who were unwilling to accept the necessary compromises, who were most prominent in the movement. It is doubtful if any one thought much about the political problems that were involved. They were still Englishmen and went with the consent of the king and under his protection, but they went to get away from the conditions prevailing under the English government, and England knew and recognized with them that this action put them beyond the pale. How it would work out probably no one knew or felt it necessary to know. They could wait and see.

But the all important fact for us to note is that whether they wanted to be a part of England or not, it was now physically impossible to be so. Practical administration must have things handy and accessible, while they were many weeks away. It implies familiarity with conditions, and this was something that no English minister could claim. To refer mat-

ters to London always involved long delay and usually resulted in perfunctory and unpractical decisions. Meanwhile the colonists were not savages, but Englishmen quite as competent as those at home and infinitely better informed regarding local conditions. It was inevitable that such men should have their own way in most matters, and that although England might send them governors and go through the forms of administering the colonies from London, no governor would get along with them who did not respect their judgment and their wishes. As England was rarely concerned in the matter, no sensible governor would invite trouble by opposing their will, or bother his superiors by referring matters needlessly to them. The inevitable *modus vivendi* was from the first something like this. The colonies allowed the king to rule in theory, and he allowed them to rule in fact. To challenge either half of this arrangement was to insure trouble.

By a similar unwritten arrangement the colonists were subject to taxation, but paid no taxes. Being British subjects and under the king's protection, his right to demand tribute was as old as monarchy itself, a right not invalidated by the growing power of Parliament. But at a time when Britain's rivals were supporting their colonies by grants from the royal treasury, regarding them somewhat as expeditionary forces, it was clever financiering on Britain's part to get her colonists to pay their own expenses. To tax them for the privilege of waging an arduous frontier campaign for the mother country would have been preposterous. No doubt the time would come when

their lot would be that of normal citizenship, and normal duties would be recognized. Until then taxation " must be postponed. But the longer it was postponed, the more difficult it became to establish it. The days of hardship were long continued, and as poverty slowly gave way to modest affluence, colonial needs absorbed the local revenues. Quite naturally, the colonies came to regard this arrangement as reasonable and just. They looked out for their own end as the home folks did for theirs. Their burdens were as heavy and their work as well done. They shared in the common defence. When England fought France, they fought New France, and served at their own charges. They asked no help, and no help should be asked of them. If this was not ideally equitable, it was as near it as men are likely to get. All this was felt rather than asserted by the colonists, and England acquiesced by silence rather than by direct avowal. The right to tax was neither asserted nor withdrawn. It was merely held in abeyance until it was eliminated by atrophy.

Representation in Parliament was the third matter of vital concern to a Briton. In the case of the colonists, this right, like so many others, went by default. As the home government was chiefly occupied with home affairs, it interested the colonists but little, and they would have felt it a burden rather than a privilege to participate in its management. Representation in Parliament in the early days, when the colonies were but insignificant communities of malcontents who had shaken off the dust of their feet against the British government, was of course unthinkable. When later

these conditions changed and representation might have seemed more appropriate, the colonists were canny enough to realize that if they helped govern England, England would help govern them. Representation thus wore the aspect, not of a privilege, but of an insidious menace. Meanwhile the colonists had developed little parliaments of their own and were jealous of their prerogatives. They were the weaker party, and their prerogatives, in theory, rested only on English suffrance. The less said about the matter the better. So they waived their right to representation in the great council of Englishmen.

To summarize the situation, in theory, the colonists were Englishmen, entitled to all the privileges and subject to all the duties of British subjects. But just because they went so far away that they could not conveniently communicate with England or act under the detailed direction of her government, they had developed a substation or advanced base of government direction, and to this they reported for duty or applied for privilege, until all working relations with the central station were forgotten and died of disuse. Yet while they had been growing self-sufficient and American, they were still Englishmen and had not the slightest idea of being anything else. It is a puzzling relation, and one that the world had hardly known before, and was therefore unable to define clearly. Organic connection between homeland and colonies, though nominally intact, had quite ceased to function. Yet there was a conscious union of a very real character, something quite different from the mere friendliness existing between two independent states. Try to

concrete it in the form of taxes and parliamentary control, and resistance was at once manifest, but leave it alone, and it remained, an impressive reality, intangible but potent.

The saying of Bismarck, that the art of the statesman is the proper evaluation of the imponderables, was never better illustrated than here. The unity in question was built of imponderables, of things that can not be weighed or translated into material terms. A proper evaluation of the imponderables would have discerned in this unity an infinitely precious thing. Unfortunately the faculty here required is the gift of a few rare spirits, among whom can not be included the English monarch and his advisers of this period. The king inherited a struggle the necessary issue of which he was unwilling to accept. The authority of the people, as expressed through its responsible Parliament, had steadily encroached upon the irresponsible authority of the monarch, who now engaged in a desperate struggle to save and if possible to strengthen his prerogative. The main issue was between Parliament and himself, an issue in which the colonies were not directly concerned, save that it gave them a powerful ally. But if the king's authority had weakened as regards Parliament, it had also weakened as regards the colonies, and that for a different reason. Parliament did not represent the colonies, and it was an open question whether it could claim authority over them. It might plausibly be contended that their relation was to the king alone. Yet their avowed allegiance had been shadowy in the extreme. If royalty was to recover its prerogative, this normal allegiance

must be translated into fact. The rights and duties of British subjects must become real through experience. To the minds of these men, as to certain in our day, only material relations were real relations. The imponderables were too unsubstantial.

It is but fair to add that Parliament, though at feud with the king and therefore the logical ally of the colonies, was neither able nor willing directly to espouse their cause. Not only was Parliament at the time in artificial subserviency to the king, but it had its own feud with the colonies, claiming, like the king, an authority over them which they were nowise minded to recognize. Parliament as a whole was hardly more expert than the king and his ministers in the evaluation of imponderables. But there were a few who recognized the fatuity of the king's effort to control Parliament and of his attempt to assert in the colonies an authority which was both alien and outworn. These few proved to be the true representatives of the English people.

We know the outcome, and yet we perhaps do not always recognize its significance, for we too are not always able to appraise the imponderables. The all-important fact is that at the outset the colonists were Englishmen, owing an allegiance to Britain which was a tremendous reality, albeit imponderable. The king and his ministers, endowed with no diviner's sense for the things of the spirit, felt that this structure of the imponderables was unsubstantial and untrustworthy, and sought to transmute it into a more material substance. In so doing, they wrecked the mystic fabric of British allegiance and British unity. When they

began, the colonies were British. When they ended, they were American. The change was not outward and political merely. There had been a regrouping of the imponderables.

It must not be concluded, however, that this was due to the character of George III. Had there been no struggle with Parliament and no effort to recover a vanished prerogative, the issue would have arisen in another way. The situation was one which had never arisen before, and one which the most intelligent of peoples could hardly be expected to appreciate. Never before had two countries been really one in their inmost consciousness and yet completely independent in all their political activities. History was witness that real bonds between nations had always been material bonds. Assuming, as everybody did, that unity was to be maintained, it seemed a patriotic duty to supply the material bonds which alone could guarantee its continuance. So they reasoned, so anybody would have reasoned in their place. Their reasoning was natural and in the light of past experience, conclusive. It was a mistake that simply had to be made. It chanced to be a king who made it. It might just as easily have been a Parliament, and a very reasonable Parliament at that. King and ministers and personalities were accidents in the case. The essence of the situation was British unity existing under conditions of extreme geographical separation. The new thing which these brought into the world was not at once to be recognized by those schooled in a less intangible order of things. The reign of the imponderables was not yet.

The temptation is irresistible to turn for a moment to this same struggle in our own day. A nation has arisen which holds a quarter of the earth in fief, and which yet seems to be no nation, for its parts are themselves nations, jealous of their liberty and brooking no interference, yet feeling themselves one, bound together by the imponderables. And there is another nation that puts its trust in more material things, sceptical of bonds that can not be seen with the eye and handled with the hand, a nation that has declared through the mouth of its prophet that a nation united by other bonds is "a sham," that you have but to touch it and it will fall to pieces. And they have given heed unto their prophet and have touched, and the world waits the outcome. Was that other prophet right, or was he wrong, when he said that the art of the statesman was to appraise the imponderables?

CHAPTER III

THE GREAT EXPANSION

THE nation which was thus started on its independent career, with those characteristics in its people which resulted inevitably from a long frontier experience, was dowered with a domain of uncertain extent, but vastly in excess of present or even prospective needs. Its settlements formed a chain of fairly developed communities along the Atlantic seaboard, with a narrow fringe extending westward into that illimitable domain in which as yet they could not even post their sentinels. Remorseless as had been their war of extermination against the French, there was nothing they needed so much as population to fill the aching void from which the French had been expelled. The motive which has seemingly impelled men to migration and conquest in all ages of the world, the need of room for a growing population, was one that the Americans had never known. The crying need was always for population to fill the empty spaces and do the yeoman's work and, save where religious prejudice interfered, immigrants seem always to have been welcomed. The peopling of the whole western territory might have been foreseen, and the expulsion of the French and other movements of appropriation thus justified, the usual motive working merely by antici-

pation. But there is much evidence that it was not foreseen and that the American people long regarded themselves as an Atlantic coast people, backed by a great interior which would never be filled by the growth of their own population. Many decades after we became a nation, there were intelligent Americans and even distinguished American statesmen who regarded the idea of filling up the land from ocean to ocean by the natural growth of the American people as wholly chimerical.

It is important to get clearly in mind this prevailing feeling of our people, as the psychological background of this first century of our national history. If they sought new territories, it was because they wanted them, not because they needed them. It is easy for us to see that real need was only a question of time, but they did not live in any consciousness of such a time. We also can see that there were urgent strategic reasons for our territorial expansion, but it is all but certain that they wrought their work unguided by any such ideal. The seer may have understood the craving, but the people merely felt it. They lived in a constant consciousness of territorial sufficiency, but sufficiency brought no satiety.

The first century of American history is a record of unparalleled territorial expansion. This expansion began almost from the first moment of our independent life. It has been noted that the nation began essentially as a chain of coast settlements with a slight and uncertain western fringe. The Atlantic coast was the only certain thing about its boundaries. Even that was uncertain at either end.

The first problem was started by the treaty of peace with Britain. It will be remembered that this treaty had a certain clandestine character. We had pledged ourselves not to make peace with Britain except in conjunction with France, our ally. When the surrender of Cornwallis made peace possible, France began to manœuvre for a peace that should make the colonies in a sense dependent upon her. As this design became apparent the American envoys were indignant and evaded the spirit of the agreement while observing its letter. They negotiated a treaty with Britain, settling all details, and then laid it before the French minister for his adhesion and approval. He was intensely indignant at being thus excluded from the negotiations where alone he could have hoped to accomplish his purpose, but as the complete agreement left him no plausible pretext for objecting in a relation where France had steadily professed disinterestedness, he assented with bad grace.

The clandestine character of the treaty went further, however, and included a provision of a more questionable character, in the shape of a secret clause which was not included in the text of the treaty and was never revealed to the French minister at all. England, it must be remembered, was then at war, not only with the Colonies, but also with France and Spain. Both England and Spain had widely scattered possessions, and it was pretty certain that when the time for peace came, there would be exchanges. Gibraltar was the chief object of contention, but it was certain that England would not surrender this on any account. The only question was, how much would it be neces-

sary or wise to concede elsewhere in order to reconcile Spain to the loss of the famous fortress. Florida was most likely to be the price of peace with Spain. It was a Spanish settlement anyway, and England had but recently acquired it by exchange in order to round out her colonial boundaries. Now that the colonies were lost, its value was much lessened, and if "swaps" were called for, Florida was likely to go.

The boundaries of Spanish Florida had been much as at present except that the western projection extended to the present eastern boundary of the State of Louisiana or almost to the Mississippi River. But when England acquired it, she found it convenient to extend it clear to the Mississippi, adding that tip of Louisiana which she had acquired about the same time. She also extended it considerably to the north, adding a broad strip of territory which belonged to none of her colonies and which she could most easily administer in this way.

Now that she faced the possibility of yielding Florida, this question of boundary was important. Hence this secret clause above referred to, which specified that if Florida remained British, the northern boundary was to be the parallel of thirty-two degrees and thirty minutes, but if Florida became Spanish, the northern boundary was to be the parallel of thirty-one degrees as at present. Florida was to extend westward to the Mississippi in either case, for as Spain, who, by the previous acquisition of Louisiana, controlled the other side of the Mississippi, desired above everything to control its mouth, this was the thing that chiefly made Florida valuable to her. The

result was a broad zone of debatable territory, the "Yazoo Lands," about the size of the State of Pennsylvania. By this treaty Britain said in effect to her late rebellious colonies: "If I keep Florida, I want these lands, but if Spain is to have Florida, I would rather they would be yours."

The significance of this attitude on the part of Britain, an attitude manifested in many other connections, will be considered later. At present we are concerned to note the American attitude toward territorial expansion. Little is recorded on the subject, for the reason that that attitude is taken for granted. From the first it was one of stout insistence. The lands were neither strategic nor needed, nor were they closely akin in population. To secure them would not give the country a natural frontier. Spain, having acquired Florida in the settlement, of course, found out about the secret clause and insisted that Florida, which had been ceded to her, could not be one thing to one claimant and another thing to another. Florida was Florida, and if the northern boundary was thirty-two degrees and thirty minutes for Britain, it was thirty-two degrees and thirty minutes for Spain, a very plausible contention. It all availed not. America insisted, and at last in 1795, under a virtual threat of war which Spain was in no condition to face, Spain yielded, and the line was drawn at thirty-one degrees. Technically this may perhaps be classified as a defensive act rather than conquest and annexation. We merely insisted on our "rights" under the treaty with Britain, waiving the question whether Britain had any right to grant us such rights. The important thing to

note is that Spain denied our right and yielded to a threat of force. This is conquest in essence, for conquest is usually based on some alleged right, and this right is enforced by coercion. The American "forward policy" was thus inaugurated at the very birth of the Republic, and it scored its first considerable victory when our constitution was six years old.

This advance was necessarily followed by others. Slight as was the general appreciation of strategic problems, anybody could see that existing boundaries were no stopping place. Florida, extending clear across to the Mississippi, completely cut off the country from the Gulf of Mexico and closed our southern access to the West Indies with which, at that time, we maintained an extensive commerce. The very narrowness of this artificial barrier was an incitement to break it down. More important still to all the interior territories was the navigation of the Mississippi. We had extorted from Spain by force the privilege of navigating the river to its mouth, but her people resented the concession and made it as uncomfortable for us as possible. The control of the river, therefore, even more than access to the Gulf, engaged the attention of the Americans and their government. This was made possible by an extraordinary turn of events in Europe. Napoleon, just risen to power, reacquired Louisiana from Spain in exchange for certain rather specious promises of a dynastic character which he never fulfilled. The transfer, long concealed, was divined by the Americans as the result of renewed obstructions to the navigation of the Mississippi. It is noteworthy that there was an instant and

widespread clamour for war with Napoleon who was already at the zenith of his fame. The President, however, sent a commission to buy, if possible, the city of New Orleans and some portion of Florida to secure control of the Mississippi, the purchase price not to exceed \$2,000,000. As Napoleon was confronted just then with a war with England who controlled the seas and would almost certainly seize the territory, he offered to sell the whole, and the commissioners hastened to buy for eight times the sum allowed them. To go home without Florida which they had been sent to purchase, and with a territory which had not been asked and which the American imagination had not yet come to desire, and above all with an expenditure eight times the authorized amount, implied some confidence in American imperialist sentiment. That confidence was justified by the prompt ratification of the treaty. It is worth while to note that Jefferson fully believed that he was violating the Constitution in the purchase, a fact the more significant when we recall that Jefferson and his party were inclined to construe that document in the most conservative sense. Evidently all parties to the transaction "had their nerve with them." Spain protested that France had not acquired title and that she had pledged herself not to dispose of the territory to any other power, both perfectly valid objections, but we ignored them as matters that did not concern us. The reluctance against purchasing stolen goods, we did not feel, as indeed nations never do. It is to be noted that Britain did not protest, although this sale of her booty at the moment when she was about to seize it, might have been open

to objection. She seems not to have regretted the strengthening of America.

This acquisition, the largest ever made in all our history, was accomplished at the ripe age of fifteen years. It extended our territory westward to the Rocky Mountains, a very vague boundary, but one little liable to cause actual disputes throughout the greater part of its length. Unfortunately it gave no northern or southern boundary, thus insuring later difficulty with Britain in Canada and with Spain in Mexico, difficulties to be settled as might be expected, in the one case by agreement and in the other case by war. It is a great pity that the southern boundary was not defined at once, but American statesmen seem to have been incapable at that time of appreciating the need of definiteness in the vast unpeopled West. There was a little difference of opinion between Spain and France as to the boundary between Louisiana and Mexico, a difference amounting approximately to the present State of Texas, but as no one at the time had the slightest interest in Texas, and all attention was focused on the control of the Mississippi, it did not seem worth while to undertake a negotiation with a nation that was feeling aggrieved in order to secure a definite line through an immeasurable wilderness. Our acquisitions had not only outrun our needs, but had completely outrun our imagination, a much more important consideration, for men seldom care to delimit carefully that which has not been taken possession of by their fond fancy.

Spain undoubtedly felt aggrieved, and with reason as regards France. Naturally we acquired her resent-

ment along with her possessions. This was responsible in part for the somewhat dubious plan of campaign by which we now sought to complete our original program. For if we were indifferent to Texas, we were keenly alive to the desirability of controlling Florida, particularly West Florida, for all along the dominant consideration was the Mississippi. We now controlled all of the western bank and all of the eastern bank north of latitude thirty-one. We wanted the rest.

Our first move was to challenge the validity of Spain's title. The title was doubtful, as indeed most of these early titles were, but it would have seemed sufficient if it had been ours. Spain, of course, stoutly defended the title, but being unable to defend the territory, America had the better of the argument. She got a foothold in the very year of the Louisiana purchase, then negotiated vainly, threatened war, and finally took forcible possession of the western portion of West Florida in 1810. By this time Alabama and Mississippi were filling up and wanted access to the Gulf. In default of other means, or perhaps in preference to other means, the balance of West Florida was seized in 1813. The extreme preoccupation of Europe with the Napoleonic struggle made possible this unceremonious procedure. Spain, of course, protested frantically, and even Britain lodged formal protest, but all to no purpose.

There remained East Florida, the Florida of our own day. Her case was radically different from that of West Florida. She did not control the Mississippi, nor was she necessary to give any other state or terri-

tory access to the sea. But failing these reasons, there were others. Broader conceptions of strategy now began to prevail. Florida, almost touching Cuba, completely dominated our commerce between the Atlantic and the Gulf. Spain was little to be feared, but her possessions might be alienated to France or Britain. That was a thought to give us pause, and it led Jefferson to state the essence of the Monroe Doctrine twenty years before the date of Monroe's famous message. To make matters worse, Florida became a refuge for outlaws, filibusters, and hostile Indians, who harried the border much as Mexican adventurers are doing today. The man who formulated our extremest doctrines about liberty and the consent of the governed, as well as his associates, had none of the scruples which their present day disciples profess in their name. They openly declared that Florida would become American as soon as Spain became involved in another war; they invaded Florida again and again to chastise outlaws and destroy hostile posts, and finally finding that Spain could not or would not maintain order in Florida, they virtually took possession of the territory and then forced Spain to cede Florida for \$5,000,000, all of which was to be paid to American citizens in satisfaction of claims against Spain.

There can be no possible doubt about the desirability of this annexation, but equally, there can be no question about its spirit. The temper of the country was one of unqualified aggression. Jefferson's statement that as soon as Spain became engaged in another war, Florida would become ours, is significant.

There is no suggestion of a moral impediment. Florida was necessary to complete our natural frontier, in itself a strong incentive to aggression. If it had been objected that Spain had rights in Florida (no such objection seems to have been urged) the answer would probably have been that incompetency invalidates all such claims, a doctrine instinctively accepted by energetic peoples and ever a cardinal principle of American policy. Most readers will remember with what force it was urged against Spain in our war for the liberation of Cuba.

The acquisition of Florida marked the beginning of another policy which has been rather peculiarly American, the disguise of seizure under the form of purchase. Seizure has traditionally been the privilege of conquest, and money payments, if any, have been an added perquisite. (Indeed it is the curious tradition of this our world that indemnity is due only from nations that have allowed their territory to be invaded, and who are thus condemned to bear the cost of the invasion.) The United States has chosen to construe its seizures as purchases, paying for them a moderate sum, the more willingly when, as in the present instance, the money could be kept at home to pay uncollectible debts due to American citizens. The method has the advantage of salving wounds which otherwise might fester. It is available, however, only in cases where the purchaser is in a position to set the price unaided by the seller.

The acquisition of Florida was at once followed by an agitation for the acquisition of Cuba. The strategic argument was identical and even more

urgent, for a hostile base in Cuba could be as injurious as one in Florida, and harder to get rid of. The compunctions later felt about the suitability of the Cuban population for the duties of American citizenship, seem not to have troubled the ardent doctrinaires of the time. The annexation of Cuba as a state in the American union was freely urged, Jefferson in particular having championed the idea to the end of his life. But in this case Britain interposed her powerful objection, and though this raised American apprehension of British designs and led to further development of the policy soon to be embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, the project of American annexation was dropped, and the great problem of Cuban development postponed for nearly a century.

The southeastern corner of our continent was now properly rounded out, and with the necessary postponement of plans for overseas development, our restless energies turned to the northeast corner where a bit of rounding out needed to be done. The treaty of 1783 in which England recognized the independence of the Colonies, had made an honest attempt to fix definite boundaries between them and British possessions to the north, but neither party knew enough of the country to do so. Some of the mistakes were merely ludicrous, as when it was specified that the boundary in the west should be a line running due west from the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi River. Inasmuch as the Mississippi rises considerably to the south of this point, such a line would never touch it even if carried round the world. But where intention was plain and

no conflict of interests was involved, rectification was easy.

In the extreme northeast there was a more dangerous ambiguity. The attempt had been made to establish natural boundaries by following rivers and watersheds, a perfectly proper method but dangerous unless detailed by a survey. No such survey was made or was possible at the time, and neither the river "source" nor the "highlands" designated in the treaty were so easily identified as had been expected. In brief, there was a debatable territory of something over twelve thousand square miles or about the area of Massachusetts and Connecticut, which was claimed by both the State of Maine and New Brunswick. This proved a difficult question to settle, and one which peculiarly illustrated the American temper. Maine and New Brunswick, the territories immediately concerned, each claimed everything in sight and were absolutely deaf to all proposals of conciliation or compromise. The Federal government was hardly less so. After the failure of early attempts at negotiation, resort was had to arbitration, and the king of the Netherlands was chosen as arbiter. He gave about two thirds to Maine and one third to New Brunswick. Our minister in Holland protested against the award without referring it to Washington. Washington sustained him, however, and the award was ignored, our government thus establishing an unenviable and well nigh unique record in the history of arbitration. Then began preparations for war, not only by the United States, but ridiculously enough, by the State of Maine on her

own account. Troops were raised and money voted, and if Maine and New Brunswick had been left to themselves, war would undoubtedly have resulted. Fortunately, one of the bumptious claimants had a sober backer, and the dogs of war were held in leash until Webster and Lord Ashburton (uncle of the late Lord Cromer) arranged a compromise. This divided the territory in much the same proportion as the earlier arbitration award had done, and the treaty was violently denounced by extremists on both sides, but was finally ratified in 1842.

With the close of this long-standing controversy, all boundary problems in the east were settled. To the south we had settled all questions by wholesale annexation. Beyond lay the sea and the islands which were reserved for a later chapter in our history. To the north we had reached an amicable agreement with a stalwart people who knew how to stand their ground, but insisted upon being friendly. From the Atlantic through to the Rocky Mountains the northern boundary was determined past all hope or need of changing. Meanwhile our domain had been immeasurably extended in the west by the addition of the great plains which stretched on and on till their margin faded in the silent mountains or the illimitable wastes of the great desert, where desire died and the wanderer stopped and dominion had no need to extend.

As we look back over this first period of American history, we are not profoundly impressed with the moderation and reasonableness of American demands, or with the tact and considerateness of American procedure. We want the earth, and we say so quite

frankly. Not that we have far reaching designs of world empire; — far from it. Such unholy ambitions have always been abhorrent to us. We merely want the next thing beyond. We are like the young woman who had no sympathy with the craze to be rich. All she wanted was to have money enough so when she saw something she wanted, she could buy it. We have worked out an imperial destiny from instinctive impulse rather than from deliberate purpose.

Our method of procedure is equally characteristic, — to ask for what we want, — for all of it, — and stand our ground. Recognizing that possession is nine points in law, we have shown a strong inclination to make appropriation our first step in the proceedings, whether we contemplated purchase or conquest. We have also appreciated the value of a threat of war at the proper moment.

With decadent Spain this procedure was fairly suitable. She was hopelessly incompetent to manage her colonies and helpless to defend them against our aggression. Her protests against our appropriation of her territories only afforded us an opportunity to give her a piece of our mind. Spain cuts a sorry figure through it all, and we can not be sorry that she was dispossessed, but there are times when one can not help feeling a bit of sympathy for Castilian sensibilities.

With Britain the American procedure was less successful. She was not decadent, and knew both how to defend and how to value the possessions which we challenged. New Brunswick was not to be won like Florida. The marvel is that American aggressive-

ness did not lead to more serious consequences. The record is one of unfailing conciliation and concession on Britain's part, but never one of weak surrender. The significance of this attitude will be apparent later.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC

THE building of our territory on the east was now done, and on the whole, well done. Starting with the Atlantic coast line as our one definite boundary, we had carried our frontier to the tip of Florida, and thence on round the Gulf to the Mississippi and beyond. So much at least was necessary to our safety. It would have been a calamity if our southern boundary had remained at parallel thirty-one as established in the treaty of independence. The end of this coast line, to be sure, was arbitrary, and considering the character of the neighbour in that quarter, it might have been surmised that it was but tentative. It remained in fact unfinished business to come up soon for the strenuous consideration of the nation.

At the other end, our long frontier had been carried safely round the corner and extended through the great lakes and along lesser lakes and rivers to the accepted northwestern corner, the Lake of the Woods. From the northwestern corner of this lake some brave guess work carried our frontier to the Mississippi which had been chosen as our western boundary. Guesswork it had to be, for no one had ever explored the region. The guesses were very unlucky and might later have proved embarrassing, had not the acquisition of Louisiana, long before settlement reached this

point, moved our western boundary to the Rocky Mountains and made connection with the Mississippi quite unnecessary. We have now to follow this northern line on to the western ocean.

The original treaty specified that the line should run from the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods due west to the Mississippi. When the Louisiana purchase moved the western frontier to the Rocky Mountains, the natural thing was to extend this line to the mountains, and this was agreed upon without much difficulty, thus obviating the embarrassment of the later discovery that such a line did not touch the Mississippi at all. Unfortunately no one seems to have known just where the starting point — the northwestern corner of the Lake of the Woods — was situated and since definiteness was desired, another guess was made and parallel forty-nine was adopted. This again proved to be an imperfect guess, and the line refused to make connections with the northwest corner of the lake. The adjustment ultimately agreed upon gave to Minnesota a curious little piece of detached territory which remains as a monument to the ignorance of those who drew the line between the two peoples.

Ignorance but no ill-will. There is no other boundary in the world so arbitrary as this. Nature had seemingly anticipated no such horizontal division of the continent, and had arranged her mountains and rivers the wrong way. The original plan to find a natural boundary had to be abandoned, though both sides realized the danger of an arbitrary line. Yet no boundary in the world is more settled or more serv-

iceable than this. It contains no strategic traps, no ambiguities. Its acceptance conceals no mental reservations. By a supreme triumph of friendliness it was early agreed that the line should not be emphasized by fortifications. The unreasoning have argued from this the needlessness of carefully drawn strategic frontiers; the discerning see in it the essential unity of two kindred peoples.

As we follow in imagination the march of the American people along this westward line to the summit of the great divide, it now seems plain to us that destiny beckoned them farther, that this was no stopping place, and that nature's limit must be the great western ocean. But the United States had in fact reached limits more natural than any reached since or likely to be reached in any period of subsequent expansion. The Rocky Mountains are a watershed, one of the greatest in the world. They do not culminate in a narrow line of serrated peaks like the Pyrenees, and a delimitation would necessarily be arbitrary, but the sterility of the soil on either side of the line allows plenty of margin to arbitrariness and makes delimitation easy. If we wanted a natural stopping place, this was the place to stop.

But the American people have not been looking for stopping places. For them all stopping places have been starting places, and that forthwith. The new boundary was no exception. Even before the Louisiana purchase was consummated, Jefferson, whose whole interest in the purchase seems to have centred in the control of the Mississippi and whose original plan contemplated only the purchase of West Florida,

sent out the Lewis and Clark expedition to explore the headwaters of the Missouri, ostensibly in the interest of trade with the Indians. This expedition penetrated to the Pacific coast by way of the Columbia River. It is impossible to say whether the thought of territorial expansion actuated this expedition, but it can hardly be doubted that the expedition contributed to that end, adding one more to the shadowy claims which America was able later to advance as an offset to like claims on the part of her rivals.

This region of vague extent known as Oregon, where our mountain boundary, sweeping far to the northwest, came nearest to the Pacific, was the vortex of international rivalry. Nowhere in the world were the claims of the great powers so pretentious or so preposterously conflicting as here. It was here that the great nations of Europe put out their longest tentacles and reached farthest into the shadowy unknown.

Russia, in the period when the nations of Western Europe had been colonizing America, had pushed her way across Asia and gained a foothold in America at the northwestern corner. From this point she claimed the coast south indefinitely. She had even established a garrison as far south as Bodega Bay, a few miles north of San Francisco. Spain was in undisputed possession of South America and of the Pacific Coast of Mexico. She claimed everything to the north indefinitely. England had established herself in Eastern Canada and, claiming the hinterland westward to the sea, she struck the line midway and claimed both ways indefinitely. The whole territory

in question was therefore covered with claims three layers deep before we appeared on the scene. These claims were based on accidents of exploration and discovery, fur trader's stations and the like, all of them trifling in comparison with the magnificent domain at issue, a territory, it must be remembered, extending from California to Russian America, wherever the latter might be. The American claim was hardly better than the others, but in one respect her case was stronger. She was nearer and better able to occupy the land, an advantage that counted in the end.

It is not clear that America at any time during this early period, formally adopted the policy of extension to the Pacific coast. It seems rather, that as one question after another came up bearing on the case, she "played safe," keeping the way open, with the result that, despite the reluctance of such statesmen as Webster, even to the last, she found herself committed to the policy and became a candidate for all honours.

A controversy with Russia opened the competition. In 1808 and again in 1810, that country proposed commercial arrangements with the United States which were rejected on the ground that we did not know the limits of Russian territory and therefore could not tell to what ports the proposed commercial arrangements would apply. Then Russia suggested that a generous territory be tentatively allowed to Russian trade, exact boundaries to be agreed upon later. Again the United States refused, doubtless realizing that tentative arrangements were likely to become permanent. Finally, compelled to be more

definite, Russia modestly stated that she claimed only down to the Columbia River. This claim, which would have given to Russia the State of Washington and everything to the north of it, our government refused to discuss, and when later, the Czar attempted to assert a modified but preposterous claim by imperial edict, we retorted by denying that Russia had any right whatever to territory in the Western Hemisphere. These mutual extravagances paved the way to a compromise agreement in 1824. It was recalled that the Czar in 1799 had established latitude fifty-five as the southern limit for his trading company, and it was argued with force that this was the limit of his rule. Finally the Russians asked for a slight change to fifty-four forty, the southern end of Prince of Wales Island, a perfectly reasonable request, the granting of which settled the matter. In this valiant fight we crowded back our later southern border in the firm conviction that it was to be our northern boundary and that we were thus widening rather than narrowing our ultimate domain.

When in 1810 we refused Russia's commercial proposals on the ground that we did not know where the line was, one of our arguments was that we should get into trouble with Spain who claimed all this coast up to the Russian line. This was a half way recognition of Spain's claim which was much the weakest of all. This turned out to be good policy (though it can hardly have been foreseen) for when in 1821 we secured Florida by treaty, we induced Spain to throw in Oregon as a trifle for good measure. The acquisition of this claim cleared the field of the two end

claimants and left us with a single rival. It also defined the boundaries of the territory at issue. Oregon extended from latitude forty-two to latitude fifty-four forty, and from the Pacific to the Rocky Mountains. That is, it included the whole of Oregon and Washington and Western Canada up to our southern Alaskan border.

The two residual claimants now advanced upon Oregon from the east, along that parallel of forty-nine already agreed upon. The prolongation of this line to the coast, as later agreed upon, cutting Oregon not far from the middle, seems the obviously reasonable settlement of such a controversy. But it did not at all seem so to the men of that time. In the long controversy of more than thirty years which ensued, the claims of each were urged in all possible ways, and the most varied proposals were made, but at no time did either party show definite historic reason for the line proposed. Above all, both parties seem to have assumed from the first that they must settle the matter amicably and must be patient until they could do so.

Strangely enough, the first proposal made,—that of the Americans in 1818,—was almost exactly the one accepted twenty-eight years later, the extension of the line of forty-nine to the coast. Britain refused, and proposed the Columbia River which would have given her nearly the whole of the State of Washington. No agreement being possible, both agreed that the territory should be open to the settlers of both for ten years, an agreement later renewed for ten years more. This ultimately became the deciding factor

for reasons already mentioned, but this was not anticipated at the time.

Soon after came the extravagant Russian decree already referred to. It is significant that America and Britain, though they had but just finished their second war, at once combined against Russia. America ultimately succeeded in driving Russia back to fifty-four forty, a victory which of course inured to the benefit of Britain, as America soon realized, for she at once proposed the line of fifty-one as a boundary. This was two degrees higher than before, but that was offset by the fact that we had crowded Russia back. England demurred, and proposed the line of fifty-one running west from the Rocky Mountains until it struck the Columbia River. Thence the river was to be the boundary. This would work out much as before, giving Britain most of Washington. The next time the matter came up Britain proposed forty-nine and the river and America proposed forty-nine clear through, both proposals, it will be noticed, less favourable to America than the preceding.

Gradually it became apparent that the line of forty-nine, which did well enough for the interior, was painfully unsatisfactory in Oregon. It crossed the Columbia River which both parties insisted upon having, and it clipped off the southern end of Vancouver Island with far more loss to the one side than gain to the other. Hence the next proposal was to take forty-nine as the basis but to give Britain the tip of Vancouver and America the territory between forty-nine and the upper Columbia. This American proposal Britain rejected, and America in turn rejected

Britain's counter proposal. As the ten years' truce agreed upon in 1818 was about to expire, a second truce was agreed upon for a like period.

During the course of these negotiations both parties at times took extreme ground. Britain, replying to an unacceptable clause in Monroe's famous message, declared that she had a right to "colonize" down to the California line. At another time, America declared that Britain had no right whatever on the Pacific coast. It does not appear that Britain ever intended seriously to annex the whole of Oregon, despite her assertion, but the American contention that we were entitled to the whole region up to fifty-four forty, though perhaps little more than rhetorical at the first, gradually became a passionate national conviction which led us to the brink of war. This was due to the appearance, toward the end of the second truce, of a new factor, the American settler.

By the terms of this truce the territory was to be open to settlers of both powers on equal terms. For many years only trappers and fur traders took advantage of this privilege, and of these the British, backed by the powerful Hudson's Bay Company, had the decided advantage. But just before the expiration of the second truce a remarkable missionary, Marcus Whitman, who with others had gone to Oregon in response to a unique Indian appeal, returned aflame with enthusiasm for the winning of Oregon. The result was not only a stream of settlers who returned under the leadership of Whitman, but an immense awakening of interest in the territory on the part of the American people.

It is wholly characteristic of the American people that once they were conscious of the existence and value of Oregon, their attitude was one of uncompromising aggression. They refused to listen to a division of the territory, and the demand for its annexation entire became a campaign slogan in the presidential election of 1844 under the fine alliterative form of "fifty-four forty or fight." Polk, the exponent of this uncompromising policy, was triumphantly elected and it looked as if England must yield her claim or fight for it.

England was genuinely alarmed. She was intensely averse to farther trouble with America, yet she felt it necessary that Canada should have an outlet to the Pacific. Could this outlet have been secured in any other way, it is probable that she would have yielded to American insistence. She did indeed do her best to force Russia farther back and get an outlet north of fifty-four forty,—tried even to narrow up the Russian strip so as to give her the heads of some of the inlets, precisely as Canada tried it many years later. But her reason for all this effort was precisely Russia's reason for opposing her, for Russia did not want Britain in the Pacific, and so she guarded the "Panhandle" jealously, hoping that America would make good her claim and come up to fifty-four forty.

Rebuffed by Russia, Britain returned to the struggle with America increasingly determined to get her share. Unfortunately, the affair coincided with other causes of irritation against Britain, and feeling in Congress and in the country ran very high. Some of

the speeches made at the time now sound foolish and unreasonable, but they were very characteristic of American feeling at the time, perhaps at other times when similar crises have confronted our people.

Nothing can be more striking than the British efforts at this time to effect a peaceable settlement without sacrificing what seemed to Britain a vital interest. Proposal after proposal was made, only to be rejected. Arbitration was urged in several different forms, but the Americans would not hear of it. When it is remembered that American claims based on discovery and exploration did not extend north of the Columbia River, while British explorers had both come earlier and gone farther, the Americans can hardly be accused of lack of enterprise.

It is difficult to tell what the outcome might have been if circumstances had not created a diversion that proved favourable to Britain. Texas had been admitted to the Union and war with Mexico had become inevitable. War with Britain was therefore less practicable than before. Meanwhile, Polk having been elected president on the platform of fifty-four forty or fight, that slogan, in accordance with a fairly established precedent, was regarded as having served its purpose and as being no longer necessary. More important than any of these, however, was the fact that the nation was now rent asunder by the great controversy that was to paralyse its efforts for a generation and make it impossible for it to present a solid front on questions of this kind. The lines were now sharply drawn between the slavery and anti-slavery parties, and all questions of territorial ex-

pansion were now debated in the light of this issue. Since it was accepted that slavery could not flourish in northern latitudes, the expansion of our country to the northwest was looked upon as strengthening the anti-slavery party, while extension to the southwest strengthened its rivals. Both parties were intensely imperialist, but mutual jealousy now insured strong opposition to all expansionist schemes.

Under these conditions Britain renewed her proposals, and after repeated failures, a settlement was finally effected in 1846, after nearly forty years of controversy. The previously adopted parallel of forty-nine was extended, as originally proposed, through to the coast. It was not carried across the island of Vancouver, however, but stopped at the shore of the great sound whose waters formed the obvious division for the rest of the way.

Strangely enough, even this did not end the controversy. In the sound were a number of islands which either country might plausibly claim. Over them the controversy raged for another twenty years. The story is interesting merely as showing once more the American characteristics. An American soldier is said to have overheard a British marine remark that the British flag was to be raised on one of these islands the next day. The soldier reported it to his colonel, afterwards General Robert E. Lee, who sent over a small detachment and raised the American flag that same night. The British, on their arrival ordered the American flag lowered, which was refused. The controversy was referred to the respective governments, who in turn, after years of fruitless negoti-

ation, referred it to the arbitration of the German Emperor by whom, after the most exhaustive study by experts, it was decided in our favour in 1872. As this award, unlike that of the New Brunswick arbitration of 1831, gave us all of our claim instead of a part, it was accepted, and the controversy which had continued for sixty-four years, was at last closed.

The purpose of these pages, it will be remembered, is not to trace the growth of the American domain, but to ascertain the temperamental attitude of the American people toward militancy and imperialism. Nor is it intended to criticize or to defend this attitude. The traits of character so strikingly manifested in connection with these transactions, will be approved or condemned by the reader in accordance with his local prejudices or philosophical bias, but no statement here made can legitimately be construed in favour of either contention. The sole purpose is to ascertain.

Modesty, moderation, and content with existing boundaries, in the sense in which Americans have sometimes enjoined them upon other nations, have not thus far revealed themselves as American traits. It would be unwarranted to attribute to Americans in this period of national expansion, a definite policy of deliberate and unlimited expansion. They have had no such policy, indeed, no consistent and persistent policy whatever, and they have consistently and sincerely condemned such a policy on the part of others. But they have had, like other peoples, what the outside world quite naturally construes as such a policy, a permanent instinct of self assertion which acts auto-

matically in all situations. They don't want the earth, — far from it. But whenever circumstances have directed their attention toward some concrete portion of it, it has looked good to them, and they have cast about successfully for reasons why they should possess it. They have wanted it, and if possible, have taken it, from impulse, and then have justified the taking by arguments developed later. Best of all, they have justified it by their own large power to organize, develop, and bless. The need of room, so often and plausibly cited by other peoples in justification of their aggressions, is a need that they have never known. The needs and the convenience of neighbour nations they have never regarded. American imperialism has been of the most unmistakable and undisguised variety, and never more so than in the campaign of "fifty-four forty or fight."

CHAPTER V

DESPOILING THE LATIN

WE must now move round to the southwestern corner of our country where it will be remembered that the Louisiana purchase had left our boundary indeterminate. The boundary had never been defined, and the treaty of cession made no attempt to define it. The American commissioners were so eager to grasp the huge prize offered, that they seemed not to have asked about the boundary until the purchase was assured. When they did ask, they received from the two French ministers characteristic and seemingly disinterested replies. One said the boundaries were vague, and that it was well they should be. The other advised them to make the most out of their bargain. The instinct of the professional diplomat who saw an opportunity in vagueness, could hardly be better illustrated.

The Americans, however, whether through ineptitude or scruple, did not profit by their opportunity. They thought of trying to stretch their title over West Florida, at that time their chief solicitude, but failed to do so, and later acquired that territory independently by the simple process of seizing it. The western boundary did not trouble them merely for the reason that they did not know it and had not learned to think that far. It was recognized that the boundary here

was a river, but whether the Sabine or the Rio Grande was not clear. The present state of Texas lies between these two rivers.

When they got round to it, the effort was of course made to secure this territory. It was planned to include it in the Florida treaty in 1821, a proposal so universally popular that it was opposed and defeated in the cabinet by a cabal hostile to the Secretary of State lest it bring him undue prestige. Mexico now became independent, and we had a much more difficult party to deal with than Spain.

When in 1827 Mexico organized the territory into a state with a constitution prohibiting slavery, the southern states became aroused. To have the great southland take sides against slavery looked bad for them and might have serious consequences. From this time on they were persistent champions of Texan annexation. But for precisely similar reasons the northern states were opposed to it. The result was a protracted struggle in which American imperialism was for a time completely overshadowed by the bitter struggle over slavery which was to have such a tragic conclusion.

Proposals for the purchase of all or part of Texas were made in 1825, soon after the recognition of Mexican independence, and were repeated in varying form throughout the period of controversy. To all such proposals Mexico turned a deaf ear. She was hardly less helpless than Spain, but she made it clear from the first that she had no intention of parting with any portion of her territory unless forced to do so. Very soon, however, the factor which had proved de-

cisive in the case of Oregon, intervened to decide the fate of Texas. The restlessness which had carried American settlers to the Mississippi soon carried them beyond it, and they began to cross into Texas. A movement was early organized to colonize Texas systematically with Americans, who should then declare Texas independent and ask admission to the United States. This movement, unnoticed at first, excited the most strenuous opposition, both in Mexico and in the anti-slavery states, for the settlers made no secret of their intention to reverse the policy of Texas in the matter of slavery. But Mexico had no power to stop it and the United States had no right to stop it. So settlement continued, until in 1836 Texas declared herself independent. War with Mexico followed as a matter of course, but Mexico, distracted by revolution, though she might harass, could not conquer her seceding state. Texas was duly organized as an independent state, slavery was recognized, and admission to the United States was at once sought.

But if the anti-slavery party could not interfere with the first part of the program, they had their say about the second. Annexation was successfully resisted for nearly ten years, until at last Britain and France began to interest themselves in Texas. The exact nature of this interest is open to question, and rumour undoubtedly exaggerated its importance, but it alarmed the United States and elated Texas inordinately. There can be no doubt that these countries strove earnestly to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States, even arranging a treaty by which

Mexico was to recognize the independence of Texas in return for a pledge on the part of the latter never to become a part of the United States. Their motives, or at least those of Great Britain, are not far to seek. It must be remembered that this was just the moment when we were pushing what Britain regarded as excessive claims to Oregon under threat of war, and the slogan of fifty-four forty or fight was resounding through the land. Every proposal looking to the joint navigation of the Columbia River and even to any access whatever to the Pacific had been rejected. There can be no question that Britain regarded this contention of ours as profoundly unreasonable, and it would be strange if she had not felt disposed to even the score.

But Britain was accused of having another motive, one that the United States resented much more profoundly, but which we may perhaps now regard differently. She had some time before abolished slavery in all her dominions and was recognized as the uncompromising foe of the "institution." Nothing so incensed the southern states as Britain's alleged purpose to induce Texas to abolish slavery, a purpose undoubtedly consonant with British opinion if not actually entertained by the British government. Perhaps both these reasons weighed more or less with the French people and government as well, for France had even more conspicuously if not more resolutely committed herself to the cause of human freedom. Doubtless both countries, too, were moved by the jealousy which nations naturally feel of upstart and incontinent powers.

Whatever their motives, the intervention of Britain and France had the effect of greatly strengthening the annexation sentiment in the United States. The extreme bitterness of the anti-slavery agitation still insured powerful opposition to the annexation of what was sure to be a slavery state, but the opposition was in the minority and in 1846, after ten years of imperfect independence, Texas became a state in the American union. A single year therefore marked the extension of our northern boundary to the Pacific and of our southern boundary to the Rio Grande.

Mexico had long before warned the United States that the annexation of Texas would mean war, and she kept her word. The United States very properly prepared by sending troops to the Mexican border where a petty attack by Mexicans gave the much desired occasion, and a two years war followed in which Mexico was necessarily defeated and her capital occupied. Perhaps no successful war was ever the object of such bitter criticism on the part of the winning nation. It was denounced in the most unmeasured terms as a war of criminal aggression against a weak people and in the interest of an infamous institution. This judgment, enshrined in our literature by the genius of Lowell, has become a tradition with our people, and the frank avowal of its iniquity has become a popular form of innocuous national penance. This conventional verdict may well be challenged. Its acceptance is of course due to the connection of the war with slavery, later so completely discredited. Slavery is a very black chapter in our history and our awakened national conscience follows with just aver-

sion its influence in our national affairs. But there is another side to this whole transaction which has been unduly neglected. The war with Mexico resulted from our annexation of Texas. Now Texas is the only annexation that we have ever made on the American continent with the expressed consent of its inhabitants. With their consent and much more than their consent, for they had been suppliants for admission for ten years. We did not ask the consent of the inhabitants when we annexed Louisiana or Florida or northern Maine or Oregon, and only in the last case is it reasonably certain that such consent would have been given. But when in Texas an elected convention passed on the question of annexation every delegate but one voted for it, Texas therefore had the best possible claim to membership in the Union, a better claim than North Carolina or Rhode Island, states that had yielded but a tardy and grudging consent to the Constitution. It is a pity that Texas came in as a slave state, but this was inevitable, and with slavery a recognized institution in the United States, those who fought slavery by opposing annexation were neither consistent nor wise. The annexation of Texas is probably the most irreproachable episode in our long record of imperialism.

It is to be noted also that this victory of the pro-slavery party was so much less than they had hoped that it may well be counted a defeat. The intention had been not only to annex Texas, but to cut up its vast territory,—a territory as large as the German Empire,—into a number of states, thus adding a considerable number of senators to the pro-slavery ranks

and maintaining the ascendancy of that party in this citadel of its power. In the struggle for annexation they won, but the plan of division failed. Of nearly a million square miles of territory acquired from Mexico, only Texas took their side, and that only as a single state. The gain to our national domain was enormous, but the gain to the cause of slavery was slight.

For the war which followed, Mexico may fairly be held responsible. She not only threatened it in advance and technically committed the first overt act, but it may fairly be said that all reasonable effort was made to secure a peaceable settlement.

The war having resulted in defeat for Mexico, the usual forfeit was exacted. Mexico was compelled to cede to the United States all the territory north of the Rio Grande and the Gila River, including most of the present state of Arizona, parts of New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Idaho, the states of Utah and Nevada, and above all the imperial state of California, still prosy and Spanish, but destined a brief year later to disclose riches such as Cræsus never dreamed. The whole territory had but the scantiest Mexican population, and had already begun to attract American settlers whose reports had aroused the interest of the American people. That is tantamount to saying that we had begun to desire the land. Efforts had been made to purchase the whole territory along with Texas at an earlier date, but without success. Seizure was the inevitable if unbeautiful alternative. Yet there is nothing especially heinous in this acquisition, as such things go. Mexico had no idea what she

was losing, but equally, we had no idea what we were getting. It is true that no account was taken of the wishes of the inhabitants, but they were few and had little right to determine the future of a region which under any arrangement, was certain to be peopled by others than their posterity. Mexico lost a possession of immense potential value, but she had no conception of that value and very little power ever to profit by it. Of present hardship there was little. In one important respect the hardship of defeat was significantly lessened. In accordance with a practice already noted as characteristically American, the victor paid the war indemnity. For the territory thus ceded, the United States paid Mexico fifteen millions of dollars besides assuming private claims against the Mexican government amounting to three and a quarter millions more. It was altogether a very mild case of *vae victis*.

The Mexican war is an odious memory, for its backers were the champions of slavery, and it bulked large in their schemes for the extension of that discredited institution. Had these schemes been the true cause of the war, as is sometimes unwarrantably assumed, that would be its sufficient condemnation. But it is difficult to believe that under any circumstances Texas would have remained contentedly outside the United States, or that seeking admission she could have been permanently refused. Nor is there anything in the subsequent history of Mexico to warrant the belief that she would ever have acquiesced in the union without war. Even if war had been averted in this connection, the same issue must have

arisen later in connection with California, already filling up with an American population and soon to be flooded with the gold seekers of forty-nine. If there had been no slavery question, the war would have come, and uncomplicated by slavery it would have had the almost unanimous approval of the American people. Subsequent developments which, it must be remembered, were in part foreseen, have tended to justify that approval.

Extensive as was the territory transferred to the United States, it is well to recall that it represented the moderate rather than the extreme demands of the public at that time. The entire country had been conquered and an American army occupied its capital. Its Spanish population, though more considerable than that of Florida or California, was not unassimilable. Its capacity for self-government was far from demonstrated. What wonder that a strong party in the Union favoured complete annexation? Indeed, every member of the cabinet except one, and many Senators and Congressmen favoured this policy. It is more than likely that such a proposal would have been received with favour by Congress. But President Polk, despite the jingo platform upon which he had been elected, was moderate in this case as in that of Oregon. He resolutely resisted the extreme counsels of his own cabinet and took from Mexico only territory that was unlikely ever to be Mexican and was already incipiently American. The fact that it was taken in the interest of slavery, is a damning but irrelevant fact. Judged on its merits and apart from this unhappy coincidence, the settlement was modera-

tion itself as compared with the program of fifty-four forty or fight.

But the rounding out of our continent was not yet complete. There followed an insignificant and peaceable transaction which seems never to have attracted much attention and which has since been well nigh forgotten, but one which, for several reasons, Americans must contemplate with doubtful satisfaction. The boundary as fixed by treaty followed the Rio Grande and Gila rivers, the short stretch between them being covered by an arbitrary line. This involved some uncertainty, as the country was not yet surveyed, but on the whole it was an exceptionally satisfactory boundary. Yet the Americans did not find it so. The project for a trans-continental railroad was broached at this time, and this route, later followed by the Southern Pacific, seemed the most feasible one. Unfortunately, however, the feasible location was on the southern or Mexican side of the Gila. Thereupon the Americans claimed this as belonging to them. This could be done only by drawing the arbitrary connecting line, not from the head waters of the Gila to the nearest point on the Rio Grande, but between points far down the two rivers. This made a very long arbitrary line and a very short river frontier and was anything but a plausible interpretation of the treaty. But we wanted the territory, and a way had to be found. Our claim having been asserted, Mexico forestalled us by taking armed possession. War again became imminent. As there were other matters of importance between the two countries,—heavy claims of Mexico on account of

Indian raids which we had promised to prevent,—Mr. Gadsden was sent to Mexico to negotiate another treaty. This was done, and a treaty laid before Congress which ceded a large territory to the United States in return for which United States was to pay Mexico fifteen millions of dollars and satisfy the claims of Mexican citizens to the extent of five millions more. This treaty Congress refused to ratify, and a new one had to be made which ceded much less territory, waived all Mexican claims, and called for a payment of but ten millions. As this sum was but a fraction of the damages claimed by Mexico, to say nothing of the territory ceded, and as the treaty further released the United States from its recent contract pledge to restrain the Indians, its terms were not unnaturally regarded by the Mexicans as leonine, and their president was compelled to flee the country as result of the transaction. Congress was thrifty.

Never did thriftiness so overreach itself. The changes forced by Congress for no presentable reason except trifling economy, at a time when there was virtually no public debt and a large surplus in the treasury, resulted in a sacrifice to the United States which was little less than a calamity, and the repairing of which is now an urgent and unsolved problem.

The southern boundary of New Mexico follows the parallel of thirty-two to the Rio Grande, then drops down the river to El Paso (the Pass) some fifteen miles below the parallel, then runs west again for a hundred miles, and again jogs thirty miles to the south where it resumes its final westerly direction. These jogs to the south carry the line more than a hundred

miles south of the Gila and effectually clear the mountain barriers east of Tucson which were an obstacle to railroad building. Once past these barriers, however, the railroad could safely turn to the northwest, as it now does, and enter California at the southeastern corner some hundred miles from the Gulf of California.

Gadsden's original plan seems to have been to carry this southern boundary line due west to the Gulf. The Senate, in insisting upon modifications to the treaty, seems to have had chiefly in mind the Mexican claims and the necessity of avoiding them. In the short space of five years the pledge to protect Mexico from the Indians had laid this country liable to the extent of fifteen to thirty millions. To satisfy this claim and secure release from this pledge was the all important thing. The only farther object was to secure a railroad right of way from El Paso to California. Gadsden's proposal accomplished only the last of these objects. The Senate therefore cast about to find some harmless concessions which could be made as showy offsets for the very substantial benefits which they were to ask of Mexico. The decision was easy. West of Tucson the railroad would turn north, while Gadsden's boundary kept on due west thus enclosing a vast area of perfectly unnecessary and perfectly worthless territory. Moreover the only land connection between Mexico and her province of Lower California was through this territory. Such a concession ought to look large to Mexican eyes. So the diagonal was drawn as it is today, from meridian 111 to a point near the California corner, and Mexico waived

her claims and released us from our pledge and reduced her price by five millions. It was clever bargaining with a weak and corrupt government.

But he laughs best who laughs last, and the laugh is decidedly on us. The mouth of the Colorado River is wholly Mexican, and commercial and irrigation schemes are subject to her veto. Above all, the control of the Gulf of California looms large in all considerations of national defence. Here is a body of water at our very borders whose strategic possibilities are hardly second to any other, the title to which we have voluntarily relinquished to a nation that is neither able nor altogether disposed to prevent its being used against us. Access to the Gulf at a single coast point would give us complete defensive control. That access was offered and rejected at a time when both parties were blind to its value. It is now desired and withheld by parties who are both thoroughly awake.

For once we did not take when we might have taken. We refrained from no altruistic sentiment or conscientious scruple. We bargained sharply with ignorance and cupidity, and were the victims of our own ignorance and cupidity in return.

CHAPTER VI

THE BREAK WITH TRADITION

THE history of the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century, is a record of frank and consistent imperialism. There are the usual affectations and protestations of higher purpose which are inseparable from the struggle for existence on the part of peoples and individuals whose social organization schools them to the law of deference, but these normal concessions to the social instinct are not excessive and never degenerate into fawning hypocrisy. Lacking the plausible excuses of the crowded older nations, we have been rather constrained toward candour, and our instinctive imperialism which we share with all normal peoples, has been comparatively frank and avowed.

All this has been easier because of our situation. We began on the edge of a great empty continent which was lying fallow. To subdue it to human service was obviously beneficent. There was no other power on this continent which could for a moment contest our claim. To us, at least, it seemed reasonable that European powers should keep out of America, since America was content to keep out of Europe. It was therefore our very manifest destiny to appropriate the central part of North America and bring it

under cultivation as rapidly as possible. To the American people, consequently, imperialism had nothing of its traditional predatory character. It was a struggle of "cosmos against chaos" in which the question was not, how much do we need, but how much can we manage. It would have meant a perversion of all wholesome instincts and an apathy most ignoble, if the American people had not pushed its control as rapidly as possible across to the Pacific.

How far considerations of strategy entered into American calculations it is difficult to determine. The strategy argument was of course urged, and in certain cases like Florida, which thrust itself far out into the pathway of our well developed commerce with the West Indies, it was no doubt seriously considered and influential. But it is probable that even here Americans were more concerned over Indian raids into Georgia than over foreign menace to our West India trade. On the New Brunswick border it is doubtful whether considerations of defence had any influence. Webster's defence of the treaty on the ground that it gave the mountains to New Brunswick and the good land to Maine, does not sound like an argument of the General Staff. Finally, in the Gadsden purchase, we have seen our Senate completely oblivious of strategic considerations which are now recognized as of the highest importance.

This early period is in fact a very unmilitary period. Political expansion is always a concomitant of settlement, and it is the settler rather than the soldier who appraises the lands to be acquired. Maine is appeased by the fact that she gets good land, and Gads-

den's purchase is rejected because the land secured is worthless. The strategic result is in fact anything but ideal. Aside from the fact that our territory is utterly at the mercy of Britain, not only via Canada, but through her naval bases in the Caribbean,—a danger which we justly regard as purely theoretical,—our relation to Mexico, a state whose persistent jealousy constantly inclines her to serve as a base for our enemies, is one that no strategist can contemplate with satisfaction. Such strategical advantage as our territory acquired during this period was largely accidental. Our notion of metes and bounds was altogether naïve. From our starting point on the shores of the broad Atlantic the untilled lands stretched in unbroken continuity to the broad Pacific, our clearly appointed limit. Never was manifest destiny quite so manifest. A Webster might scoff at the arid lands beyond the mountains, but to the sense of the common people the problem was simple and plain. So we moved on to the Pacific, never doubting that there we should catch up with our fleeting horizon.

Owing to these peculiarities of our situation and to certain influences derived from our experience, our imperialism during this early period had developed conservative features which it is important that we should note. All the territory that we had appropriated had been continuous and compactly arranged. This rounding out of our territory was in itself a powerful argument in favour of annexation. Who can doubt that the mere looks of the map appealed strongly to the American imagination as a reason for the annexation of Florida, California and Oregon?

But concurrently there grew up a feeling against the annexation of detached territory. Jefferson and his contemporaries seem to have felt no hesitation about annexing Cuba. They justly felt that the sea with its easy pathway united us to Cuba much more than it separated us from it, and that Cuba was in effect much closer to the colonies than Kentucky whose defection Washington feared on account of the dividing barrier of the Blue Ridge. But as we continued our progress by land, and as railroads removed land barriers, while the sea continued to be the symbol of political separation, the annexation of overseas territories seemed less natural.

Far more important, however, was the influence of our federal development. It was inevitable that the territories acquired in our westward advance, as they filled up with population drawn from the older states, should in turn become states. The term, "territory," therefore acquired a special meaning, as an area administered by the federal government pending preparation for statehood. Even the boundaries of the future state were usually determined in advance. "Territories" were, therefore, merely unripe states, and Americans knew no other status for territory under the control of their government. So strong was this tradition that when later the question of permanent dependencies of the United States was discussed, it was naïvely objected that we had no governmental machinery suitable for governing dependencies. The fact that we had been governing dependencies all along and doing it quite as successfully as we did anything else,—doing it much after the fashion of our British

cousins, by the way,—all this quite escaped our objector's notice, simply because he had thought of our territories, not as dependencies, but as states in the making. He was quite sure that we had no place in our system for dependencies. There is no doubt that he reflected the almost universal American feeling. Territories must become states, and annexations could only be made with this expectation.

Meanwhile a great deal had happened to lessen our naïve faith in the capacity of all peoples for democracy. Jefferson, we have seen, favoured the admission of Cuba as a state. He seems never to have questioned the fitness of its people for participation in the responsibilities of popular government. But the slavery controversy, with its race to add slave states and free states, had raised the issue of fitness, and ultimately discredited all communities of slavery antecedents. Populations akin to those known in slavery naturally lost credit, while the experience of alleged republics in Latin America was far from reassuring.

It is plain, therefore, that as American imperialism, toward the middle of the century, completed its first and most obvious task, it was confronted by very positive barriers, physical and psychological, in its farther progress. It was faced on the east and the west by the largest seas in the world, on the north by a nation that it could not affront and on the south by a nation that it could not fear. There was a strong conviction that a nation's territories should be continuous, that its people should be homogeneous, that its government should be democratic, that it should

be based on the consent of the governed, that all should participate in its responsibilities, and that all its territorial units should have a uniform status. Farther territorial expansion could hardly meet these conditions. If the Americans were to follow further the star of empire, they must sacrifice their much heralded political principles and the most distinctive characteristics of their nation. Nothing could better illustrate the dependence of political convictions on environment and their subordination to the deeper instincts of race assertion, than the ease with which America made this momentous transition.

The outstanding fact in this transition was the civil war. This inexorable struggle not only made serious inroads upon our political philosophy, but it gave us the consciousness of military power and directed our attention to military considerations. An increased interest in strategic problems is at once apparent.

The most important episode in this connection resulting from the civil war, was the intervention of France in the affairs of Mexico and her withdrawal when peace enabled us to enter an effectual protest. This was merely a new assertion of an old doctrine, albeit one of the most extreme phases of American imperialism. Hitherto the doctrine had not been seriously challenged and neither we nor others knew what our attitude would be if put to the test. Perhaps even yet the issue would be doubtful, if it were sprung upon us when we were unprepared. As it was, France chose the one moment in our history when we were fully able to assert our will. But the problem of the Monroe Doctrine belongs not to the nine-

teenth century, but to the twentieth, and must be reserved for later discussion.

The conspicuous event of the time was the purchase of Alaska from Russia for the sum of \$7,200,000. It is the more conspicuous because it was not preceded by any events which made the purchase a logical necessity. Viewed in the broad perspective of history, it stands as a more or less isolated and gratuitous transaction. There was no public demand for it, and the general attitude toward it seems to have been one of good-natured indifference. No immediate danger was averted and no immediate advantage gained. Yet when, after one or two earlier suggestions, the transfer was finally seriously proposed, the treaty was drawn up and signed the same night and was ratified almost without opposition. Yet this territory was detached and the most sanguine could not expect it to become a state. Its population was not American and was guiltless of any consent to the transfer. It is amazing to see the easy way in which American traditions went by the board in this epoch-making annexation. So mystifying is the whole affair that quite a mythology has grown up as to the motives that actuated the parties to it. The simpler reasons are the more plausible. Russia was tired of it. She had meant it as the beginning of a great American empire, and Britain had headed her off. It promised nothing now, and was expensive. Besides, the next war with Britain (which was then a foregone conclusion) would see it annexed to the British Empire without compensation. Russia was selling what she did not want and could not keep.

On the other hand, Seward, one of the most fearless expansionists we ever knew, wanted to get Russia out of the Western Hemisphere and hoped to see Alaska linked to the United States later by the annexation of Canada, a scheme to which he was frankly committed. As a part of the scheme of a united North America the acquisition of Alaska is consistent and intelligible. As an isolated fact it would not have seemed so to the knowledge and the reasoning of that time. All intimations that he divined Alaska's wealth, and all complacent references to the hundreds of millions that have been taken from her mines, are beside the mark. He did not know her wealth, and if he had, he would not have forgotten, as his admirers have done, that it costs something to get those hundreds of millions out. Seward's scheme of a united North America through the union of Canada with the United States has not been realized, and the idea is now nowhere entertained. But at the time it was nowise an unreasonable plan. It coincided with a very low ebb of imperial enthusiasm in the British Empire, and the opinion was widely held that the self governing dependencies of Britain, like the "territories" of the United States, were merely serving a probation which was to end in complete independence. The statement was made, even in official circles, that whenever Canada wished to sever her connection with the mother country, she would be free to do so,— a statement which is doubtless still true, but with this important difference, that no one now expects that that time will come, while then it was quite definitely anticipated. There soon arose an agitation headed by influential Canadians,

for separation from Britain and union with the United States, an agitation which might perhaps have been successful if it had been earnestly and tactfully seconded by the United States. In this connection, however, our traditional imperialism has always been strangely lacking, a phenomenon which will later call for explanation. We have steadily refused to be anxious about Canada or territorially covetous toward her, and have viewed with indifference if not with sympathy, the confirmation of Canada's unnatural dependence upon Europe and unnatural separation from ourselves.

But while Seward's larger scheme has not been realized, the exclusion of Russia from the Western Hemisphere is so important as a measure of national security, that it amply justifies the annexation. In this connection, the importance of which later events have done so much to emphasize, the great secretary was undoubtedly far in advance of his time. Earlier American imperialism had been economic, and with most Americans it remained so, as the jibes at "Seward's icebergs" sufficiently proved. Seward's policy was essentially strategic. That we have since found wealth there is pure luck.

The nature of Seward's policy is clearly manifest in his next move, the attempted purchase of the Danish West Indies. Their economic value is insignificant, but their strategic importance is enormous, as Seward and a few of the leaders who had learned the lessons of the war clearly perceived. But he was ahead of his times, and the earlier easy going indulgence of Congress now failed him. The plain

fact is that he was tackling a twentieth century problem in the intellectual environment of the nineteenth. The political imagination of the American people was still in its infancy, and Congress seldom fails to represent faithfully at least the limitations of the people. There was as yet no appreciation of impending pressure from Europe and no conception of annexation which was not to eventuate in statehood. Proposals which transcended these limits in both respects stood little chance of acceptance.

The whole matter was complicated by the fact that the government was now convulsed by the fiercest factional fight known in all our history, a struggle between the President and Congress. Matters came to such a pass that the President's recommendation was sufficient to insure the opposition of Congress. As Seward supported the President, he naturally shared the bitter hostility of Congress. The very advantageous treaty negotiated by Seward would hardly have commended itself to the men of his generation in any case. As it was, the Senate contemptuously refused even to consider it, and continued in that refusal, even though Denmark twice obligingly extended the time for its consideration.

A like fate overtook the effort to establish a protectorate over Santo Domingo under the next administration. Here again factional spirit was rife, so much so as to elicit from President Grant a dignified protest in his last communication to Congress on this subject. But while personal rancour may have turned the scale, the objections to the new imperial-

ism already cited were now more definitely formulated and strongly urged. The uncertainty as to the attitude of the Dominican people and above all the unfortunate — yet natural — recommendation that Santo Domingo be admitted as a state, were made the ground of earnest and sincere objection. A protectorate was too “un-American” to be considered, and no other way out of the difficulty suggested itself. The strategic argument, on the other hand, was naturally much less felt by Congress than by Grant. So the proposal was decisively negatived.

It seemed, therefore, that in 1870 we knew where we stood. We had been consistent not only in what we had done, but in what we had refused to do. Adjacent territory which could be filled with our kind of people and made into states we wanted, and that without assignable limit. But we did not want territory that could not be made into states, nor did we want states made of such material as Santo Domingo had to offer. Our apathy toward Canada remained a somewhat puzzling exception to the first proposition and our acquisition of Alaska a nominal exception to the second, but no reasonable person could doubt our attitude on either. American imperialism had reached its limit, physical and psychological.

But though we may halt at the river's brink and turn aside, if we come to a place where there are stepping stones and half-way points, we turn again and cross to the other side. Traditional American policy, was separated by a seemingly impassable gulf from Santo Domingo as a perpetual dependency, and still

more from Santo Domingo as a state. To cross this gulf we needed a midway station or stepping stone. Hawaii furnished the midway station.

The Hawaiian Islands, situated a third of the way across the Pacific and peopled by an alien race, were not eligible for annexation under the conditions of the early conservative program we have been considering. But commercial relations had been long established and had become very extensive, while a remarkable missionary movement, perhaps the wisest, broadest, and most successful yet to be recorded, had established a close bond of union with this country. Up until the middle of the century we had had no thought of anything but the independence of the islands, but there were unmistakable signs that independence could be maintained only artificially by American intervention. Britain and France did not share our scruples about annexing distant islands, and they were just then engaged in making a clean-up of the Pacific. Once the British flag had been hoisted there and withdrawn only at the strenuous request of our government, and at another time France had taken practical possession. Intervention and constant championship of Hawaiian rights became a settled policy of the United States.

Finally, in 1853, following a definite request of the Hawaiian government, a treaty of annexation was negotiated, but this was not submitted to the Senate because it conferred statehood on the Islands, a policy to which our Secretary of State was wisely opposed. Fifteen years later the indefatigable Seward again urged annexation, but finally confessed that other issues for the time being made impossible the considera-

tion of "the higher but more remote questions of national existence and aggrandizement." These two terms, "national existence and aggrandizement," give the key to Seward's policy and to the imperialism toward which we were inexorably moving.

Whether the national mind moved fast or slow, it could move in but one direction. To occupy Hawaii would carry us dangerously far, but to let a rival occupy it would be to bring him still more dangerously near. We were beginning to hear about naval defence and were learning the value of naval bases. If the islands of the sea were to be drawn into the great scheme of things and to find their allegiance, Hawaii must become American.

Meanwhile American commerce and American influence became ever more preponderant. The government was avowedly pro-American and dependent on our good offices for its maintenance. Factions deepened into permanent feuds, and sought backing with foreign powers. Disorder finally culminated in revolution and in a request from the Provisional Government thus established for annexation to the United States. A treaty was negotiated and signed in the last days of President Harrison's administration, but was not ratified till Cleveland became President, March fourth, 1893.

Cleveland was absolutely opposed to the new imperialism. What he would have done with Oregon and California if he had been in Polk's place fifty years earlier it is interesting to speculate. But if he was reconciled to the earlier program, he was uncompromisingly opposed to the new. He not only with-

drew the treaty from the Senate but even attempted to overturn the Provisional Government and restore the effete monarchy on the ground that the revolution had been effected by American aid. He failed, however, in the one purpose as in the other. The Provisional Government maintained itself and continued to champion the cause of annexation which was accomplished, not without a bitter struggle, in 1897, early in the administration of McKinley. Even then the annexation would probably have been defeated had it not been for the outbreak of the war with Spain and the sudden realization of the necessity of preventing Spain from using the Islands as a base of operations against our western coast.

But the die was cast. The tradition of continuous territory was broken and the doctrine of ultimate statehood challenged. Would Hawaii ever become a state? Perhaps, if Americans kept going there and multiplied and replenished the land. It was a midway station from which champions of old and new might look hopefully to the nearer or the farther shore.

CHAPTER VII

THE GREAT INADVERTENCE

IN the middle of the nineteenth century, as has been noted, the United States seems to have been pretty definitely committed to the policy of limiting its expansion to contiguous territory on the North American continent. We had annexed no detached territory, and despite the inclination of our earlier statesmen toward the West Indies, it may be safely asserted that no such annexation was contemplated. The annexation of Alaska broke the tradition of contiguous territory, but it was not intended to do so. It simply represents an abortive scheme to complete our expansion northward. Whatever precedent it established, counted for little in view of its peculiar situation and character.

The annexation of Hawaii makes a definite break in our tradition, but one which can be plausibly construed as a broader application of the accepted principle. Islands for the most part belong to one continent or another, and in carefully considered schemes of development and defence, must be so included. In the age of naval supremacy in particular, outlying islands become matters of critical importance, and a controlling position on the continent implies their control. To include these island outposts is merely to

define more accurately the continent itself. No sane American strategist can consent to the exclusion of the Hawaiian Islands, any more than a European strategist could yield the Azores or the Canaries.

But clear as is this reasoning, it was far reaching in its implications. If Hawaii was necessary, by the same token Cuba and all the West Indies were required to safeguard our position. There were not wanting those who perceived the logic of this annexation, and thus began the argument which culminated in the Treaty of Paris.

The American people, however, did not at once feel it necessary to be logical. Logic is at best usually an afterthought in such cases. It is concrete situations that count. A concrete situation had arisen in Hawaii, and something had to be done about it. Other islands might be the same logically, but they did not present the same concrete situation. Perhaps they never would do so. It was enough to deal with such situations when they presented themselves. The American people do not cross bridges until they come to them.

But once the barrier of our continental tradition was broken down, our farther expansion went with a rush. In principle, every vestige of conservatism was thrown to the winds in an almost unnoticed transaction of this period, the annexation of Tutuila, one of the Samoan Islands. It would be difficult to find in the whole history of imperialism, American or any other, a more unpremeditated result or a more flagrant disregard of accepted principles or even of the considerations of ordinary prudence. Through-

out the whole transaction extending over more than a score of years, we were represented by unauthorized persons, or by persons who exceeded their authority. Yet we allowed ourselves to be bound by their action, as indeed we had to do, piling up a record of audacities, outrages, blunders, and reckless ventures in international bluff and co-operation, joining with Germany to coerce Britain, and then with Britain to coerce Germany, repeatedly resorting to armed intervention, even against European powers, till the tangle became such that only the parcelling out of the islands and their full annexation could extricate us from confusion, and save the one-time peaceful islands from hopeless anarchy. The incident is unique in our own history, but fairly typical of much that has happened in the history of other nations. The outsider is apt to look upon such transactions as deliberate scheming, their incidents of hesitation and protest being interpreted as hypocritical dissembling. In fact even such deliberately imperialistic nations as Britain and Russia have for the most part blundered into empire, committed to unavoidable lines of action by the inconsiderateness or the unscrupulousness of their subjects.

Whatever the occasion, the result is a radical departure from our former policy. Hawaii is on our side of the Pacific, Samoa on the other. It is some five thousand miles from our nearest home port, but about two thousand from New Zealand and Australia. From the large British group of Fiji it is only a few hundred miles distant, and other British islands of less note are still nearer. In short, it is in the midst of an essentially British area. Furthermore the di-

vision of the islands gave the remaining and larger portion to Germany and thus made her our next door neighbour in a remote part of the world where both countries are necessarily represented by personal agents exercising large discretionary powers. What that may mean in the way of embroiling the two countries the earlier history of Samoa should teach us.

This is narrative, not criticism. It is probable that the acquisition in this remote region of one of the most splendid naval stations in the world was a piece of great good fortune. If we were to have the far-flung battle line, it was certainly desirable that our outposts should be the best possible — as Tutuila certainly is,—and the far-flung battle line was already a foregone conclusion.

The Samoan annexation was indeed but a minor episode in a vast imperialist movement which suddenly changed the whole current of our history. In that movement our war with Spain naturally held the centre of the stage and exercised the controlling influence over our policy. That policy now developed with startling rapidity. July 7, 1898, we consented, not without sore misgivings, to annex Hawaii. Five months later the Treaty of Paris with its epoch-making changes of policy was signed. With Guam and the Philippines in our possession, we need hardly wonder that the annexation of Samoa a year later, scarce attracted notice. The die had been cast.

We are now sufficiently removed from the Spanish war to survey it more broadly and see it in truer perspective. Thus viewed, the spectacle is not entirely edifying. Nominally, Spain was at war with a re-

bellious colony, and we were a neutral state. As a people, however, we were not neutral but aggressively partisan, both in our discussion of the issue and in the action of multitudes of our citizens. Spain was powerless to conquer Cuba and equally powerless to bring her own people to a realizing sense of their impotence. There was endless accusation, recrimination, and evasion on both sides. In her charges of unneutrality and failure to restrain our citizens, Spain had a clear case. In our lame defence we urged arguments which we had repudiated when Britain used them a generation earlier. On the other hand, when we demanded reforms, Spain was no less evasive and disingenuous. It was in fact the old conflict between legitimacy and efficiency, a conflict as old as history, but one which curiously enough is always fought under disguises. Possession is normally the product and the record of past efficiency, and present efficiency is always challenging that record. But men are not philosophers enough to plead their cause in terms of ultimate principles. Hence the sophistries and pretexts that fill the air with dust while the great unconscious instincts whose bidding we are wont to do, marshal their forces for the fray. It is useless to talk of neutrality in such cases. Sympathy owns a higher law. Judged from the standpoint of diplomatic "correctness," America had no sort of a case. Yet her mandate was one that she could neither mistake nor resist. Being compelled to state the case of ultimate principles in terms of diplomatic convention, her *apologia* sounds specious and sophistical. Fortunately, there is now no such necessity. We can put

it bluntly. Spain had made a sorry mess of it, and we had lost patience and were determined to make an end of her rule. That is a dangerous philosophy for nations to talk out loud. It works havoc with the instincts of courtesy and the conventions of deference whose restraints are vital to the comities of men. But as a mute intuition working in the twilight of half consciousness, it is the instrument of the great renewer. Our war with Spain was one of the best justified of all wars.

All interest centred in Cuba, the great struggling, suffering, half human thing. Sympathy was hers, and we called for her release. Beyond that we neither thought nor willed. In perfect accord with the national attitude President McKinley, after an exhausting exercise of patience, recommended intervention in behalf of Cuba and of humanity, and the more than ready Congress declared war upon Spain, taking pains to stipulate "that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." Despite the cynicism of foreign critics, there can not be a reasonable doubt that this declaration was sincere and that perfectly sincere efforts have been made from beginning to end to redeem the pledge. Strikingly similar was the action and the intention of Britain when Egypt was occupied a few years earlier. It remains to be seen whether Cuba will become another Egypt.

But though, in beginning the war, our thought and purpose were limited to Cuba, it was quite impossible thus to limit our action. We were at war with Spain, and war knows but one law. The enemy must be attacked and crippled wherever possible. Spain had other possessions in the Western Hemisphere, notably Porto Rico, and to leave this nearby island in the enemy's hands as a base of operations and source of supplies was not to be thought of. Hence the prompt occupation of Porto Rico, and following the occupation, the inevitable appeal to the imagination and enlargement of the imperial horizon. We had not thought about Porto Rico before, but now that we did think about it, what should be done with it. The inefficiency and mismanagement which were the grounds of our war with Spain, were quite as manifest in Porto Rico as in Cuba, and there was as little hope of amendment in the one case as in the other. The smaller island had not revolted, but permanent content, the only guaranty of genuine peace, was not to be thought of. If disorder had forced us to intervene in Cuba, it would force us to intervene in Porto Rico. To expel Spain from one island and leave her in the other was simply to do the thing in instalments, a method recommended by neither economy nor humanity. The logic of the situation was inexorable.

But if Spain was to leave, what was to become of Porto Rico? Cuba was to be independent. We had promised that in the days of our liberty enthusiasm. But to Porto Rico we had made no promises and were therefore free to follow our bent. Somehow the analogy of Cuba did not commend itself. The island

was smaller; there had been no revolt, no blow for freedom; our occupation had been welcomed; we needed a naval station and became suddenly aware that Porto Rico was a strategic site, and — but what need to enumerate? The inclination to annex Porto Rico was overwhelming, and much less satisfactory reasons would have sufficed. Undoubtedly it was the wise thing to do, the only thing to do, the thing that any nation that has ever commanded the respect of posterity would have done. But it was not the less an innovation and an inadvertence. We did not enter upon the war for the sake of colonies and empire, but the war brought us colonies and empire just the same. That is the way that empires grow, our empire and other empires. Premeditated empires are seldom realized. Nowhere does intention count for so little.

If we seek a more striking illustration of this overmastering power of the logic of events, this same war can furnish it. It was quickly realized that Spain's chief power to injure us was in raiding our commerce. In the Far East where our commerce was considerable, she had both ships and a naval base. It was indispensable that our Pacific squadron should if possible destroy the Spanish ships at Manila before the raiding began. This, to be sure, had not entered into the plans of those who had summoned us to put an end to misgovernment in Cuba, but in willing the end, they could hardly be expected to take up the question of the ways and means. It was easy to see, however, that this had to be done. We had not thought about the Philippines, scarcely knew, indeed, that

there were such things, but when a study of the map disclosed the fact that there were Spanish possessions in this part of the world, and that there were cruisers there ready to raid our commerce, we of course saw that we must destroy those cruisers.

So the cruisers were destroyed and then we were again faced with a situation that we had not foreseen. Spanish rule in the Philippines was not essentially different from what it was in Cuba and not much more popular. The fleet that we had destroyed had been its support. Without the fleet there could be no Spanish government, and under the circumstances, no government of any kind. Anarchy meant massacre and all the horrors that come when savagery, long held in leash, again has its chance at those it hates. We had not thought about that when we destroyed those cruisers to protect our commerce. Some of us, far from the scene, were loath to think about it afterward. But those who were there had to think about it, and could do only one thing. They must maintain the order whose support they had destroyed.

For this reason Dewey remained. For this reason, perhaps, he "interrupted" the cable lest unconscious Washington should veto his decision or call him home. For this reason he raised our flag in Manila. For this reason,— *and for other reasons*,— we are in the Philippines today.

It was only a question of giving time enough for the imagination to picture that battle in the shimmering light of that tropical sea, and Old Glory waving from the venerable ramparts of sleepy Manila, and retreat

became impossible. We never had thought about it, surely, but now that we did think about it, how important to have a naval station in the Far East where our cruisers could protect our commerce and be on hand for other possible emergencies such as this. How plain our duty to redeem these islands from Spanish misrule as well as those near our shores. How providential the opportunity which brought eight million Asiatics to the missionary and the teacher instead of forcing their ministry to wait for a grudging hearing. What possibilities for commerce, for exploitation, for organization, for philanthropy, for — In short, we were in the mood to stay, and we drafted soldier, ruler, merchant, and priest into the service of justifying our choice.

The task was not easy. The Philippines do not, like Porto Rico, stand guard at the gateway of our homeland. They guard the entrance to a remote and different world. To us here at home they are hardly a defence. They are rather a thing to be defended, and that at a distance and against possible claimants near at hand. Their value depends all upon our farther policy. If we are minded to push our battle line out to this front of the far eastern world, to plant our naval stations in every sea and police the planet with our sentinels, then the Philippines are a brave beginning. But we had not planned to do that. We had not thought we wished to do it. Nay, up to the very time when it all happened, we had not wished it. We had resolved to free Cuba and to abate a standing nuisance in our neighbourhood. And lo, here we find ourselves in Malay land, deep enmeshed

in the tangled web of the East. It may all be fortunate, but it certainly was not intended. If in advance, any one had proposed to annex the Philippines we should have questioned his sanity.

The decision once reached to annex the Philippines, the treaty was framed with intelligent regard to the true situation. Manila could not fail to be a naval station of importance, and all precautions were taken against its isolation. The commercial route to the Philippines is usually a roundabout one, for ships find it advisable to touch at Japanese and Chinese ports as well as at Manila. But for naval and military purposes a direct route is preferable. Hawaii lies on this direct route about three thousand miles from our shores. In the six or seven thousand miles from Hawaii to Manila an intermediate station was desired. This was supplied by the island of Guam which Spain was also compelled to yield. With the annexation of Tutuila a year later, the United States completed its system of stepping stones across the Pacific, Hawaii for Japan, Hawaii and Guam for Manila, and Hawaii and Tutuila for New Zealand and Australia. Britain herself could not have chosen them better. She had been our teacher, and we had not sat at her feet in vain.

It is all so natural, yet all so unexpected, so momentous. Two years before, ours was a republic, home staying and with no thought but to continue so. And now an empire had arisen, an empire of which we had been the builders, but not the architect.

CHAPTER VIII

AFTERTHOUGHT AND EMPIRE

THE nineteenth century, which had witnessed the expansion of the American Republic from the Atlantic to the Pacific, might seemingly have been content to leave it within those safe limits. Nevertheless at the very close the irrepressible American temper slipped the leash, and the conservative policy of the century was abandoned. Hawaii was annexed July 6, 1898. Seven months later the treaty of Paris gave us Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and suzerainty over Cuba. On January 16, 1900, we were formally installed in Samoa. Thus in the short space of eighteen months we had pushed our frontier out many thousands of miles, enmeshing it with the frontiers of the great powers of Europe, and necessarily revolutionizing our relation with other powers and modifying the strategy of our national defence.

But changes far more serious than those of boundary or strategy were involved in these annexations. Our whole political philosophy underwent a radical change. We had believed in a compact territory, and had thought to stay within the limits, or at least within the lee, of our continent, but we had annexed Samoa. We had learned to prize race homogeneity, but Porto Rico seemed certain to remain Spanish. We averred that "governments derive their just

powers from the consent of the governed," but we had coerced the Filipinos. We had pinned our faith to democracy, the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, but we refused to admit even Hawaii to the privileges of statehood. We could annex Constantinople or Finland on the strength of such analogies as these.

These things are not said in criticism. Philosophies have no prescriptive rights over life. They are for the most part little more than the shadows which events cast in passing. Our earlier philosophy had been simple and idyllic, blissfully unconscious of necessities which we had not yet experienced. It served us till our broadening life brought necessities that it could not meet, and then with but moderate protest it released us from our allegiance.

"New occasions teach new duties,
Time makes ancient good uncouth.
They must upward still and onward
Who would keep abreast of truth."

There is no saving grace in an inherited rule of thumb.

As a matter of fact, the disintegration of this early philosophy had begun long before. We had never asked the consent of the peoples whom we had annexed, and in the only case where such consent was clearly expressed,—that of the Danish West Indies in 1868,—we had refused annexation. Even then, Seward had positively refused to make annexation dependent on consent of the islands. Possibly he realized that after our reconstruction of the South following the Civil War, the less said about consent

of the governed the better. Consent is the reward of just government, not its preliminary.

Nor had we shown much concern about race homogeneity when we annexed Spanish Florida and northern Mexico. It was doubtless realized that American immigration would assimilate these Spanish populations, but there is little evidence that this was felt to be necessary. Similarly, in annexing Alaska, we did violence to our tacit doctrine of continuous territory, but trusted to a future annexation of Canada to re-establish it.

In short, we had always taken long chances with our political principles, and trusted to the future to restore temporary breaches. Our only fixed rule of action had been to meet each situation on its own merits. This we kept right on doing, careless of outward consistency. There were very good reasons for our action, special and particular reasons in each particular case, reasons which appealed to sane and practical men. So we did the needful each time as we saw it, letting our philosophy adjust itself to the new situation as it had previously done to the old. That is, we gave to the great instincts of race assertion and human sympathy, precedence over traditions born of accidental situation and local experience. These traditions of course made a respectable but a rapidly diminishing protest. It took years of bitter struggle to annex Hawaii, months to ratify the treaty of Paris, while Samoa, most doubtful of them all, was a matter only of days, time enough for the bare necessities of Senatorial routine. We had crossed our Rubicon and America was an empire.

These things accomplished, there is little occasion to comment on subsequent annexations. The Canal Zone was acquired by "perpetual lease" from the Republic of Panama by treaty signed in 1903 and ratified February 23, 1904. This insignificant area probably surpasses in value, and in its influence upon our national policy, all other acquisitions since 1848, as we shall soon have occasion to note. It bears somewhat the same relation to the American empire that Gibraltar bears to the British, a trifling territory vital to our very existence, the object of intense desire to our rivals and of all our possessions the one where our right is most likely to be challenged. Nowhere else in our entire domain are the necessities and the responsibilities of empire, and the inadequacy of our earlier philosophy so manifest as in Panama.

Finally, at the moment of writing, we have to note the acquisition of the Danish West Indies. The price is large,—far larger than Seward asked us to pay half a century ago,—but no one doubts the wisdom of the purchase. We have at last become conscious of the dangers and the strategic necessities of our position. There is a beginning of that imperial mind without which an imperial domain is an anomaly and a peril. It is possible that we shall make little use of the magnificent harbour and potential naval station which the Islands offer, but we must at least make sure that no enemy uses them against us. The Canal is the magnet which attracts the steel of Europe to our shores. At all costs it must be protected from those whose ambitions menace our existence. So reasons our newly awakened consciousness.

Once more, expansion seems to have reached its limit. It may truthfully be said that no further annexations are contemplated. Nor is it probable that circumstances will again force our hand. All thought of union with Canada, the one really attractive prospect, has been abandoned. Acquisitions of territory in the old world are almost unthinkable, despite the possibilities which the world war suggests. Latin America still troubles us, but if the present war forestalls European intervention there, we shall have as little occasion, as we now have inclination, to extend our rule in this quarter. It is occasionally proposed that we acquire the British West Indies in exchange for the Philippines, but in this matter of dependent peoples, Britain has outlived the age of barter if we have not. It is altogether possible that the age of annexation is at an end.

The age of annexation but not the age of imperialism. Imperialism is a permanent process, annexation a passing phase. Annexation is suitable for a harsh and primitive age, or for empty territories, or for territories favourably disposed, but in this age of the world the empire builder who knows no method but annexation, would not get very far. If we are done with annexation, that only means that we have learned a subtler art.

As the nineteenth century exerted itself to complete the task of the primitive imperialist era, so the twentieth century hastened to inaugurate the new era. The century was but two months old when Congress on March 1, 1901, enacted the famous "Platt Amendment," defining our relations with Cuba. The act,

passed under this unobtrusive name, was destined to become, next to the Federal Constitution, perhaps the most important document in the history of the United States.

It has been noted that the Cuban struggle for independence was the occasion of our war with Spain, and that in entering the conflict we pledged ourselves to establish that independence and to hand over Cuba to the control of her own people as soon as conditions would permit. We promised this readily and sincerely, and quite as much to remove our own apprehension as that of the Cubans. We had as yet no overseas possessions, and had just rejected with emphasis the petition of the Hawaiians for annexation, listening the while to words of scathing denunciation from President Cleveland on this and all similar projects. We probably thought we agreed with him. We have always stoutly maintained such principles except when circumstances called for their temporary abandonment. We distinctly disapprove of crossing bridges as an abstract proposition. It is only when we come to them that we make an exception. We came to the Hawaiian bridge very soon after, when war was really upon us, and we crossed it without hesitation, but for the present we disapproved. So much the more the Cuban bridge which was not yet in sight. So we cheerfully promised never to cross it. We fully meant it. We sympathized with the sore-stricken people, and we still had something of our former easy faith in independence as a panacea. Besides, we instinctively felt the advantage, before the world and before ourselves, of a disinterested pro-

gram. Has not even Germany sought the rôle of champion of the independence of little nations?

There can be little question that the acquisitions which speedily followed effected a considerable change in American sentiment on this point. There was more to be said for the annexation of Cuba than for that of Porto Rico, and vastly more than for that of the Philippines or Samoa. Yet all these were annexed, while Cuba was "freed." The promise stood in the way of annexation. There were not wanting those who saw the anomaly and favoured the repudiation of the pledge on the plausible ground of the welfare of Cuba herself, and such sentiments were more manifest in Havana than here. European observers accepted annexation as a foregone conclusion, remembering Egypt, Finland, and the like. Further protestations of our purpose were the subject of cynical levity. Had we had the cynicism so frankly manifested by our critics, we should doubtless have done as they predicted. We have done things quite as bad as this,—perhaps should have done this under different leadership,—but under Roosevelt we kept our promise and withdrew from Cuba.

But it was impossible to be unconscious, as we had formerly been, of our own interest in Cuba. The war had taught us that Cuba, feeble as she was, might be our undoing. Moreover, our two or three years of military occupation had been years of busy effort and of almost magical transformation. The dark little land of a few years before was now illuminated by the play of our national imagination, and we decided to make our withdrawal conditioned upon the protection

of our interests and the perpetuation of our beneficent work. This was putting a liberal construction on our promise, but not an unpalatable one. We had promised to leave Cuba to her own people when her "pacification was accomplished," an elastic condition which it necessarily rested with us to define. It could be interpreted narrowly, as the mere suppression of disorder in the island, or broadly, as the establishment of conditions which would insure permanent peace in Cuba and the adjacent territories under her influence. There was the usual difference of opinion between the literalist and the rationalist, a difference that has always been with us and which, in every crisis of our history, has been decided in favour of the latter. The decision in this case was comparatively easy. To withdraw as soon as Cuba was quiet but while conditions were such as to inspire a speedy recurrence of disorder, would be crying peace! peace! when there was no peace. Pacification must be more than temporary quiet, if it was to have any significance as a condition of self-government. It is the product of slow development, economic, social, and political, as Britain has found in Egypt, and we might legitimately have stayed indefinitely as she has done, waiting for the elusive condition. We chose a unique alternative.

The Amendment provides, (1) that Cuba shall enter into no compromising arrangements with foreign powers, (2) that she shall contract no debt which can not be paid out of current revenues, (3) that the United States may intervene to preserve Cuban independence, enforce treaty obligations, and ensure a government able to protect property and life, (4) that

all acts of the American government be validated, (5) that American sanitary regulations be enforced, and (6) that Cuba sell or lease to the United States sites for two naval stations. The requirements were in effect somewhat more exacting than this brief summary would indicate, paragraphs 1 and 3 being particularly comprehensive. The United States retains virtually complete control of foreign relations, and may intervene to correct almost any condition which she judges to be seriously unsatisfactory, her naval bases on opposite sides of the island serving practically as garrison posts for the exercise of her control. That these provisions were seriously meant is indicated by the fact that the right of intervention has been exercised repeatedly, once to the extent of superseding the regular government for a considerable period.

Cuban politicians were quick to see the purport of the Amendment and to protest that it destroyed the independence which the United States had promised and which we purported to be giving. With great reluctance they accepted the unwelcome conditions, appending certain "interpretations" thereto which were calculated somewhat to lessen their rigour. It was all in vain. They were informed that the acceptance must be unqualified, and they finally yielded with bad grace.

There were not wanting objectors at home who declared that under the Amendment Cuba would not be independent, but would be a protectorate. This the author of the Amendment stoutly denied. Both were right, but the objector had the better case. Techni-

cally Cuba is not a protectorate, for protectorates do not ordinarily define and limit the powers of suzerain and dependent as is done in this case. Nor are the relations as here defined altogether such as are traditional in cases of that kind. A protectorate governed by a written constitution is in a sense unique and perhaps marks a significant advance in the art of imperial organization.

But all this is beside the mark, however important. In his main contention the objector was right. Cuba may not be technically a protectorate, but Cuba is not independent. She can not negotiate with foreign powers, she can not borrow money, she can not even manage her home affairs or conduct her housekeeping, except under the supervision of her suzerain and within the narrow limits prescribed by the agreement. Her territory is virtually garrisoned by the suzerain's forces who reserves the right to intervene practically at discretion. We may not join in the objector's protest, but we must concede the essential correctness of his analysis. Cuba inaugurates a new era in American imperialism.

Before considering the consequences that have followed from this epoch making arrangement, it is well to consider its adaptation to the conditions with which we had to deal. The interests of the United States were vital, and the Platt Amendment shows both a clear appreciation of them and a rare wisdom in adapting means to ends.

It was first of all necessary that Cuba should not be occupied or in any way controlled by a foreign power with whom America might be at war. It is

beyond question the best base in existence for an attack upon the United States with the exception of Canada. There are many ways in which a foreign power might get a foothold in such a country, ways against which Cuba unaided would be quite unable to protect herself. There was indeed much reason to fear that an independent Cuba with its inevitable misgovernment, would be in more or less constant trouble with the United States, and that a short sighted resentment would lead it to throw itself into the arms of a power hostile to the United States. This possibility, so painfully suggested by recent conditions in Mexico, was foreseen and forestalled, not merely by pledging Cuba to a policy of aloofness, but by a series of provisions calculated to secure the fulfilment of that pledge. The naval stations at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda undoubtedly serve general naval purposes, but it can not be doubted that their chief purpose is to protect Cuba against foreign occupation. Similarly, the provision that Cuba should contract no debts which she could not pay out of current revenues, was designed to avoid occasions for foreign intervention. Finally, the somewhat extraordinary provision for intervention to suppress disorder, though designed in part to protect American property and prevent friction between the two countries, had also as its chief purpose the forestalling of foreign intervention.

All this will be clear if we note the way things work in countries similar to Cuba where no such safeguards exist. Let us suppose such a country organized after the fashion of a republic and influenced

by its example. The temptation to showy public expenditure and unremunerative public works is strong. Even if honest,—a somewhat rare condition in Caribbean lands,—the government soon contracts debts which it cannot pay. With impaired credit, it now begins to mortgage its revenues. A new loan is contracted for the payment of which the customs receipts are pledged. Then local discontent results in a revolution. As a military or political movement this is farcical, but its financial aspect is often serious. The revolutionists, always impecunious, desire to fill their war chest and empty that of their enemies. The favourite move is to seize the customs house where, of all places, ready money is most likely to be found. But this money is pledged to foreign creditors whose interests the government is under obligation to protect. If in addition to this seizure of funds, citizens of the same country have had their buildings burned and have perhaps lost their lives in the disorders, even the most reluctant government can hardly evade the obligation to intervene. When, instead of being reluctant, the government in question is looking eagerly for a pretext for occupation, it will readily be understood that these disorders may have the gravest political consequences.

Things like these had happened time and again in the pseudo-republics in the neighbourhood of Cuba, save only the fatal intervention, and this had been prevented only by the protest of the United States backed up by favouring conditions in Europe of which Americans have been singularly unconscious. In a word, we had again and again been threatened,— and

were still threatened,— with unwelcome neighbours in the Caribbean, when the problem of Cuban independence came before us. We had impulsively decided to free Cuba, and had pledged ourselves to grant her independence. And then, with the reflection that follows impulse, it became clear that independence was not a thing to be granted or withheld, but a thing dependent upon deep underlying conditions. Judged by this deeper test, Cuba was not and could not be independent. No country as small as Cuba and situated as Cuba is, could be independent, even if its people were wholly wise, a condition which the Cubans hardly fulfilled. This necessary dependence of Cuba once perceived, it was merely a question upon whom Cuba should depend. There was but one sane answer to such a question. Cuba must be dependent upon the United States and independent of other powers. To this end, there must be no imprudent debts, no alliances or treacherous understandings, no disorders or pretexts for intervention. And for the attainment of these ends we must rely, not on promises and good intentions, but upon garrisoned posts and authorized intervention. The Platt Amendment was merely the formal recognition of facts which none had created and which none had power to alter. Our only choice lay between frank recognition and the ostrich policy of voluntary unconsciousness, a policy which would have left the great necessities unaltered, but would have resulted in endless bickering, heart burning, and perhaps in irretrievable disaster.

One provision of the Amendment stands quite apart

from all the foregoing, and is in fact hardly relevant to our inquiry. Our temporary occupation, coinciding as it did with epoch-making discoveries concerning the origin and nature of tropical diseases, had enabled us virtually to eliminate yellow fever, one of the most terrible scourges that ever devastated our territories. This result could be maintained only by the vigilant enforcement of regulations then in force. With any people competent to manage their own affairs and inherently capable of independence, such enforcement would have been a matter of course. Our Congress, however, deemed it necessary to stipulate that these regulations should continue in force. It is significant that this was one of the demands to which the Cubans took exception. Of course the objection was based, not on the end sought, but on the method adopted. They wished to reserve the right to adopt some other system of sanitation. Stripped of its dissembling, this meant that they were willing to will the end but not the means. Sanitary regulations are notoriously irksome to a people of low development. There is nothing from which denizens of the tropics suffer so much as from filth, but there is nothing with which they are so loath to part. Cleanliness implies thoughtfulness, restraint, and sacrifice of immediate comfort. Filth is the concomitant of careless ease. But the filth of the tropics means the blight of the world, and in this, as in so much else, the men of the tropics must forego the privileges that are congenial to their nature.

CHAPTER IX

THE AFTERMATH OF PANAMA

THE clear perception and definition of our relation to Cuba was made possible by our military occupation of that country and the obligation thus imposed upon us for a considerable time of administering the country and studying its needs. But for this war, while the problem would have been the same, there would have been nothing to overcome the inertia which always retards action in such cases. We should have allowed Cuba to blunder on, compromising herself and us to any extent, until finally the presence of imminent peril would have roused us to a tardy recognition and a painful assertion of our inevitable interests. As it was, the relation was defined and established under singularly favourable conditions.

It was inevitable, however, that this arrangement should suggest the problem of other states similarly situated. For instance, if it was all important that Cuba should not become a base for German hostility, or a breeding ground of pestilence, was it not equally necessary that precautions be taken regarding Hayti or the Central American states? A yellow fever victim would derive little consolation from the assurance that his germs were not of Cuban, but of Haytian origin. Conceivably, too, a German expeditionary

force might reconcile itself to temporary exclusion from Cuba, if a convenient base were available in Santo Domingo or Honduras.

In a word, the policy adopted with regard to Cuba, though perfectly sound and necessary to the protection of our most vital national interests, was of little value unless it was generally applied. The perception of this fact was speedily manifest in an effort to extend some form of American protectorate over the Caribbean region.

This effort was immensely stimulated and its scope extended by the decision of the United States to build the Panama Canal. The Canal was in any case an inherent necessity, commercial and military, of our geographical situation. It is certain, too, that in its vast influence upon our national and commercial development, shifting the centre of population and business enterprise, as all such things do, it will make itself ever more necessary, an indispensable condition of the life that it will create. And just as it becomes a necessity to us, it becomes the inevitable objective of any attack upon us, for the essence of attack is always to strike the vital necessities of the enemy. Moreover the international character of the canal traffic makes its control by an enemy or a rival a matter of immense positive advantage. Imagine the possibilities, merely from a business standpoint, of German occupation of the Canal with power to levy discriminating tolls at discretion.

The Canal is at a distance from our borders, and it can be attacked and defended only by sea. It can not be too often insisted that all effective naval opera-

tions are short range operations. It is possible for a European navy to steam to the Panama Canal, but unless it had the rare good fortune to meet and destroy its antagonist at once, it would quickly exhaust its coal and other supplies and be reduced to impotence. Against an enemy that played the waiting game, its chances would be small unless it had near by a vast accumulation of coal, food, munitions, and reserves of men, with opportunities for repair and refitting, all accessible and under protection. This is the meaning of the oft mentioned but popularly ignored naval base.

It is therefore the obvious policy of the United States, if it wishes effectually to defend the Canal, to prevent the establishment in its vicinity, of hostile naval bases. This can mean nothing less than the control of the entire Caribbean Sea on the east,— for any one of its myriad islands and of its adjacent coasts is near enough to serve as a hostile base,— and on the west to control the few neighbouring islands and the adjacent coasts for a considerable distance to the north and to the south of the Canal. This control, of course, does not necessarily imply occupation. It may take any form which we can be sure will guarantee the result. Occupation by a powerful and friendly power may conceivably be satisfactory. It is in any case our necessary reliance in the case of Jamaica and a large number of other islands under British rule. But where we doubt the power of a nation, however friendly, as in the case of Denmark, or where we doubt both power and good will, as in the case of some of these local independent states, we

are constrained to seek other guaranties or incur the obvious risk.

It was quickly perceived that the Platt Amendment was the ideal thing for the safeguarding of our interests in this region. To prohibit foreign alliances, debts, and revolutions, and insure their elimination by a limited occupation, was at once the adequate provision for our needs and the irreducible minimum of our requirement. This involved no interference in legitimate internal affairs, and at the same time it offered the priceless advantage of our protection.

But the application of the new principle to countries recognized as completely independent presented serious difficulties. Outside control is not a thing that is welcomed by even the weakest and most incompetent of peoples. Much more serious, however, was the reluctance of our own people to assume the responsibilities involved, and above all, deliberately to impair the seeming independence of peoples long recognized as free. It was the conflict between the early ideals of our people and the new born consciousness of their vital needs. Unfortunately this conflict of ideas and of temperaments, difficult to manage at the best, was complicated by its coincidence with other issues on which parties had divided with extreme bitterness. As in Johnson's and Grant's administrations, feeling had become so bitter that men were willing to defeat measures which they approved, merely to checkmate the administration. The vote on the Caribbean treaties, in some cases at least, did not reflect the feeling of either Congress or the country.

But the objections of the one side and of the other

to the establishment of formal relations of dependence with certain of these countries were soon overborne by the development of perilous conditions arising from their helplessness and demoralization. Santo Domingo, whose request for annexation as a state had been refused in Grant's time, proceeded rapidly to force our hand. The republic became hopelessly bankrupt, while petty revolutions continually robbed industry of its fruits. An acquaintance of the writer who lived long in Santo Domingo, thus relates his experiences. "I have lived through five of these revolutions and have never heard a shot fired. I knew the leader of one of them. He confided in me that he had gotten three thousand dollars and was going to start a revolution. Later he and his army made me a call. There were thirty-one of them, five of them being generals. I treated them all to coffee, and after that, when they robbed the mails, they always sent me my letters." It would be difficult for burlesque to go much farther, but in a country whose military defences were on much the same scale, and where the soldiers of the realm were likely to join the revolution if it promised excitement, such disturbances were a fatal obstacle to industrial and political development.

In 1904 an American company in Santo Domingo was awarded large claims against the government by an arbitration commission and a lien on the customs receipts. This at once brought up other claims, until in 1905 the United States was compelled to intervene or permit other nations to do so. The affairs of the country were taken in hand exactly like those of a

defunct railway company, a receiver being appointed who collected the revenues, gave the government a stipulated allowance, and devoted the balance to paying the nation's debts. Its authority was at first nothing more than the moral backing of the United States. It was immensely successful, the natural resources of the country being rapidly developed under these wholesome conditions.

On its face, this arrangement was altogether unlike that with Cuba. It said nothing about relations with foreign powers, asked for no naval station, did not mention intervention, and required nothing with regard to sanitation. It was purely financial and temporary. Our Senate would not have sanctioned anything more at this time. It would not have sanctioned even this if it had not been rather drawn into it in an effort to redress the extensive grievances of an American company. But it seems to be a law of international relations that these things never stop where you intend them to stop. The financial arrangement worked beautifully. The revenues increased, legitimate requirements were met, and rapid progress was made toward payment of the debt. But with the elimination of revolutions and plunder, life seemed to have lost its zest for Dominicans of a certain type. Smouldering discontent broke forth into revolution in 1912, the custom-house being as usual the storm centre, and the difficulties were adjusted only with great difficulty and with the aid of a special commission. The storm broke again in 1914 and more seriously. This time a German cruiser was hurried to the scene to "protect German interests,"

a purpose which it was already suspected was susceptible of broad interpretation. In alarm, our government hurried a considerable fleet of warships to Dominican waters, and order was restored by a substantial intervention with bombardment of rebel batteries.

It was clear that something more than a peaceful receivership was needed, but it was with extreme and perilous reluctance that we at last faced the situation. It had long been our policy to soothe Latin-American sensibilities. And besides, we had our prepossession in favour of independent republics. In 1911 President Taft had negotiated treaties similar to the then flourishing Santo Domingo arrangement, with Honduras and Nicaragua, countries utterly bankrupt and threatened with foreign intervention, but the Senate refused to ratify them. The rejection of an even more advantageous treaty with Nicaragua in 1913 was followed by a disastrous revolution. While the rejection of these treaties was largely a matter of that factional spite which has so often complicated our foreign policy, there can be no question that it implied an unreadiness on our part to embark deliberately upon a protectorate policy. We had made a start in Cuba and in Santo Domingo, both rather unwittingly, and we consented to see the thing through, but to adopt the general policy of managing the affairs of all neighbour peoples who did not know how to manage their own was something for which we were emphatically unprepared. There remained, of course, the embarrassing question. "If they can't manage them and we don't manage them, what

then?" It is our way not to answer such questions until we have to. When the German cruiser came, we had to answer.

But the cruiser was not all. An announcement was made at this time in a joint note from Germany and France which, though almost unnoticed by our care-free people, must have given our government food for thought. Hayti, like all her sister pseudo-republics, was bankrupt, and a receivership was plainly impending. This announcement was to the effect that if intervention in the affairs of Hayti should become necessary, *the intervention of a single power would not be satisfactory*. This was the most direct challenge that the Monroe Doctrine had received in the ninety-one years since its proclamation. The American receivership in Santo Domingo had been a conspicuous success, and save for our reluctance to intervene by force of arms, it would be difficult to allege a reason why it should not be extended, if need be, to the Haytian end of the island. The only possible conclusion is that the protesting powers regarded the receivership as likely to lead to something more, and they were right. But the clear intimation that they claimed a share in these perquisites of West Indian reconstruction, had far reaching implications. The incident was speedily lost sight of in the infinite calamity of the world war, and we have scarcely realized how narrow was our escape from complications that now appal the imagination.

The danger has passed for the moment. Germany and France are not sending joint notes just now, and they have other cares than the Monroe Doctrine.

But the incident has effected a change in our attitude which nothing else could have brought about. This is reflected in our latest Caribbean treaties, treaties that are the result, not of military occupation like that with Cuba, nor of a financial arbitration like that with Santo Domingo, but of a clear recognition of standing peril such as confronted us in Hayti at the time of the joint note.

Appropriately enough, the chief of these treaties is with Hayti. This treaty, combining the essential features of the Dominican receivership and of the permanent relation with Cuba, adds certain important features which mark a great advance and greatly enhance our control. The treaty is furthermore a masterpiece of diplomacy in its handling of Haytian susceptibilities. It contains the now familiar provisions regarding alienation of territory to foreign powers, the contracting of debts, and the maintenance of sanitary conditions. It also establishes a receivership but this is a somewhat more elaborate affair than that of Santo Domingo, and plainly recalls British example. There is to be a "receiver" and also a "financial adviser" to the administration. The function of the one would seem to be to collect and disburse revenue, that of the other to "advise" the government as to all investments, taxes, expenditures, and so forth, it being stipulated that the expenses of the receivership are to be paid first, and debts next, the native government being provided for out of the remainder.

The most important innovation, however, is the establishment of a native constabulary, urban and

rural, *under American officers* for the maintenance of order. Experience has abundantly proved that such a constabulary in the hands of British or American officers, can be made absolutely loyal to the dominant race. It rapidly acquires a prestige and caste character of which it is immensely proud, and which makes any collusion with its own race for purposes subversive of the established order, altogether unlikely. This, therefore, is tantamount to full American police control. All the officials thus provided for are to report to "the presidents of both republics." Finally, both countries, separately and specifically, pledge their "aid" to any extent that may be required, to the authorities thus established.

A most important feature of this treaty, and one which shows both the progress made since Cuban days and the unconscious acceptance of our larger responsibility, is the diplomatic form of its phraseology. The Platt Amendment is brutally frank. Cuba *must* and *shall*, or we will "intervene." No wonder the Cubans saw in this the negation of their independence. But in Hayti the two governments "co-operate" to establish the necessary institutions. All functionaries are "appointed" by the Haytian government on "recommendation" of the President of the United States. The United States will not "intervene," but will "aid,"—both governments will aid,—the newly established authorities. The American government will assert no authority, but its representatives will "advise" the Haytian government. It is easy to see in the American officered Haytian constabulary something very like the native troops of India and Egypt,

while the "financial adviser" is obviously the "resident," so familiar in the native principalities of India or in the Federated Malay States. But these British terms, though originally chosen for their innocuousness, are avoided. The secret is out that these terms connote real authority. That might alarm the Haytians. It would alarm Americans still more.

This latest development of American imperialism is therefore in many ways sharply contrasted with our earlier timid ventures. It is the first frank recognition of the inability of such countries as Hayti to govern themselves, of the necessity of preserving order and security in territories so situated under existing world conditions, and the inadmissibility of allowing any nation but ourselves to undertake the task, propositions hardly to be questioned save by those who reject all the principles upon which the present world order is based. The treaty not only recognizes the essential principles of the Platt Amendment, now become the constitution of the American empire, but it establishes American control, not potential as in the case of Cuba, but actual and comprehensive, not only over the finances and general policy of the government, but even over its local police. Cuba is allowed to appoint her own officials, to collect and disburse her own revenues, and to police her own territories, with only the warning that we shall "intervene" if she does not do these things satisfactorily. And since intervention is a very cumbersome and costly expedient, and one which is highly distasteful to both parties, Cuba is in fact free to indulge to a considerable extent in tropical politics without feeling our

heavy hand. She has neither the annoyance nor yet the assistance of an "adviser," though we may perhaps assume that the position of American representative in Cuba is one of delicate responsibility. Our relation with Cuba thus insures only an emergency control, a disadvantage, beyond doubt, as regards the immediate ends of government, but possibly an advantage in the end. In any case the freer relation was appropriate to the conditions under which it was established. Cuba did not come to us bankrupt, mortgaged to foreign creditors, and demoralized by a century of independence. No doubt these conditions would have appeared promptly if Cuba had been free to do as she chose. But as they were not present, and as our obvious concern was to protect ourselves and avoid foreign complications for our necessary protégé, we have wisely limited ourselves to the attainment of these objects. We could undoubtedly manage Cuban affairs better than the Cubans do, but the world has learned that local administration is not the function of empire.

We had a different problem in bankrupt Santo Domingo and Hayti. We tried to meet the situation in Santo Domingo by the simple business device of a receivership, only to find the financial situation complicated by revolution and the dreaded foreign intervention. With the distinct warning of the two greatest military powers of the world that in case of further disturbances, we must share with them the privilege of intervention, we wisely decided that there must be no further disturbances. Foreign entanglements, bankruptcy, revolution and pestilence must cease in these

neighbour lands. How could we have willed less than this? And since who wills the end must will the means, we embodied our decision in this treaty with Hayti. What else could have provided the means? Lingering hopes that Hayti may sometime be self-sufficient, or perhaps just another concession to Haytian susceptibilities, limited the duration of the treaty to ten years with privilege of renewal if necessary. Renewal may be taken for granted. Hayti will be independent as Egypt will be independent, when the empire that now exercises control as a condition of its own existence, shall have ceased to exist.

In the treaty with Hayti the great principles of Caribbean protection are definitely recognized and formulated. Further application, however, though plainly inevitable, must await favourable opportunity. One case of peculiar urgency required immediate attention and was settled almost simultaneously with that of Hayti. Nicaragua was the most troubled state in Central America. In ten years there were sixteen revolutions. Finances, it is needless to say, were in a most deplorable state. All parties had come to realize the desperate condition of affairs and were praying for intervention. Nevertheless, treaties after the Santo Domingo pattern providing for a receivership under American control had been twice ignored by the United States Senate. The inertia of our continental tradition still continued, even in the face of the most imminent peril. Once more, too, the spirit of faction,—a quarrel between the President and a section of his own party,—complicated the issue. But for the war who knows what German

cruisers might have appeared upon the scene, and what complications might have arisen from our refusal to look this perilous situation in the face?

But as the terrible reality of this struggle of the nations became apparent and we slowly perceived our closer relation to it, the thoughts of the nation inevitably turned toward the problem of national defence, and in particular toward the Canal, that most vital yet most exposed part of our defensive system. It was remembered that Nicaragua offered an alternative route which we had long considered. The possibility that some other power might secure this route and construct a competing canal, meanwhile getting firm lodgment on the territory of helpless Nicaragua, like so many possibilities hitherto ignored, now became a disturbing reality. For such a transaction the avowed bankruptcy of Nicaragua and our own refusal to come to her relief furnished ample excuse, while our hesitation in fulfilling our pledge about the canal tolls furnished the sufficient pretext. Such a canal would be fortified like our own and would thus become automatically a double naval base.

Prompted by such considerations as these we negotiated and ratified in 1916, a treaty conveying to the United States in perpetuity each and every canal route across Nicaragua and leasing for ninety-nine years with option of ninety-nine more, two islands on the east coast and a naval base to be chosen at will in the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific side. In return the United States was to pay to Nicaragua the sum of \$3,000,000, but it was prudently stipulated that the money was to be deposited in an American bank

chosen by our Secretary of State and devoted to the payment of Nicaraguan debts under his supervision.

The strange thing about this treaty is its silence on the familiar principles of the Platt Amendment,—foreign entanglements, contracting debts, sanitation, and intervention. The explanation is to be found in the fact that Nicaraguan affairs were already in our hands. American troops had occupied Nicaragua for several years, while an American bank, formed for the purpose with the consent of our government, had gotten complete control of the finances and the productive assets of the hopelessly disordered state. The \$3,000,000 paid by this government had mostly been advanced by this bank, and the arrangement mentioned above was merely one of reimbursement. It would seem in effect that the administration, balked by a factious Senate, yet compelled to act to avert national disaster, had resorted to the device of creating a private receivership to do, under governmental countenance and guaranty, the work which the government was not permitted to do itself, and which it was yet impossible to neglect. Be this as it may, the work was done, and America was in control, unofficially if not officially. The treaty and its stipulated payment redeemed the obligation of the government to those who had done its work.

But the question naturally arises why the government did not at the same time assume its further functions and provide, as in Hayti, for the inevitable and necessary protectorate. The conditions prevailing in Central America apparently furnished the answer. Nicaragua is not an isolated island, but one of

a group of little states habitually jealous and often at war with one another. The necessity, both local and international, of bringing order out of this chaos, is apparent to all, but American opinions — the reflection for the most part, of individual temperament,—naturally differ as to the remedy. The one party sees hope only in a foreign protectorate,—necessarily that of the United States,—and vast and manifold are the influences constantly at work for that end. Property in particular, whether in citizen or alien hands, refuses to believe in the capacity of peoples so small, so crude, and so unfavourably situated, to provide the protection which it requires. Those also who are chiefly concerned with the fate of greater nations and who see the strategic position of these unconscious little states, naturally incline to an American protectorate as the only adequate safeguard of its vast interests.

But there is another temperament,—one possibly less impressed with actualities and more liberally endowed with imagination,—which seeks a remedy in political rehabilitation and real independence. If these people are ignorant, they must be educated; if they are thriftless, they must learn thrift in the hard school of experience; if they are small, they must gain consequence by union. A federated Central America with possible inclusion of other Latin peoples, is the logical program of this party. The practicability of this program and its relation to the problem of our national interest we have to consider in connection with the larger subject of Pan-Americanism. For the moment we are concerned only with its bearing on the treaty with Nicaragua.

An important step was taken in the direction of federation when in 1907, on the initiative of Mexico and the United States, a Central American court of justice with one representative from each Central American state, was established to decide the questions which had kept these little states in turmoil. It was fondly hoped that the existence of such a tribunal would make these incessant wars unnecessary, and by establishing peace, lead to ultimate union. These hopes were far from realized, but something was accomplished.

It will be plain that if these states were to arbitrate their quarrels among themselves, they must be free to do so. If one of them were made a protectorate, it would lose all freedom of action in foreign relations, and the others would have to deal with the big suzerain state rather than with an equal. Moreover it would put an end to all possibility of federation so far as the protected state was concerned. Since this experiment, begun at the instance of our government and under its patronage, was still in progress with some prospect of successful results, the protectorate must be held in abeyance. More exactly, since bankruptcy had made a receivership inevitable, the protectorate must remain unofficial.

But the great question of the canal with its predestined defences of island and bay, could not be thus risked. To these our government must have a title which no rival among the great powers could question. Hence these were conveyed by treaty, while the more general interests of foreign occupation, debt,

sanitation, and intervention were not "nominated in the bond" but were quietly assured in fact.

With all this deference, however, the treaty at once dealt a staggering blow to this system of incipient federation. It excited the jealousy of neighbouring states who vaguely saw in it advantages to Nicaragua which they did not share. Two of them, Salvador and Honduras, shared with Nicaragua the coast of the Gulf of Fonseca, and consequently had joint rights to its waters, while a third, Costa Rica, had for one of its boundaries the river which was to be utilized in part for the proposed canal. These states protested that Nicaragua had sold what she did not possess, and that the establishment of a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca gave control of their adjacent coasts. Salvador and Costa Rica brought suit against Nicaragua for damages before the Central American court already mentioned and won by the predestined majority of four to one. Nicaragua promptly ignored the decision. The authority of the court was plainly at an end as regards matters to which the United States was a party.

These protests seem to have been technically justified. Our Senate took no notice of them beyond asserting that it had no intention of violating the neutrality of the protesting states. The procedure was rather summary and our action possibly precipitate. It may be questioned, too, whether a joint treaty with the four powers concerned would not have given us a technically better title. But it may also be questioned whether such a treaty would have been prac-

ticable and whether the attempt to secure it would not have resulted in a series of hold-ups eventuating in extortion or in the failure of the treaty. Meanwhile Nicaragua was the all important party. If her consent was not enough to build a canal, it was at least enough to prevent any one else from doing so. And Nicaragua was necessitous and in our power. It was a very human transaction, but then, who expects our Senate to be superhuman?

Whatever the merits of this discussion, it only obscures the larger question at issue. The conflict is between opposed principles and temperaments. The one takes seriously the nominal independence of such countries and esteems as of primary importance their regulation of their own affairs. The other recognizes them as dependent, not by choice of ourselves or others, but necessarily and inherently dependent, because of their smallness, their location, their climate, and the resulting race characteristics. To the independence party, Central America is its own little world. To the imperialist party, it is but a pawn on the mighty chess board of world empire. We may sympathize with the one or the other, but we must not judge the one by the standards of the other. The United States plays the vaster game, must play it and play it well, for the stake is its existence.

CHAPTER X

THE UNFINISHED TASK

IT is difficult to follow the expansion of America in the Caribbean without feeling that it will go farther. Whether it should go farther is not the question. This is neither an indictment nor a propaganda, but a study. No more is assumed than that national character shows a certain continuity, and that incentives which have been potent in the past are likely to be potent in the future. If so much be conceded, then the further development of Caribbean domination seems assured. If the considerations which have impelled us to restrict the liberty of Cuba, to take over the financial problems of Santo Domingo and to assume the management of Hayti, are legitimate, then there is more work of this kind for us to do. Conditions were no worse in Hayti than in other Caribbean countries. Utter recklessness and incompetency have characterized the management of every one of these pseudo-states which the preoccupations of the real nations have temporarily abandoned to independence. It was a matter of chance which one of the dancers should first pay the piper, but all have danced and all must pay. As each faces in turn the inevitable crisis, the same problem presents itself. What reason is there to believe that we shall not meet it in the same way?

Indeed, the chief reasons rather gain in force as the process is continued. As regards its own prosperity, to be sure, and its economic serviceableness to mankind, each territory redeemed from chaos to order is so much clear gain. But in the matter of protecting our health against tropical diseases, or preventing the lodgment of hostile powers near our coasts, our work in rehabilitating these countries is largely thrown away unless we complete it. It is like the building of a wall which is useless until the last breach is closed. The nearer we come, therefore, to completing the wall, the more compelling the motive to close any breaches that remain. There is strong reason to believe, therefore, that the impulse to dominate the Caribbean and the Pacific coast within the same latitudes, will be not only continuous but cumulative as a factor in future American policy. Doubtless this domination will assert itself in various ways, some overt and complete as in the case of Porto Rico, others indirect, unofficial, perhaps merely moral. The only requisite will be real control. This control it can hardly be doubted that America will insist upon acquiring.

Before considering the question of form and method, it may be well to inquire what the limits of American control are seemingly destined to be. We will confine ourselves first to the problem of defence.

It hardly need be said that we have little to fear from these countries themselves. Military operations which may be necessary to restore order in these regions may prove troublesome and expensive, and certain of these countries in the hands of a foreign

enemy might be a serious danger, but left to themselves they will hardly endanger the United States by military aggression. Mexico might conceivably have the rashness to attack us and the brief good fortune to achieve temporary successes, but the certainty of the ultimate outcome is likely to deter her from aggression, unless backed by foreign powers. Unfortunately there is much reason to believe that in the event of a strong combination of European powers against us, the sympathies of Mexico, with her old grievances, and perhaps of all the Caribbean states, would be with our enemies. This would not necessarily be due to any injustice on our part, though our record is doubtless far from perfect in this respect, but to the simple fact that they are smaller and weaker than ourselves and to their consciousness that no matter what our deference to their pride, their fate is in our hands.

It is Europe, therefore, that we have to fear, Europe that surpasses us in need and in power to take, Europe that alone has the power to make these helpless neighbours formidable, Europe and Japan, for outside of America there is only Europe and Japan. They hold Asia and Africa,—and they are not satisfied. Our problem is therefore to hold them at a distance. Even at a distance they are terrible. Planted near our shores they would be irresistible. These powers of whose friendship we have no sufficient guaranties, must have no colonies or naval stations in the Caribbean. They must have with these irresponsible states, no relations of intimacy or obligation which in an emergency might be transmuted into

the thing we fear. That is the irreducible minimum of our demand, and whatever the means chosen to secure this end, there is no indication that the American people will relax its effort or lessen its demand.

One exception must be made to this veto upon Europe. We have nothing to gain by vetoing British expansion in the Caribbean, at least as regards our national defence, for the simple reason that she is there already in positions as strategic as any that she is likely to acquire. Beginning within a hundred miles of the Florida coast, her islands stretch in an almost unbroken outer chain to Trinidad in the extreme southeastern corner where the chain links solidly with the mainland, while the bulwark of British Guiana is only a few miles away. In the middle of the area and absolutely commanding the chief entrance, Britain holds Jamaica with the Caymans farther west. Finally, on the Central American mainland at the western boundary of the Caribbean, is British Honduras. There may be reasons why Britain should not acquire farther possessions here and should have no part in the necessary work of redeeming these forfeit states, but these reasons can hardly have to do with our national defence. It is to be hoped that we have other guaranties against harm at the hands of Britain, but if not, we shall hardly find safety in limiting her acquisitions in the Caribbean. Her present possessions are sufficient to meet all military and naval requirements.

The proposal that the United States acquire these possessions in exchange for the Philippines has already been mentioned. The reasons urged concern

the Philippines rather than the West Indies. Those who make the proposal are apparently anxious to get rid of the former rather than to acquire the latter. They believe the possession of the Philippines exposes us to grave dangers, yet do not feel that we are at liberty to dispose of them without regard to the welfare of the inhabitants. The problem of the Philippines will be discussed in its place. For the present we have only to note that such an exchange would contribute nothing to our safety in the Caribbean. It would give us more naval bases, but we have enough already. Meanwhile, if there are those whose imagination suggests a possible attack from Britain, it may suffice to reflect that Canada would furnish the necessary base.

The case of France is slightly similar. By her possession of Guadeloupe and Martinique together with several smaller islands in the eastern Caribbean, with French Guiana farther east on the South American mainland, France occupies a strong strategic situation which an aggressive power might use effectively as a base for a farther advance. The question naturally arises, is France such a power? Have we anything to fear from her presence in the Caribbean? We may safely assume that all powers that are real powers and have some degree of liberty of action are aggressive powers. On this point France has left us in no doubt. No people has cherished the dream of empire more fondly than France or made greater sacrifices to realize it. It would be a mistake to assume that as a republic her temper has seriously changed. Never has French imperialism been more

zealous and seldom has it been more successful than in these recent years of the Republic.

It would also be hazardous to count on the sentiment of the present moment as offering permanent guaranties for the United States. That sentiment is certainly one to be carefully conserved, an asset of possible inestimable value. But sentiment undergoes surprising changes with changing circumstances, and nowhere more so than in France. The French are today the allies of the people whom they have hated longest of any in Europe. We share at present and are likely to share increasingly their cordial good will, but changed conditions and new conflicts of interest may quite destroy this safeguard.

There is reason to believe, however, that the advance of France will not be in this direction. Her vast designs in both America and Asia have proved abortive and have seemingly been abandoned. On the other hand France now has possessions in Africa which are of enormous extent and value, and the development of which makes heavy demands on both her enthusiasm and her resources. It is probable that as the result of the present war these possessions will be still farther increased. With every step of her advance challenged by jealous and powerful rivals, France seems little likely to hazard her African empire in an imprudent American venture.

In another respect the problem of the French colonies is less reassuring. France will not use them to our hurt, but can France hold them? Had France and Britain been beaten in the present war, it is wholly conceivable that such colonies might have been part

of the price that France would have to pay for peace. That opens another line of thought. It is conceivable, too, that with but slight commercial interests in this part of the world and a limited merchant marine more profitably employed elsewhere, France might consent to sell the islands. There can be little question who the most eager customer would be. For these and similar reasons it may well be the policy of the United States to acquire the French possessions if possible as we have recently acquired the Danish Islands, not because we need them or because of their intrinsic value, but because their possession by Germany or some power similarly disposed might be fatal to our security. Still another power presents a similar problem. Between French Guiana and British Guiana lies Dutch Guiana, and the same power possesses Curaçao, a group of islands off the coast of Venezuela. Holland as a neighbour we may view with perfect tranquillity. But Holland is one of the little countries of Europe whose existence depends on the maintenance of the present balance of power between Britain and Germany. Were Britain to be crippled ever so briefly, Holland would become a part of Germany, and her vast island empire would automatically pass under German control. This union might be overt in the form of annexation, or concealed under the form of an entente or an alliance. It would make little difference. Holland would be compelled, no matter how unwillingly, to place her possessions at Germany's disposal. It is precisely this which we have feared in the case of Denmark. The danger in this case was perhaps a little greater, for it is pos-

sible that Britain would stake less to maintain the independence of Denmark than that of Holland, but the cases are not greatly different. In both cases these West Indian possessions are remote from the chief centre of national interests and are unprofitable. To Germany they would have a value not measured by their balance of trade. Holland is less likely to sell, and her possessions are perhaps less available for the purchaser's purpose, but the reasons for the one purchase hold in a degree for the other, and make it a seeming necessity of ultimate American policy.

But our chief danger lies, not in the possessions of other powers, but in the so called independent states. These offer in abundance not only the naval stations required, but valuable resources in tropical products and in some cases populations capable of efficient use under foreign training. They are one and all incapable of protecting themselves against foreign aggression, while their recklessness and incapacity involves them in obligations to foreign powers which at times compel intervention and always furnish its plausible pretext. All are of the lowest political morality and susceptible to bribes as well as to flattery. Finally, the disparity between them and the United States and the frequent necessity of unwelcome action on the part of the latter naturally results in jealousy and ill-will on their part. No doubt all these regrettable conditions can be modified and possibly eliminated in time by patience and wisdom on our part. No doubt every reasonable effort should be made to that end. But that is not the question. The fact to be noted here is that the character and temper

of these states makes them subservient to the purposes of a hostile power. Germany (for the moment necessarily the type of such a power) can find in any one of these states the site that she wishes and in their dishonourable policy the excuse for seizing it. Against such action these states could oppose no force whatever, and in the face of so plausible an excuse it would be most embarrassing for a foreign power to protest.

That this is not mere imagination recent events have clearly shown. German intervention in Venezuela was prevented in 1908 only by a direct threat of war, coupled with the greatest tact on the part of President Roosevelt. A German cruiser at Santo Domingo forced us to violent and precipitate intervention. During the period of the war and probably before it, German intrigue has been busy in Cuba and Mexico with results not yet wholly manifest. And within the year have come reports of German negotiations for a submarine base in Venezuela, a country whose policy seems to have become definitely pro-German, and of German intrigues in Yucatan to prevent the customary sale to the United States of the sisal, a monopoly product indispensable to the harvesting of our grain crop in this year of need. These interferences, ranging from petty annoyance to deadly peril, are but suggestions of an ever present possibility of unlimited scope against which these states have neither the power nor the moral character necessary to protect us. It is easy to minimize the significance of German intervention in Santo Domingo and Venezuela. Perhaps Germany would have withdrawn when her grievances were redressed. But

such incidents tend to recur, and repeated intervention usually ends in occupation. Nor is Germany the only danger. It is certain that Japan has sought a naval base in the vicinity of the Canal and has made overtures to disaffected powers regarding it.

Whatever the actual danger involved in these conditions, there can be no question that the government of the United States judges it to be serious and that the acquisition of the Danish West Indies, the protectorate over Hayti, and the various arrangements with Cuba, Santo Domingo, Panama, and Nicaragua have had as their chief purpose the defence of the nation against this danger.

How far will the United States go? It is impossible to say, but it is possible to say how far this policy may go. The object is to protect the southern approaches to the United States and above all the approaches to the canal and the traffic routes between the Americas. Through the Caribbean passes all the traffic between our eastern coast and the eastern coast of South America, between our eastern coast and western South America, between our eastern coast and our own western coast, between the entire Atlantic basin and the vast Pacific world. The Caribbean is in the Western Hemisphere what the Mediterranean is in the Eastern, the jugular vein through which passes the life blood twixt heart and head. Imagine the result of submarines sheltered by careless or jealous peoples along a route like this.

What did those nations who were vitally interested in the safety of the Mediterranean think necessary to its defence? Nothing less than the direct control of

its entire irresponsible coast. The northern coast was held by responsible powers, powers if not wholly trustworthy, at least to be dealt with as independents rather than as dependencies. The southern coast was helpless and irresponsible. The power that all dreaded might buy or seize at will. France, long established in Algeria, seized Tunis, Britain seized Egypt, a world war was risked to save Morocco, and last of all Tripoli was seized with incontinent haste, lest a lodgment of Germany at Benghazi bring all their work to naught. Even outside the sea the same anxieties were felt. Within a year after England captured Gibraltar, she brought Portugal under her control lest danger should lurk around the corner, and the attempt of Germany to establish herself at Agadir, some five hundred miles down the outside African coast was resisted at the risk of war.

It will be easy here for our minds to go off on a tangent and lose themselves in the query whether Britain and France had a right to assert control of the Mediterranean against Germany. That is not the question. We are interested solely in seeing what they regarded as necessary to that end. There can be very little doubt that we have decided to keep Germany and all similar powers from getting a foothold in the Caribbean. What is necessary to accomplish our purpose? Britain and France have told us. There must be no Barbary Coast left for Germany and her like to appropriate. But the Caribbean coast is all Barbary Coast. Then there must be no Caribbean coast left open to appropriation. This means some form of effective control over all the

islands not in responsible hands (a control already assured), over all of Central America (a control more nearly assured than official reports would suggest), and over at least Venezuela and Colombia. This need not mean annexation or even a protectorate. There are many ways, and any way is good which will insure that these people shall not dare, if possible that they shall not wish, and above all that they shall not be able to serve the purposes of the enemies of the United States.

It must be remembered that since the Canal is the vital organ, the paralysis of which might be ruin to the United States, the adjacent Pacific Coast is hardly less important than the Caribbean. Here again Colombia has the power, as she at present has the inclination, to do us harm. It is desirable to remove the inclination, though whether apology and penance for a much provoked and justified offence would effect the desired propitiation may be doubted. A purchased good will resting upon a foundation of jealous weakness and low political morality, is a feeble guaranty against the bribes of our rivals. We shall hardly be safe while Colombia retains her power to harm us, with Germany on the one side and Japan on the other to put her friendship and her probity to the test.

One state remains which presents a different and a more difficult problem. In her situation Mexico is to be grouped with the powers just considered. Her proximity to the Canal, though not so immediate as that of Colombia or Central America, is sufficient to give us every concern, while her extension to the north-

west and her monopoly of the Gulf of California gives to every indentation in her long Pacific Coast a strategic value of which we are becoming increasingly, not to say anxiously, conscious. Meanwhile Mexico is too large, too populous, too rich, and too advanced, to permit of the summary treatment meted out to Hayti and Nicaragua. She is able to harm us, able to resist our control. Is she able to protect us against the dangers which her very existence in this quarter involves? In some other part of the world she might reasonably aspire to independence and self-direction. It is the emphatic determination of the American people that that shall be her privilege. Rarely has such a provocation to intervention been resisted as that which Mexico has given to the United States during the last five years. While official forbearance has at times belied the impatience of the people, there can be no doubt that it represents their settled determination to assume no responsibility for the internal affairs of Mexico. So far as these affairs can be isolated from the tangle of world affairs in which our own destiny is inextricably involved, Mexican independence rests upon the foundation, not only of American conviction, but of the deepest American sentiment. If interference were necessary, Americans would detest the job.

But this fact remains, a fact which no man can alter and which must become greater and plainer with the passing years. Mexico lies between us and our most vital possession. In no way, direct or indirect, can she be allowed to jeopardize its safety or to weaken control of those seas and those coasts upon

which its safety depends. And in no way could this so easily happen as by indiscreet relations with nations capable of challenging our control. Nor are these relations to be feared merely in the form of hostile alliances such as that insanely proposed by Germany between Mexico and Japan. It is not even voluntary relations that menace us most, but relations forced upon Mexico by her own recklessness, incompetency and injustice. If Mexico were differently situated, a wronged nation might be slow to punish her, and other nations slow to intervene, but when powerful nations are looking for pretexts to intervene, and their rivals see in their moves a menace to their own safety, Mexico must walk straight. If Mexico is to escape a protectorate, it must be by voluntarily assuming its essential limitations. She is not free,—no nation so situated can ever be free,—to live unto herself. It is to be feared that the Mexican people have not the capacity permanently to maintain real independence of action in a situation exposed to the full impact of the mightiest forces of world imperialism. To steer an even course twixt such a Scylla and Charybdis would imply a skill to which no people, Anglo-Saxon or any other, can yet lay claim. Failing this absolute correctness of procedure, Mexico seemingly must pass under the effectual control of the greater power that is doomed to depend upon her loyalty and trustworthiness.

It remains to be considered what change if any, is likely to take place in the form of our Caribbean control. Present forms show a wide range. There is

the broad autonomy of Cuba, tempered only by intervention in rare emergencies. There is the private receivership of Nicaragua with its official connivance, then the official receivership of Santo Domingo, and finally the full protectorate of Hayti. Which will be the preferred form and ultimate model?

It is unlikely that any one type will prevail throughout our "sphere of influence." Practical empire builders are not misled by any love for the logical or the symmetrical, into strained efforts for uniformity. They care nothing for symmetries and everything for adaptations. The countries in question differ widely in character, and very different circumstances are responsible for our intervention. The working arrangements decided upon will differ accordingly, and that perhaps increasingly with the varying character of their development.

Yet there is a tendency toward the more complete control, a tendency which may go farther. The earlier interventions were the more timid, the later the more resolute and complete. Cuba comes first, Hayti last. The difference is not an accident. Half measures have been disappointing. The Cuban experiment did not save us from the necessity of a costly military reoccupation. The well managed receivership of Santo Domingo did not avert revolution, or save the island from German cruisers and American occupation. If we are compelled to occupy Cuba again, we shall probably stay. If our work in Santo Domingo continues, we shall doubtless have a constabulary. The half measure is easier to introduce.

It is less repugnant to the natives and to ourselves. But it has thus far failed to accomplish its purpose without the supplement of violent and costly military intervention. It is probable, therefore, that the more partial forms of control will evolve into more complete forms if control is continued, and that subsequent occasions for the exercise of control will be influenced by these experiences.

In particular it may be doubted whether the system of private control so successfully introduced in Nicaragua and doubtless extensively developed in other Central American countries, can persist. The superior efficiency of such a system may be conceded, and the informality with which it may be introduced is a great advantage. The resort to such an expedient when government ignores a situation which will not suffer neglect, may be a patriotic duty. But such a system, involving as it needs must do, the backing of government, has all the disadvantages to the nation of direct governmental intervention without the advantage of publicity and effective responsibility. Above all, it is impossible to imagine such a control uninfluenced by considerations of private profit which experience warns us to keep away from the administration of dependencies. If American control is necessary in the Caribbean, it should be the control of the American government, and not the control of private interests for whose sins we must answer and whose acts we can not determine. This is written in no unsympathetic spirit toward those interests. They are needed and should be encouraged. But they furnish

additional occasion for national control, not a substitute for it.

It may be expected that American control in the Caribbean will become more avowed, more comprehensive, and more extensive as time goes on.

CHAPTER XI

PAN-AMERICANISM

THE progress of our inquiry has brought us at last to the continent of South America and to the much advocated policy of Pan-Americanism. Indeed, from the moment that we crossed the Rio Grande we have been upon the domain of this attractive doctrine. The discussion of its proposals has been purposely deferred. It has seemed necessary first to trace the development of American imperialism from its beginnings on our far eastern frontier westward across the continent and out to its farthest battle line, to take account of its conquests, to note its habitual attitude, and to project into the immediate future the resultant of its temper and its opportunity. That temper has been and still is one of instinctive assertion. Though occasionally balked by domestic faction, the imperialist impulse has never long been held in check. Counsels of prudence have been occasionally heard, but to those who recall our acquisition of Samoa and the Philippines it would be absurd to claim that these counsels had prevailed. The American empire has grown with prodigious and incontinent rapidity. The Roman Empire did not grow so fast. The British Empire did not grow so fast. Neither of them took such long chances or so often did the unintended and unconsidered thing.

There is no evidence that this temper has changed. If we have committed follies, as the prudent assert, we have not yet been punished. We have learned subtler ways of winning, more varied ways of ruling. We have found new reasons for old impulses, and old impulses have renewed their youth.

Finally, we are still confronted with opportunity. More than any other people, we have prizes within our grasp. And we are grasping them. Never was our frontier more alive than it is today. Acquisition of new territory has become a commonplace and passes unnoticed. Not one American in a hundred realizes that we have a protectorate over Hayti and that our control is creeping out through all these southern seas. If he knew, his only reaction would probably be a slightly increased complacency. The door is thus opened wide for a government, embarrassed by the mischievous irresponsibility of these petty make-believe states, to take refuge in an ever broadening imperialism. Unless the leopard changes his spots, this must carry our frontier to the limits we have mentioned.

Will it carry us farther? There is plausibility in the suggestion. In the full sense of the word nature furnishes no absolute boundaries. If we could cross the Pacific, we may cross anything. Incentives to the control of the American tropics are likely to be found in the world's growing need of their products, the necessity of more intensive exploitation, the inefficiency of their peoples, and the incompetency of their governments to encourage and protect foreign enterprise. It would be rash to predict that this inherent

conflict between northern energy and tropical lethargy will not result in farther extensions of northern control over the American tropics.

But equally, it would be a mistake to assume that such an appeal will come from the American tropics alone. Geographical propinquity will count for very little beyond the limits of the Caribbean. Indeed South America offers no such propinquity. If it is a question merely of exploiting the tropics and not of vital defensive strategy, the pathway of the sea may lead us to Asia as easily as to South America, and the Philippines may as easily be the base for a farther advance as Hayti or Panama.

Nor is the call of the tropics the only one. The war upon which we have now embarked has incalculable possibilities. We are committed not merely to the redressing of our grievances to date, but to the vastly larger program of settling such difficulties as the war itself may create. Without taking too seriously the fascinating program of "making the world safe for democracy," it is well to remember that the war is to be fought on European soil and in conjunction with nations having possessions in every part of the world. When the peace conference meets we shall hear very little of the sonorous slogans which heralded the war's beginning and much of the concrete problems for which these phrases suggest no very tangible solution. Taken in the aggregate, it will be the problem of policing a troublesome world and maintaining and improving its productive activities. Who knows where these police duties may call us? Present inclination and intention in the matter will have very

little influence on the result. There will be new interests to consider, world interests and local interests, interests of our allies, interests of humanity's helpless wards, and new and unforeseen interests of our own. And along with all this there will be new passions and new visions which will have tremendous power over us to determine our decisions. Who knows what these decisions will be? Is it certain that we can get out of the old world when once we have gotten in?

Of course we do not intend any such enlargement of our program. We can not conceive of circumstances which should induce us to make the Philippines a base for further advance. But then, we did not intend to take the Philippines and could not have conceived beforehand of circumstances which would induce us to do so. Our study of American imperialism has been in vain if we have not learned that it is not premeditated but essentially inadvertent. Perhaps this is the normal character of imperialism. The plea of Demosthenes to the Athenians that they should cease to be led by circumstances and should learn to lead circumstances, was unavailing. It may be questioned whether any people can learn the difficult art of leading circumstances. There are vital processes in national as in individual life that seem able to function only when unconscious. One nation in our day has adopted the program of deliberate and conscious imperialism, with results not encouraging to the policy of leading circumstances.

It seems quite impossible, therefore, to forecast with any certainty the future of American expansion

beyond the limits of the Caribbean. Not that the American advance can go no farther, or that it will go no farther, but that there is no telling at present where that farther going will be. If the Monroe Doctrine seems to imply for us predominantly American interests, it must be remembered that the maintenance of that doctrine is as likely to lead us into war in the old world as in the new, and that war tends to create local attachments and interests, wherever it goes. We were fighting for purely American interests when we sent Dewey to the Philippines, and forthwith our interests ceased to be purely American. Moreover, doctrines do not determine destiny, but destiny determines doctrines.

In considering a program which is to be conscious and deliberate rather than instinctive, it is important to remember what manner of men we are. The adoption of a policy at variance with our temperament will not change our temperament, or at best it will change it but very slowly. The imperialist instinct is strong in us by nature, and it has been strengthened by three centuries of intrepid assertion unrebuked by a single serious mischance. We have profound faith in our capacity and in the universal adaptation of our institutions to human wants. Our capacity for forbearance is therefore slight.

But important as it is to see ourselves as we are, it is even more important to see ourselves as others see us. It is a peculiarity of this unintentional imperialism that we are largely unconscious of our own attitude. As we are never aggressive until circumstances suddenly coerce us, we live in constant mood of

fancied deference which overshadows all else in our experience. Outsiders are quite uninfluenced by our consciousness of innocence of which they have no experience. They see only our acts which have been consistently aggressive, and from which they not unnaturally infer a consistent purpose of aggression. Their attitude seems to us one of unworthy suspicion, and ours to them one of designing hypocrisy. The relation is natural and is not to be conjured away. It must be with consciousness of our character and our reputation that we confront the proposed policy.

The term, Pan-Americanism, though seemingly self-explanatory, is but vaguely defined. It suggests the analogy of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, but a comparison reveals only contrasts. They seek the union of all members of a single race under a single government. But Pan-Americanism implies neither a single race nor a single government. A single government for all the Americas could only be our own. Such an extension of our rule is certainly not to be predicted in the light of our present knowledge.

So far from advocating this policy of ultra-imperialism, the advocate of Pan-Americanism is usually a pronounced anti-imperialist. He deprecates above all things the extension of anything like sovereignty over the lesser American states. He would have us not only scrupulously respect their independence, but defend it against all comers. He would recognize not only the independence of these nations, small and great, but their equality with each other and with ourselves. No paramountcy and no patronage would find a place in such a program. Studied deference,

frequent intercourse, and arbitration of difficulties are of course urged.

Turning from these generalities, emphasis is usually laid upon the importance of South American commerce, and Americans are urged to exploit this market more wisely. We are reminded of the great wealth of the more progressive of the Latin-American countries, their culture, their tastes and their peculiar requirements, and are mildly chided for our apathy and our ignorance regarding these our American neighbours. The facts cited in some of these earnest appeals are startling and quite justify the reproach which they occasionally imply.

Every appeal for international amity, for mutual acquaintance and friendly intercourse is deserving of sympathy and support. There seems to be no doubt, too, that American enterprise has been less awake to its opportunities in this part of the world than in almost any other. For a nation so familiar with the world as we are, it is difficult to account for our misconceptions regarding South America, while our slipshod business methods there are hard to reconcile with our efficiency elsewhere. These conditions are hardly creditable to us, and the effort to correct them deserves unqualified support.

There is a possibility, to be sure, that our advocates have overlooked certain facts and that the most sanguine expectations may not be realized. The more developed parts of South America are climatically much like our own country, and the most of their exports are commodities which we produce in sufficiency. We are therefore less able to be useful to each other

than are countries of a more complementary character. Tropical South America is different, since the tropics and the temperate zone are permanently necessary to each other. But tropical America is as near to Europe as it is to us, while Africa, its great competitor, is not much farther away. There is little natural basis for mutual monopoly in the trade of the Americas.

Ethnically, too, the bond of kinship, a bond which affects all customs and the whole fabric of economic and political life, is not between the Americas, but between Latin America and Latin Europe on the one hand, and Anglo-Saxon America and Anglo-Saxon Europe on the other. It must be remembered, too, that this nearness of kin is also nearness in space. The great Latin countries are all nearer to Latin Europe than they are to New York, and New York is nearer to Liverpool than Latin America is to either.

Too much importance should not be attached to these facts. They perhaps explain present trade relations, but they do not explain, much less justify, our ignorance and apathy regarding this vast field of opportunity. The advocacy of closer trade relations with Latin America is amply justified and deserving of success.

But there is nothing in all this to justify the name, Pan-Americanism. There is nothing that is exclusively or even pre-eminently applicable to the Western Hemisphere. Does not every argument that is urged in favour of closer commercial relations with South America apply equally to Australia, to China, to every country? The gospel of Pan-Americanism is thus

far but the gospel of world intercourse and amity given a specious particularity in this somewhat neglected field by the use of a pretentious and misleading name. Pan-Americanism stands for no natural unity that is relevant to our discussion. If historic accident had not applied a single name to two rather exceptionally separated grand divisions of the globe, the concept like the name would never have come into existence.

Beyond this doctrine of commercial intimacy and international amenity, there have been no very significant developments of the Pan-American idea. Suggestions have been made, however, that something of political co-operation might result as commercial and other bonds were developed, and the Latin countries came into their own through the exploitation of their great natural resources. The idea is an attractive one, and there are not wanting those who see in a Pan-American league the one hope of effectively enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. Such a league seems to some to be foreshadowed in the A B C conference summoned by Mr. Bryan for the settlement of Mexican difficulties. This won for its author numerous plaudits, not because of its achievements which were disappointing, but because of the principle involved which seemed to be the harbinger of a happier time. It is important to consider the possibilities of a Pan-American league since in spite of its vagueness,—or possibly because of its vagueness,—it appeals to certain minds. Is such a league possible, and if possible, would it be efficient?

The Latin Americans are not of our race and do

not speak our language. That is not an insuperable obstacle to co-operation, but it has invariably prevented co-operation in the past except in cases of conquest or the menace of extreme danger. But the greater difficulty lies in the fact that these countries are small and weak as compared with our own. They perceive perfectly that a league of nominal equals would be in fact a league dominated by a single power and that alliance could only mean subordination. It is here that our imperialist temper and record, so perfectly visible to others and so blandly ignored by ourselves, come in to complicate the situation. Fear of American aggression is the outstanding fact in Latin America, a fear varying in inverse ratio to their nearness to ourselves. We protest with all sincerity that we have no hostile designs. If they concede our sincerity, they see in it no protection. We had no designs against Porto Rico or the Philippines or Cuba or Hayti, yet they have one after another fallen under our control. Our intentions interest them little in the face of our remorseless advance. That we have had compelling reasons for each forward step is poor consolation. There are more such reasons waiting to justify the steps they fear. Each step is a trifle to us, too small an item in the day's work to disturb the complacency of our conscious good intentions. To them it is momentous, the shaping of a people's destiny.

The important thing to note is that neither party can help it. It inheres in the situation. They have had to give ground before us, and they will have to give ground again, no matter what forbearance we manifest. They see it,— or rather they feel it, which

means much more. We should feel it if we were the under dog. Tact and forbearance on our part, and wisdom on theirs will lessen the difficulty, but nothing can remove the fundamental relation between the two Americas.

Why not?

There are three reasons, all of them inherent and measurably permanent. These deserve our careful consideration.

Anglo-Saxon America is united and Latin America is divided and must stay so. Mexico, though physically joined to Central America, and through it and the Isthmus with South America, is permanently separated from her Latin kin. If union is in store for her, it can hardly be other than union with the great neighbour to the north, with all that such union portends to a Latin state. Even union with Central America would modify her situation but little and that is seemingly blocked by the rapidly developing system of protectorates and is almost certain to be opposed in the interest of the protection of the Canal. Central America may conceivably become a single state, but even so only an insignificant one and one inevitably under our protection. Union across the barrier of the Canal is unthinkable, unless in the form of loose confederation under our auspices.

South America is divided from end to end by one of the mightiest mountain barriers in the world, one which separates adjacent countries more effectively than the widest ocean could do. The western slope is narrow, too arid to develop more than a scanty population, and too long to be administered from a

single centre. The broader eastern slope is divided in its turn into distinct political units differentiated by climate and race, factors of the greatest importance which we shall soon be called upon to consider.

Those who are hopeful of a political union in South America will of course urge that railroads and commercial intercourse tend to lower these barriers and so make union possible. They will perhaps cite the example of the United States whose population is not divided by the Rocky Mountains, as an argument that the union of South American states is not impossible. Such an analogy is wholly misleading. Under a single government our eastern population expanded into the western territory which had been acquired by conquest. There was no federation between separately developed states. In other words there was union before there was any barrier. That makes all the difference in the world. So obvious are the obstacles to union in the present instance that its most sanguine advocates hardly hope for a consolidation of Latin America into less than seven distinct nations. So partial a unification would hardly affect the problem with which we are concerned.

In considering the possibilities of such a union, we can not safely ignore the teachings of experience. There can be no question as to what the teachings of history are in this connection. Peoples thus separated never unite unless compelled to do so. This compulsion may come in various ways. For instance, one of these countries, let us say Argentina, might conceivably conquer the rest, advancing step by step as we have done in the north. But her task would be

immensely more difficult than ours has been, and these difficulties are increasing. No one thinks that such a conquest is contemplated, still less that it will be effected.

Or an outside power might conquer South America and unite it, or what amounts to the same thing, force it to unite in self defence as the American colonies were united by war with England. Such a unification is more probable, but it is the avowed policy of the United States to prevent an attack on Latin America, and it is probable that with the aid of European jealousies, we shall succeed. South America will thus be spared the pressure necessary to unite her. To that type of mind to whom history is irrelevant, such reasoning will no doubt seem inconclusive. Such persons can see no reason why the obvious advantages of federation should not lead intelligent men to adopt it. To all of which it may be pertinent to reply that men are neither wholly intelligent nor wholly disinterested, and that to such, the advantages of federation are not entirely obvious, while the sacrifices and painful adjustments which it requires are usually very much so. The enthusiast is confident that growing intelligence will reveal these advantages which shortsightedness now overlooks. It is possible that intelligence would reveal to the enthusiast obstacles which enthusiasm has overlooked. There is much reason to fear that if we wait for intelligence to make this nice calculus of advantage which is to overcome our narrowness and reconcile us to irksome readjustments, we shall wait long for union among men. Such union as we have thus far achieved has

been the result of compulsion which has enforced the necessary sacrifice pending the realization of ultimate advantages. This historic method will not be applied in South America,— certainly not if we can help it,— and as a consequence South America will seemingly remain divided.

The second reason for disparity between the two Americas is the character of their populations. That of Anglo-Saxon America is European and efficient; that of Latin America largely Indian. This is unequally true in different parts. The population of Argentina is largely European, a fact to which the remarkable prosperity of that progressive country may be largely attributed. In other parts of the temperate zone something the same is true. But through the broad tropical belt of South America and in the Caribbean countries and Mexico, Indian blood predominates, the European population being in some cases not over one eighth of the whole. An extensive admixture of negro blood, sometimes completely displacing the Indian, still further complicates the situation. Serious as is the negro problem with us, it bears no resemblance to the race problem in some of these states, and the different solution reached in the two Americas is not the least of the permanent barriers between them.

With all deference to the claims of these races, we must recognize that Anglo-Saxon America has an immense advantage over Latin America in the character of its population, and that this advantage can not but be disturbingly apparent to the latter. It is a source of weakness to Latin America and an additional oc-

casion of division among its peoples. For the European population of progressive Argentina is as little inclined to merge with the negroid population of tropical Brazil as we would be in like case.

This brings us to the third reason for the political weakness of Latin America, namely its tropical climate. For purposes of racial-political inquiry it is customary to broaden the zone of the tropics to thirty degrees on either side the equator. The assertive nations of the world have been located outside these limits during all the historic period. The peoples within this zone have almost invariably been ruled by peoples outside it. The reason for this, though familiar in a partial way, is of so much importance and has so direct a bearing upon questions of modern statecraft that it must receive careful consideration later. For the present we have only to note the relation of the two Americas to this zone.

Anglo-Saxon America lies almost wholly in the temperate belt. Only peninsular Florida and part of Texas drop below the parallel of thirty. Latin America lies almost wholly in the tropical belt. Only Uruguay and the main parts of Argentina and Chile lie outside of latitude thirty south. It is in these countries and in the adjacent highlands of southern Brazil that are found the wealth and enterprise of Latin America. Possibly something of the same energy and wealth may appear in the higher tablelands of the tropics, but these regions in South America are largely arid and therefore unsuited to the maintenance of a considerable population. The great bulk of Latin America is tropical and must perma-

nently accept the limitations of a tropical climate.

The climate of the tropics is not only a limitation in itself, but it accentuates the other limitations already noted. A mountain chain is much more of a barrier in the tropics than in a temperate clime, for tropical peoples do not build railroads and bore tunnels. Political union is also more difficult to tropical peoples on account of their feebleness of initiative. Nor is it in the tropics that energetic peoples displace feeble folk by their greater power of multiplication and survival.

The limitations of Latin America are inherent. These limitations are susceptible of slow modification, and Latin America will undoubtedly progress. But Anglo-Saxon America must also progress, and certainly under more favourable conditions. Concede such rate of progress as we will, the disparity remains, must remain, so long as the one is predominantly tropical and the other temperate, the one divided and the other united, the one fundamentally Indian and the other Anglo-Saxon.

In considering the prospective relation between the two Americas it is further to be remembered that it is the tropical end of Latin America with which we are in contact. The prospect would be entirely different if Argentina were our next door neighbour and therefore the natural sponsor to us for the Latin peoples. But it is the most irresponsible of the Latins whom nature has made custodians of Panama and who have the guardianship of our citadel. Unconscious of the interests with which they trifle, provocative and venal in their relations with nations whom we can not

permit to have pretexts for aggression, and tempting with their unguarded wealth the cupidity of a grasping world, how can we consort with Latin America as a trusted equal, or show to her irresponsible peoples that forbearance and disinterested recognition which Pan-Americanism enjoins? Failing this studied restraint, there can be no genuine mutuality between the Americas. The relation is inherently that of a protectorate, and the Monroe Doctrine is the recognition of that relation. This the Latin nations perfectly understand and deeply resent. Like most of the raw material of nations yet to be which makes up so large a part of our half baked world, Latin America has yet to learn that relations of dependence are writ in the constitution of the planet. It is perhaps well that susceptibilities should be soothed by diplomatic disavowals, but such efforts should be limited to the amenities of life. All attempts to remove the unacceptableness of this relation by the fiction of a league of equals will but advertise the disparity which is the ground of the offence. Pan-Americanism as a policy of commercial enterprise and international good will is commendable and important. But as a project of political co-operation in an age when such co-operation has become essential to national existence, Pan-Americanism is a delusion. In the stern race rivalry of our time Latin America is one of the least eligible of all the candidates for our alliance. She comes to us not as an additional protection, but as an added and difficult interest to protect. In the great problem of national defence Latin America stands, not as an asset, but as a liability in our account.

CHAPTER XII

THE DEPENDENCE OF THE TROPICS

ALLUSION has been made in the preceding chapter to the conditions of tropical life as a handicap to national development. This assumption is not likely to be challenged in view of the facts of common knowledge in the world about us, and the uniform testimony of history. It may be questioned, however, whether there is any general appreciation of the reason for this fact and of its significance to our present inquiry. No government of tropical origin commands the respect and confidence of mankind, nor has the modern world any faith that the people of the tropics are capable of organizing a stable and equitable government. We accept submissively enough the dictum of the historian that no satisfactory government in the modern sense was ever yet organized by a tropical people and tacitly admit the inference that none ever will be or can be. Yet these passive admissions find no recognition in our political philosophy where we still love to attribute universality to our favourite propositions. We believe that the necessity of order and justice is universal and that government is everywhere needed to secure them. We assert that democracy or self government is a universal right and that "governments derive their just powers

from the consent of the governed." And along with our unhesitating assertion of these universal principles we tacitly recognize the permanent inability of two thirds of the human race to provide for themselves that order and justice which we have declared to be indispensable and yet to be unobtainable in any other way. We have thus one more example of that mental hospitality which welcomes impartially the most antagonistic propositions.

With such a conflict in our philosophy, it is not surprising that our practical policy betrays something of inconsistency and hesitation, and that whichever way we decide, the reproach of inconsistency is ready for us. This conflict of principles is especially marked in a nation's earlier experiences. After a time we get used to being inconsistent and accept it as a normal condition, as indeed it is. It is none the less important that we should attain, if not to consistency, at least to a judicious inconsistency in our attitude toward tropical peoples. To this end it may be well to inquire somewhat more carefully into the grounds of their peculiarities.

The prominent characteristic of the tropics is heat. To this is added, in a large part of the tropics, a comparatively high degree of humidity. It is this combination of excessive heat with excessive humidity that is especially trying. Heat alone, if not aided by humidity, is not incompatible with human efficiency, as witness Arabia whose population has been one of the most aggressive and efficient in the world. But unfortunately a dry climate is usually an arid climate and the result is a subsistence too scanty to support the

numerous and concentrated population required for political organization. So the Arab has become a marauder, spending his energies on the richer fields outside his habitat. Egypt, with its dry climate and its valley watered by the silent river, forms a unique and wonderful exception.

But in the humid tropics, where heat and moisture push nature into overpowering exuberance, man with his commission to subdue the earth, is reduced to helpless impotence. For all men, Hottentot and Esquimaux alike, are compelled to keep their blood at about ninety-eight. A couple of degrees more or less, if continued long enough, would kill them. To maintain this uniform temperature under wide variations of outside heat, nature has installed a heating plant and a refrigerating plant based on exactly the same principles as the artificial constructions that bear these names. We keep warm by burning fuel and insulating the exposed surfaces. We keep cool by evaporating fluid and thus absorbing superfluous heat. If the air is dry and thirsty, the fluid evaporates readily and the refrigerating plant works well. If the air is humid, the fluid refuses to evaporate and the plant refuses to refrigerate.

But we are supplied with a power plant as well, and this burns fuel and generates heat. If we work, we "get hot." The locomotive has to have a fire in the firebox even on the hottest days. In cold weather this comes in handy, and we kill two birds with one stone. We even exercise to keep warm. But in hot weather when we are trying to keep cool, this extra heat is an extra burden for the refrigerating plant, and if it

is hampered by humidity, it is quickly taxed beyond its capacity. The man must cease exertion or die. The capacity for exertion is therefore the capacity of the refrigerating plant, and this in turn is directly determined by the heat and moisture of the air.

We must be careful to avoid the assumption that this limitation of tropical character is a moral defect. We say the man is "lazy." But he *has to be* lazy, which means that "lazy" is not the right word. The inactive man in a cool climate is a misfit; in a hot climate he is the only fit. Equally erroneous is the notion that the defect is intellectual, that education and intelligence will make him efficient and give him the mastery over nature which is the condition of a self-supporting civilization. But intelligence and thought come under the same great taboo. They require energy. Not to mention the dependence of intelligence upon the vast outfit of physical appliances,—books, schoolhouses, apparatus, and the like, the production of which implies highly organized physical activities, it must be remembered that even psychic activity requires energy. When it is too hot it is irksome to think.

But the all important fact is that intellectual activities are in themselves a by-product of physical exertion. The dependence may not be immediate in the life of each individual, but in the aggregate the dependence is absolute. A man who never works may possibly do a good deal of thinking, but a race never. It is the struggle with physical environment that is the source of all the primary problems of the mind. If that struggle is casual and spiritless, these problems

make no effectual appeal. The seeming exceptions to this principle are only seeming. There is intellectual life, sometimes of great subtlety, in the tropics, but it usually proves on investigation to be an exotic, and invariably shows a tendency to detach itself from the concrete realities which are its natural counterpart. The tropics may produce a mystic, but hardly a scientist.

It is therefore in this broader sense, physical and psychic, that we are to conceive the great ban of the tropics. Condemned to inactivity, man lacks the stimuli which elsewhere develop the powers of his mind. Physical and mental torpor broken by spurts of feebly co-ordinated action and short-range, shallow cunning, are his usual, perhaps his inevitable characteristics.

From these basic defects derive others which still further limit his efficiency. He is the victim of malnutrition because too ignorant to choose and too thoughtless to conserve the proper food. Parasites and micro-organisms with which the tropics abound, find him an easy mark. It is said on the highest authority that ninety-five per cent. of the inhabitants of the Philippines are infested with intestinal parasites which enormously deplete their limited energy. Contagious diseases rage unchecked with little exercise of the simplest precautions. And all this apparently without hope of cure from within, for nature has here denied to man the energy needed to control the competing forms of life.

It is important here to notice certain propositions which hover vaguely in the western mind. One is that

the tropical peoples are young peoples and that these limitations will disappear as development proceeds. But they are not young. The evidence is convincing that some of these races are among the oldest that we know, and that their present condition is the result of a development far longer and more unhindered than our own. Nay more, the extremely imperfect development of the tropical man, as judged by our standards, is in effect an adaptation. He is a fit, not a misfit. Nature's criterion of fitness is not the ability to enjoy Browning or Beethoven. She shows no preference for what we call higher types and is perhaps as much concerned for her parasites as for her humans. We may therefore picture her as viewing her tropical types with as much complacency as any other. If we do not like them, it is we who must change them, not nature.

But why should we change them if they fit the conditions of their environment? Why disturb nature's adaptations?

The answer is simply that the tropics are necessary to our own civilization. The most remarkable phenomenon in modern economic development is the utilization of tropical products and the discovery of their serviceableness to non-tropical civilization. Our dependence upon certain of these products, as tea, coffee, and spices, is seemingly arbitrary. We have come to care much for these things, almost to require them, and are deeply concerned with the development of the tropics in consequence, but it is not clear that they meet a vital need of our civilization. Others like sugar are products of both temperate and tropical

zones, and the value of the tropics is merely as an extension of our productive domain. We can raise our sugar in the north, but only by displacing something else. The more sugar we can get from Cuba, the more wheat we can raise at home.

But there are still other products which only the tropics can produce and which are indispensable. Chief of these and type of all the rest is rubber, which has become a necessity of our civilization. The list of these indispensable tropical products is a long one, and one that constantly increases, while the number of their uses and the amount required for our needs is increasing by leaps and bounds. The demands made by a single invention like the automobile are revolutionary in our relation to the tropics.

These demands, the tropics in the hands of their own people and managed in the true tropical way are utterly unable to supply. Yet there is almost no limit to their productivity if their exuberant nature forces can be brought under human control.

This is the modern problem of the tropics. The increased yield of tropical products which our present civilization demands is something which their own peoples can not be depended upon to furnish voluntarily and unaided. Attempts to extort this increased yield by force have produced in the Putumayo and the Congo the most ghastly horrors which have ever blackened the records of civilization. Yet our civilization is unrelenting in its demands. Can we imagine that the modern world will limit its use of automobiles, telephones, ocean cables, and the like out of deference to native preferences or nature's adjust-

ments? It has no power to impose upon itself such limitations if it chose to do so. This modern world does not act as a unit. If one part refrains, another seizes the advantage, and woe to the victim of forbearance.

Nor is there anything sacred about nature's adaptations. All human progress consists in the modification of these adaptations. Our idea of a wheat head or a potato or an apple or a pig is not nature's original idea at all. Her problem was to adapt them to their environment. Our problem is to adapt them to our use. If it seem presumptuous for us to take our own fellow men in hand to adapt them in turn to our purpose, we may remember that we are doing the same with ourselves, forcing new adaptations, crushing old instincts, with no small cost in suffering and loss, all in the interest of this pitiless civilization which coerces us into its service in order that it may serve us in return.

If we are on safe ground thus far, certain farther conclusions will not be difficult. The first requisite of this indispensable exploitation of the tropics is the establishment of a government such as tropical men never establish. It must be capable not only of maintaining order and administering justice of quite an untropical sort, but also of executing public works and developing natural resources in a way which to them is unthinkable. Such a government and such an organization of forces of control can come only from the temperate zone. It is only there that conditions have made possible their development. To impose them upon the tropics, involves no more necessary

hardship than is involved in imposing them upon ourselves.

Nor does this intervention of alien energy involve a violation of precedent or an "interruption of evolution" as a recent pseudo-scientist has called it. Such interruptions are one of evolution's chief agencies. They have been going on ever since there were men capable of migration, and to them the tropics owe the very characteristics in whose behalf modern intervention is asked to forbear. The tropics have always drunk deep draughts of energy from the cool fountains of the north.

The dependence between the temperate and tropical zones is not new, though it has acquired new and unprecedented importance. It is permanent and mutual. We need their rubber, their spices, their sugar, a thousand things which nature has bestowed upon them with lavish hand, and we pay for them with the energy and brains of our manhood which is their perpetual need. The traffic is based on permanent differences of vital condition and can never cease. Nay, rather, with the improvement of the means of communication it must steadily increase, this eternal barter of men for things. Progress can consist only in facilitating the exchange, assuring its mutuality, eliminating its over-reaching and sharp practice, and conserving the element of human energy on the one hand while stimulating that of tropical production on the other.

If the control of the tropics by the temperate zone is to be accepted in principle as it has been adopted in practice, a certain revision, or at least re-interpretation

tion, of familiar political principles is plainly called for. Self-government may be a principle of universal application, but the only kind that will answer the requirements of the modern world will have to be imported for the tropics. It is not native there. It may be established there with the consent of the governed, but that consent will be neither intelligent nor spontaneous. Civilized government must be with them an acquired taste. For that matter it is so with us. The blessings of order and co-ordinated activities are nowhere seen and greeted from afar, but are accepted at best with sullen acquiescence, and at the worst, only under dire compulsion. Imagination can not picture in advance the results of experience. Consent comes only as the result of tedious adaptation. If the doctrine of consent of the governed is construed as requiring consent *in advance*, then there is scarce a government on earth that can claim legitimacy.

The case of the tropics is peculiar only in the sense that the kind of government which both the necessities and the conscience of the great outside world imposes upon them, transcends both their intelligence and their local requirements far more than is the case in the temperate zone. They are not more unwilling than we have been,—rather less so. The Hindu has accepted British rule far more willingly than the Scotch clansman. But if not less willing they are far less able to understand. The requirements of sanitation, for instance, so necessary for the safety of both themselves and the great outside world, are to them as mysterious as they are irksome. The mysteries of sound finance and of carefully maintained public works

are hardly less so. Not only do these requirements transcend their present intelligence, but in a sense they must always lack the sanction of their own experience, for some of these requirements are not their requirements at all, but requirements of the great world which has no option but to make the tropics take their place in a world scheme of things. The consent of the tropics must therefore always imply to a larger degree than in the temperate zone, an attitude of docility and submission rather than of intelligent appreciation. This attitude is readily enough secured,—is indeed characteristic of the tropics. It is of course capable of frightful abuse and perversion. It induces a submissive people to submit to the tyranny of the alien or of their own leaders. It rallies the docile around a Mahdi or an Aguinaldo as readily as around the most beneficent of governments. In this it is like all other human characteristics. If condemned because liable to abuse, no human virtue and no faculty will stand.

Whether the tropics having once consented to such government as the conscience and the necessities of the larger world demand, can be depended on to be loyal to it thereafter is a question still at issue. Not a few fondly hope that once enlightened by experience of the benefits of civilized government and instructed in its management, the tropics will gladly maintain its necessary institutions. It is easy to believe that they will gladly *will* to do so. But the matter is not merely one of volition. Whether they will perceive the means necessary to that end and will to adopt irksome measures whose necessity is not very obvious, is not so clear. We are too apt to forget that we have experience on

this point to enlighten us. Santo Domingo, Hayti, the Central American states, Liberia, are all cases in point, — if not ideal cases, just the kind of real cases which constitute our problem. To say that they have met or are learning to meet the conditions which the necessities and the conscience of the civilized world impose would be grotesque. Not one has succeeded; scarcely one is even approaching success; most have practically ceased to function and have accepted foreign control. These experiences are perhaps not conclusive, but they establish a presumption which is not doubtful. The possibility of civilized government becoming acclimated in the tropics is not yet demonstrated.

It is perhaps appropriate to notice here that the principle of self government, whether in the tropics or elsewhere, is necessarily modified in certain cases by strategic considerations. To take an extreme case, who would suggest that Gibraltar should have the privilege of self government. Its mongrel population might vote to unite with Spain, or more likely, to form an independent republic. Those who are hostile to British rule might favour such an arrangement, but obviously for ulterior reasons. So tremendous is the strategic importance of "the Rock" and so incapable its inhabitants of understanding it or maintaining it, that no one has suggested that its government should be based on other than strategic considerations. Yet the plea for self-government is continually made for Egypt which holds an exactly similar and hardly less important place in the great artery of Britain's life blood. A recent writer espouses the cause of the Egyptians with naïve uncon-

sciousness of this vital fact. "They are like every other nation in the world in wanting to run their own affairs. They grant that they may run them badly for a while. But their argument is unanswerable. They ask you to point out a single nation in history that has evolved into a self-governing community without having gone through a long period of imperfection, mistakes, and errors, even of revolution and anarchy." For New Zealand or Argentina that argument might be "unanswerable," but not for Egypt. There must be no revolution and anarchy in Egypt. It would be like a street fight in lower Broadway. If they were somewhere else, perhaps we might let them fight it out, but not here. It is safe to say that if Britain were willing to grant to the Egyptians the privilege of working out their own salvation through revolution and anarchy, the rest of the world would refuse its consent. It simply must not be.

The bearing of this principle upon our own problems in the Caribbean is obvious. Cuba, Panama, and Nicaragua can not be allowed the privilege of anarchy which in another situation they might claim. Situated as they are, they must walk straight. Theirs is the irksome honour of children born to the purple. Less obviously but not less really, the same is true of Mexico. It simply is not true that it is no concern of ours how long Mexico takes to secure her freedom or what means she uses in securing it. We are very much concerned with the means, nor can we wait for ever. The futility of mere waiting is further emphasized, by the fact, if it be a fact, as we have seen reason to believe, that tropical peoples are not merely

immature, but that there are inherent limitations to their capacity for unaided development. It is sometimes impossible to wait till they have reached this limit. It is folly to wait beyond it.

Recognizing, then, the inevitable dependence of the tropics upon the energy of the temperate zone for their guidance and constructive development, certain dangers and certain requisites call for consideration.

The tropics must be developed. That is what our trusteeship is for. If we were not compelled to seek their products, we might leave them in contented lethargy. They would never disturb us. But we need their full service if we are to build up the world civilization to which we have now set our hand. The native unaided can not assure us this service. The trustee must do so if he is to justify his trusteeship. Mere occupation, without constructive organization and development, forfeits all claims to possession. That was our indictment of Spain. It is still more the indictment of Portugal in her rich but neglected African dominions.

On the other hand, experience has demonstrated the futility of brute coercion. The trouble with the native is not perversity but helplessness. He lacks not only force, but intelligence, imagination, and foresight. Mere pressure brings but meagre returns and at ghastly cost. The Belgian Congo, the Putumayo in Brazil, and some of the French colonies are morally forfeit on this ground.

The world is not quite clear, it would seem, as to the perquisites of trusteeship in the tropics. The tendency at first was to regard tropical dependencies

as private estates or preserves to be monopolized by the owner. Exclusive privileges of trade or exploitation were reserved to the controlling nation, or conferred upon a trading company or other beneficiary at its discretion. This traffic was then worked for all it was worth, the price being forced up by all the devices known to the modern trust, even including destruction of part of the product. With the disappearance of the trading company and the admission of the general trader, the same result was sought by differential duties favouring the citizens of the possessing country, and by export duties, a favourite institution of the tropics. The earlier, direct monopolies are now obsolete, but discriminating duties and like devices implying rights of private exploitation are still common.

There is plainly a tendency, however, toward the view that the tropics are world property and not open to commercial appropriation by a single people. In not a few cases, some product which all require, is to be obtained from only a single district. To hold up the world by demanding an exorbitant price for such a monopoly product, is a risky game for any single nation to play. It accentuates in the extreme the anxiety of the dispossessed to challenge the right of possession of the more fortunate, and is one of the most serious causes of modern wars. To permit trade on equal terms and levy only such duties as are required to defray expenses of administration, is the probable policy of all tropical dependencies in the not distant future. In the home country, the economic argument for free trade is less conclusive.

We must consider the needs of varied culture and national self-sufficiency in wartime isolation. But neither of these arguments apply with any such force to tropical dependencies. Such an open door policy may seem to remove all incentive to bear the white man's burden in this onerous trusteeship, but this is far from the case. Men like to see their flag wave over distant lands and their civilization extended to alien peoples. For this they are willing to incur large costs and forego all material remuneration. There is in this unreasoned ambition, a desire to make prevail that order that we have learned to value and love, a desire which is as nearly altruistic as any that men ever know. It is only the self styled idealist who assumes that men seek dominion for pay.

There still remains, however, a tangible profit in the trusteeship of the open door. If we can not shut others out, they at least can not shut us out. And the exploitation of our tropics, if it does not inure solely to our benefit, at least includes us in its benefits by broadening the market for tropical products and giving added assurance that the needful shall not fail.

It should hardly be necessary to add that tropical dependencies require a degree of disinterestedness on the part of their administration which puts the nation to its severest test. At home the self-seeking and corrupt are restrained by the watchfulness of their peers and the scourge of social ostracism. The tropics have no such defence. They are unable to locate the evils of maladministration from which they suffer. Their opinion counts for nothing with

the corrupt administrator, and those who alone can hold him responsible are unconscious and far away. Any tendency to make such a dependency a perquisite of "deserving" candidates for official favour is reprehensible in the highest degree. If there is any place where the office should seek the man and not the man the office, it is here. So obvious is this danger that it has been urged as a sufficient reason for condemning the whole policy of dependencies. But it is a danger which the world must risk, and a danger which can be successfully met. In nothing has the political evolution of the world shown more progress in the last three hundred years than in the government of dependencies. Doubtless much remains to be accomplished, but a comparison of the Spanish government of Peru with the British government of the Federated Malay States or the American government of the Philippines should reassure even the most confirmed pessimist. Nor is the difference one of race alone. Conceding, as we are perhaps too willing to do, the superior aptitude of the Anglo-Saxon for the government of dependencies, it must be recognized that he has had much to learn and that he has been much indebted to favouring conditions. His early ventures were not so different from those of Spain, and would perhaps have turned out no better if he had begun his colonizing with the treasure trove of Mexico and Peru instead of making terms with grudging nature in austere New England. He has learned,—the world has learned,—much, and can learn the more that is needful.

It may be noted in closing this chapter that the

policy of permanent trusteeship of the tropics is a comparatively recent reaction against a view once widely prevalent that all dependencies were but apprentices in the art of self-government, and that graduation, even an early graduation, into independent self-government was in store for them. So general was this expectation that government policy was shaped by it at times to a degree that it is difficult for us to realize. It is stated on reliable authority that Britain at one time had reached the decision to withdraw from Jamaica and her other West Indian possessions, leaving them to manage their own affairs as they seemed able to do after their long tuition. Even the date had been set and the orders issued. Some change in the personnel of the British government was doubtless responsible for averting this disaster, for a disaster it would certainly have been. Since then the steady decline of Hayti, Santo Domingo, and other independent states whose case seemed fairly analogous, has applied the necessary correction to a hasty and sanguine generalization.

A similar precipitate decision of the United States regarding the Philippines has likewise been reconsidered, at least for the present. In this case, however, the problem has been complicated by considerations of national security, the conviction being widely held that the Philippines were not defensible and therefore a source of danger. This is an important question which will demand our later consideration, but for the present it is sufficient to note that this conviction greatly strengthened the argument of those who were predisposed by their political philosophy to

recognize the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government. That capacity is now being put to a remarkable test. The result of that test will be of unusual interest. Present workings are too much the result of recent American management to be conclusive. It is a nice task to distinguish between momentum and active energy, and only long experience can show how far present Filipino achievements are due to the dying and how far to the living force.

PART TWO

AMERICA AMONG THE WORLD POWERS

CHAPTER XIII

THE GREATER POWERS

OUR inquiry has led us from the early and formative period of American imperialism to its inevitable sequel in the problems which now confront us on the American continent. This continent is obviously our chief field and possibly our only field of legitimate political activity. But as we have considered our relation to the various American countries, we have been conscious at every step of the existence of other and greater countries whose interests and ambitions in this part of the world are the chief factor in our problem. It is to these countries, therefore, that we now turn, inquiring more definitely as to their interests and ambitions, and also as to other relations which we may sustain to them and which must needs further complicate our problem.

Our problem now becomes a very different one. In our own hemisphere we are plainly the paramount power. The Latin American countries are all inferior to us in size, population, wealth, and organization. This fact, taken in connection with their situation and our mutual necessities, makes them more or less dependent upon us. The dependence varies greatly, from a case like Argentina where it is a remote contingency, to that of Hayti or Panama,

where it amounts to permanent control, but in one important respect all are alike. If they need help, they must come to us. Other nations are not likely to help them, and those that might be disposed to do so are precisely the ones whose assistance we can not permit. This is the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, and if there were no Monroe Doctrine, it is the meaning of the situation. If we keep our leadership in American affairs, we keep our independence. If we lose that leadership to a stronger power, we necessarily become subservient in turn to that power. That power might be very forbearing,—as we are trying to be in our own exercise of leadership,—but that power would be paramount. There is reason to fear that certain powers in that position might not be forbearing.

The problem of American relations is therefore the problem of maintaining this paramount position, the problem of calculating the amount of control required in a given case and considering the form which that control should take. Hence the Platt Amendment, the Nicaraguan and Dominican receiverships, and the Haytian protectorate, with more in the making. Hence, too, the policy of conciliation, with its watchful waiting and its A B C conference. The problem is that of a vast protectorate with infinite complexities of physical and psychological condition which, amid constant change, must be kept in constant equilibrium.

Turning to the old world the problem is changed,—almost reversed. A number of the nations of Europe are more powerful than we are. While great changes are probably in store for some of these

powers, and our own growth in population, wealth, and organization tends constantly to give us the advantage, it seems likely that some of these powers will always surpass us. If there is to be a paramount world power, it must be in the old world, not in the new. That was settled when the shrinking planet sent up the wrinkled outlines of the continents. Americans are fond of contrasting complacently their own vast domain with the little countries of western Europe, but they forget that one European country which has not yet reached its probable limits, already has a population nearly twice as large as our own in a territory three times as large as our own and on the average more productive. Add Canada and Mexico and the West Indies to our present territory and we should still be inferior in population, in area, and in life sustaining power. Moreover this country is far more likely than we are to extend its territory, and its population is increasing at a more rapid rate. Nor is this the largest, the most populous, or the most powerful of old world powers.

But this is not all. America may conceivably hold her own against any old world power, either now or later, but she can never do so against a combination of European powers. It is occasionally argued that these great powers will break up and so their menace will disappear. The tendencies are all the other way. For many centuries political aggregation has gone steadily on, and even where it seems to have reached its limits as in the countries of western Europe, it is still going on in the form of ententes, alliances, etc., which tend more and more to harden into permanency.

For the moment our safety lies in the division of the the old world, but that protection is diminishing. An active combination of old world powers to extend their influence in America is no longer a mere possibility; it is a certainty, and we are protected from it only by a counter combination among these same powers.

As we look beyond the American continent, therefore, our relation is one of inferiority, present and presumably permanent. No doubt we are very powerful, quite the superior of many European countries, and further favoured to some extent by our position. But even in dealing with the lesser countries of Europe, we are seldom privileged to use our strength. These countries are quite as dependent as those of Latin America, but their dependence is not upon us. Any effort to assert our will against them tends to line up Europe in their defence, a combination against which we are powerless. Our only recourse is to line up Europe or part of it on our side. Europe is the arbiter. We control America, but Europe controls the world,—controls it and must continue to control it unless present indications deceive us. It is of course the larger Europe that we have in mind, not merely the little area arbitrarily set off by the Urals and the Caucasus, but the Europe which, originating here, has spread resistlessly across the white man's land of Asia and the island continents of the southern seas, while reducing tropical Asia and Africa to unquestioned vassalage. It would be blindness not to see that the centre of gravity of things human lies in this vast aggregate.

This then is our problem. How shall we make terms with those that are stronger than we, stronger for the moment in their local intensive development, stronger for the morrow in their resources and their power of growth, and always and for ever stronger in combination? Obviously the problem of today is different from that of tomorrow or the ultimate future. Europe is now divided and incapable of united action. Even so her several parts are redoubtable and partial combination is becoming habitual if not permanent. We must therefore consider our relation to these parts in succession, both individually and in their possible combinations. Only upon a study of actual national relations can we base such slight forecast of a remoter future as present knowledge warrants.

It may be prefaced that the United States is rather a novice in these matters. We have had intercourse with the powers of Europe from the first, but for the most part of a very minor and incidental sort. The relation has been like that of casual acquaintances rather than of working partners or active and close competitors. The early life of our nation was in fact one of isolation, and when our severance from Europe was once thoroughly effected, we fell into a way of assuming that nothing that happened there really concerned us. Meanwhile, as has been seen, we carried things over here with a high hand. The result was that we learned to be a little high-handed. Our attitude in such matters as the Behring Sea controversy, the Nicaragua boundary dispute, and the Manchurian Railway scheme, was curiously out of

proportion to the force at our disposal. It reflected in the sphere of diplomacy something of the popular conviction that we can "lick creation," which was only a way of saying that we thought creation safely distant and barked at it like a puppy from behind a high fence. The fence is gone now, at least in places, but we have not yet come to realize that any one may come over. It is a truism that our national isolation has vanished, that it is now possible to cross the ocean in force, and that the real frontier of every nation is now the ocean's farther shore. We have a new situation and new knowledge, but not yet the new instincts to serve our new needs. So we have been incredulous and even impatient with those who have warned us of possible trouble with Japan or other powers. We admit that they might attack us, but we do not believe they will. As our chief representative put it a couple of years ago, there was "no objection to the discussion of preparedness as a purely academic question." Even now that war has come, we hardly realize that it is a case in point or that it has any real bearing on the general question. It is one of the small compensations for the world's calamity that it seems likely to awaken us to a realizing sense of our place among the nations. We shall never realize that position or be alive to our real danger until we can believe that a nation,—almost any nation,—when tempted by a great opportunity or driven by a great need, *will despoil its neighbour*. Perhaps it should not be so, perhaps it will not always be so, but it is so now, and if we would play safe, we must assume that it will continue to be so.

The incorrigible optimism of our race which is at once the hope of the future and the danger of the present, lures us again with the promise of a false security. There are fond dreamers who believe that this will be the last war. There have been such after every war for the last three hundred years. Let us hope if we can, but let us not stake our all on so uncertain a prospect. There are no adequate moral safeguards against war. It is vain to invoke the analogy of individual relations. Seemingly the analogy does not fit; certainly it does not appeal. Nor is the spell to be wrought by paper formulas or verbal incantations. Even aversion to war is no safeguard, as our own case proves, nor is our case peculiar among present belligerents.

And there are new straws to grasp at. It is laboriously demonstrated that war does not pay, that no resulting economic advantage, even in the event of victory, can compensate for its costs, the hope being that such a demonstration will dissuade men from it. There is not a belligerent in the present war that did not know this in advance. Again free trade is urged as the panacea, the opening of all doors to the commerce of all nations, that the temptation to force these doors may be removed. How strange, in the light of such a proposal, that the one free trade country in the world should have been for decades the chief object of hostility!

But dearest of all these illusions to the American heart is the belief that democracy is the one safeguard against war, and that our task in the present struggle is to destroy the autocracy of the Central Powers

and so banish war for ever. No better illustration could be given of the vice of unhistoric thinking. During the last hundred years the two most imperialistic nations of the world, those that have expanded most incontinently, encroached most often upon their neighbours, and oftenest grasped the sword for this purpose, have been the world's two great democracies, Britain and the United States. Their nearest rival has been France, a country intermittently democratic throughout the period, and never more aggressive than under the present republic.

There is a momentary plausibility in this assumption that democracies are pacific. In every democracy of the world today there is in progress a violent class struggle, a struggle as bitter, as destructive and as painful as any war we have known until the present. The aggressive party in this struggle grudge their powder for any other cause. They hate the opposing class far more than they hate any opposing nationality. In the autocratic countries this struggle is more or less repressed and the nation is thus able to exert its force as a unit in pursuance of its designs. Germany was able to attack her neighbours; France and Britain were not. This in itself is a sufficient refutation of Germany's claim that she is fighting only to defend herself against aggression. The radical democracy of France and Britain was too intent upon its home struggle to consent to a war of foreign aggression, as the last election in France preceding the war abundantly proved.

But it would be a mistake to assume that democracies are peaceful. They are ultra belligerent. If

we assume that democracy means perpetual war at home, it is conceivable that it may mean perpetual peace abroad. That would be a huge assumption for a slender hope, an assumption as unpalatable as it is unpalatable. No, if democracy ever settles its quarrel at home, it will show the old masterful temper in the field from which it has been temporarily diverted. The world may become pacific, but not through democracy. The slogan, "down with autocracy," serves the present purpose, and ultimate purposes can wait,— must wait.

The causes of war are more vague and more comprehensive than any of these remedies imply. Nations do not fight to make money, nor to force open the doors of trade. Nor do they rally as slaves to serve the ambitions of an autocrat. They are moved by great common impulses, which individually they do not understand, to do things which individually they do not enjoy, and to seek ends from which individually they do not profit. If this seems irrational, it is because our reasoning has taken account only of the individual life,— its detachable features, so to speak. No matter what our sympathies, it is the beginning of wisdom in these matters to recognize the existence of something more than this, something for which men have always been willing to sacrifice this. All attempts to translate this "oversoul" of the nation into terms of the individual life have been in vain and must always be in vain. To give it tangibility and substance is to degrade and falsify it. It envelopes us as an intangible atmosphere of emotion which expresses itself only in symbols. Its vast

expanse and length of days, however finite, mean more to our finite minds than universality and eternity. In comparison, our lives of the moment forget to assert their little claims. The materialistic pacifist may jeer and argue, but men will worship still. The cult may be folly, but it is folly to forget that it is a cult.

And this thing that we reverence may suffer harm. Through the violence of war or the insidious encroachments of peace its votaries may be scattered, its symbols dishonoured, and its temples profaned. There may be strange accents, uncongenial customs and unwelcome ideals instead of those we have learned to love. The prospect is repugnant to our inmost souls. It was this instinctive revulsion of feeling rather than any reasoned estimate that prompted a recent distinguished utterance that "if Germany wins the war, the world will not be fit to live in."

And conversely, all may be exalted, enlarged, and glorified. Votaries may be more numerous, reverence more profound, homage more heartfelt, and symbols more sacred, if we will pay the price, perhaps the uttermost price. Do not say, I shall not see it. Foolish words! Do I not *foresee* it? Object not, my good is no better than another. Who knows but me? Or that my good is unsubstantial, no good at all, that it does not pay. Think, man, how many good things in our world would perish if such arguments were held conclusive.

In some such way the men about us might reason, were it a thing to reason out. They guard as a

sacred trust the nationality in which their lot is cast, and count no price too dear to pay for its defence, its aggrandizement, and its exaltation. It is vain to tell them that it is worthless. The argument strikes equally at all intangible good.

But why can not each nationality keep its place, recognizing its limits and respecting the boundaries of its neighbours? There are two reasons.

The first reason is that the present limits of national territory are arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Whether we regard them from the standpoint of commercial convenience, or national defence, or ethnic unity, or all three together, the same conclusion is inevitable. No rational finality has been reached. Perhaps none can be reached, but improvement seems possible. There is not a nation that does not see some particular excrescence that it would like to have removed. The result might be merely to make new ones, but it is the present ones that irritate. The result is that present national arrangements suit nobody. The situation is one of unstable equilibrium.

The second reason is that a particular equilibrium, if ever so satisfactory for the moment, is continually disturbed by the silent forces of growth. Nations change in their inner substance as the result of the situation. The progressive nations, having distanced their competitors, become unprogressive and are distanced in turn. Whole nations lose their imagination and become automatic and unadaptable. It is impossible that this should not react upon the tenure of territory, and especially upon that penumbra of tropical and island dependencies

which surrounds every great empire and which, we have seen reason to believe, has its basis in permanent condition. Nothing could have been more natural or just than that Portugal under Henry the Navigator should bring the islands and helpless lands which he discovered under the sway of his organizing genius. Nothing could be more unfortunate than to have that sway continue today. It was precisely such considerations as this that justified the expulsion of Spain from Cuba, of Mexico from California, and of Turkey from the Balkans. Yet there were some of these Balkan States that three centuries before had thrown themselves into the arms of Turkey as an enlightened power to escape the miseries of Christian misrule.

Industrial changes are potent in effecting this change in the national temper, and these again are affected by discoveries and inventions. The discovery of the route round the Cape of Good Hope ruined Venice and destroyed the reason for the allegiance of her manifold dependencies. The discoveries connected with the utilization of coal made modern industrial England and reduced artisan Italy and Flanders to hopeless inferiority. And now again the development of electrical transmission harnesses the rushing streams of Italy and makes her aspire to a larger "place in the sun."

The impatient objector will ask: "But why fight about it?" We would gently remind him once more of the purpose of our study, *not propaganda but inquiry*. Perhaps men should not fight about it, but they do. The growing and virile peoples get restive

at seeing their seedy neighbours in the enjoyment of imperial sinecures. Yet these latter think it preposterous that they be asked to give up that which is *theirs* just because upstarts covet it. There is no arbitrating this conflict between prescriptive right and presumptuous innovation.

The point of it all is that our world is in flux. Nothing is fixed, no arrangement is guaranteed. The subtle forces of change are always at work, not less in the quiet than in the stormy days. Just as the forces of nature, working silently through the years, loosen the stones in the structure that our hands have reared until at last it falls with a crash, so the forces of growth and decay, the ebb and flow of virile power, the wax and wane of imagination, slowly disturb the balance of forces in our human scheme of things, until with a crash the old order collapses and a new order begins.

Into this troubled world we must venture with wary feet. It is ours, not to expostulate and inveigh, but to acquaint ourselves with these powers that may make us or be our undoing, to learn which of the nations has become cautious through great possessions, and which is aggrieved by reason of disinheritance, to see which is menaced with a great danger or confronted with a great need from which aggression seems to promise escape, and above all, which are impelled by the pressure of rivals or of environment to cross our pathway and to seek safety or advantage at our expense. We need spend little time in discussing promises, obligations, or sensibilities. No nation will ever attack us because we have been ill-

mannered or refrain because we have been polite. Remembrance of past favours or resentment for past injuries will count and should count for little. As the generations succeed one another, there always arises a Pharaoh that knew not Joseph. These considerations of affront or injury or gratitude for past favours will loom large in the manifestos of hostility or alliance, but it will be the necessities of our rivals that decide their action. It should be,— must be,— the necessities of America that decide our own.

CHAPTER XIV

THE MONGOLIAN MENACE

AMONG the great powers with which we have to deal, one, and only one, is not European. Japan is oriental. In a sense even Japan is European, for her political and military organization, her science, and all the enginery of her national life are borrowed from Europe. Both her imperial constitution and her military organization are modelled on those of Germany and work much the same in practice. The government is essentially autocratic as in Germany, but the autocracy is of the European rather than of the oriental type, and it has learned, as in Germany, how to make parliamentary institutions both subservient and useful. The spirit and ideals of the two countries are similar in many ways.

But the Japanese people are not European, and their thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor their ways as our ways. Their history nowhere touches our own until the middle of the nineteenth century. Their religion is markedly different from ours, and while they are as little inclined as we are to make crusades on behalf of religion, neither they nor we can help taking the shape that the religious mould has given us. Finally, their social and domestic life has been developed along lines so different from our own as to be almost incomprehensible to us, as ours to them.

These things do not make peoples enemies, but they make it easy for other things to make them so. Peoples thus separated are curiosities to each other rather than kindred, and if occasions of conflict arise, the restraining scruples are few.

This segregation of the Japanese people from those of European stock (and with them, of course, the Chinese and other Asiatic peoples) is most important to our inquiry. There can be no question that our relations with European nations have been much influenced by the fact that we are related to them. We have been most reluctant to restrict our hospitality to their peoples, even after that hospitality had become embarrassing to us, and we have married and given in marriage with them freely and without reproach. Not so with the Oriental. We slammed the door in the face of the Chinese long years ago, and would have done the same with Japan had she not hastened to save us the trouble by closing the door herself. Inter-marriage with the Oriental is regarded with extreme aversion. The instinct of race integrity here asserts itself with great positiveness, refusing to reason, as is the way with instincts.

All this is familiar, much of it a fact of our own conscious experience, but perhaps we have not fully realized that the Oriental feels the same way toward us. He is curious, interested, and not unfriendly, but he knows that between our race and his own there is a great gulf fixed which neither will ever cross. He bears us no ill-will, for the most part, but if his interests conflict with ours he will not hesitate as to which to sacrifice. No more would we. Indeed he

is conscious that we have not hesitated, that with the first brush of conflicting interest we have unceremoniously thrust him aside. We need fear no worse from him,—and expect no better. The Japanese is not worse than other men. We may dismiss at once the charges of trickiness and untrustworthiness which we have unconsciously trumped up against him in defence of our race exclusiveness. Such charges have the usual, and no more than the usual, justification. The salient facts are that the Japanese are in the ascending phase of race assertion, that they are led with singular sagacity, that they have certainly no more and possibly somewhat less scruple about race encroachment than other civilized races of our day, and finally that there is between us no cushion of kinship or common culture to lessen the shock of race collision.

What reason have we to fear such a collision?

Japan has a population nearly double that of the whole United States west of the Mississippi, all in an area somewhat less than the state of California. Although she has a vast urban population, she manages by her intensive agriculture to raise nearly all her own food, while England, similarly situated imports half to three fourths of her own. Yet only one sixth of the surface of Japan is, or ever can be, cultivated. Despite the amazing frugality and admirable simplicity of Japanese life, Japan suffers acutely from congestion of population. Yet that population is on the increase, and the efforts of a solicitous government have thus far not availed to check the increase. Here is the first and most

fundamental problem of the Japanese people. There are too many for their little land, and place and food must be found for the growing surplus.

Overpopulation is one of the most serious dangers that ever confronts a nation. People do not know what is the matter. They are conscious of a vague *malaise* which expresses itself in many different forms and lends itself to the most diverse interpretations. Lack of employment, low wages, high cost of living, and burdensome taxes, necessary concomitants of overpopulation are charged to the iniquities of the industrial order, the rapacity of dealers, and the corruption of government. No social order is perfect enough wholly to refute such charges, or strong enough to ignore them. All disturbing and disruptive forces are accentuated by this most fundamental of maladies. Relief in some form is a condition of national tranquillity if not of national existence.

In an early stage of social development, relief is found in chronic warfare whose conscious purpose is feud or conquest, but whose function is to relieve congestion by a crude blood letting, always reckless and often disastrous, but perhaps preferable to its familiar alternatives, pestilence and famine. But civilized society seeks milder means of maintaining the equilibrium between population and sustenance, and no nation is seeking these means more earnestly or more intelligently than Japan. More efficient methods of economic production and more effective restraining instincts are of the very essence of civilization, but these develop slowly and do not afford im-

mediate relief. This can be found for the moment only in emigration, the means by which Europe has for three centuries preserved the equilibrium which has made the development of civilization possible, eliminating famine altogether and restricting war to other functions.

Strangely enough, this recourse is denied to Japan. There are still many parts of the world where population is not congested, many even where it is insufficient, but for one reason or another none are fully available for Japanese colonization.

There is first of all the adjoining Asiatic mainland, the only part of the world that is peopled by kinsmen of the Japanese. This field has the great advantage that no fundamental race antagonism separates the two peoples. Not only are the peoples more or less akin, the Japanese having been recruited from time immemorial by Chinese, Mongol, and Korean immigrants, but the Japanese civilization is founded on the Chinese, and the Chinese sages are quoted in Japanese literature almost as freely as the prophets of Judea in our own.

But much of this area is densely peopled and suffers from overpopulation even more acutely than Japan. To emigrate to such districts would be to jump from the frying pan into the fire. There are other parts, it is true, like Korea and Manchuria, which are not overpeopled, as the Oriental counts such things, and which are under Japanese control, and therefore doubly open to Japanese colonization. But here a new barrier exists, the nature of which it is most important to understand.

Colonization in the true sense of the word, the only sense which affords sensible relief to a congested population and promises to propagate a people's life and culture, must be the migration of all classes and in particular of the humbler and more numerous classes, the classes that most feel the pressure and most require relief. These classes must go as workers, to earn their living. They know how to live only in their own way. Going, not to an empty land, but to a land where fields are owned and industries are organized, they must compete as wage earners or as tillers of the soil with those on the ground. If these live more wretchedly than they have been accustomed to do, no matter how needless their poverty may be and how due to sloth and waste, the new comers must for a time accept their condition of life. Of course if they would do this and stick it out, they would ultimately find their native thrift and skill better rewarded in this less congested land, but people who leave their own land to better their own condition, will not ordinarily accept a worse condition for their whole individual lifetime, in the interest of these ultimate results.

On the contrary, such countries soon develop a different tendency which often acts as a bar to colonization. Instead of the settler goes the exploiter, the man of larger means and superior abilities. He buys estates, develops specialized plantations, builds mills, factories, and the like, employing cheap native labour under improved methods and with the more perfect implements of his own civilization, a combination which is often very profitable and which the foreign

organizer has no inclination to disturb. The inevitable result of this system is the development of a race caste. The countrymen of the exploiter soon find themselves socially barred from native occupations. This is not gratuitous snobbishness, but a virtual necessity for the maintenance of the prestige upon which the success of the new and mutually beneficial relation depends.

India furnishes a perfect illustration of this system. British exploitation has transformed the country in a manner incalculably valuable to its inhabitants as well as profitable to its organizers. No form of human co-operation is more legitimate or less open to criticism. There is none whose benefits are so mutual or whose services to humanity in general are so certain. But certain results are inevitable. There is no caste in India like the caste of British blood, and none so likely to persist. And the British are not *colonizing* India. The race that in this sense exploits a country can never colonize it.

The Japanese are exploiting Korea, Manchuria, and China. In the first they have a free hand, for it is theirs, and the immigration of Japanese is every way encouraged. But the traveller landing in Fusan, a city which has been a Japanese headquarters for many centuries, finds all the humbler occupations in the hands of Koreans. The Japanese, more numerous here than elsewhere in the province, already form a caste in which the Japanese coolie can find no place. In Manchuria the same is true in a more pronounced degree. In China, the Japanese compete with many other nations for the privilege of organizing its vast

human energies and developing its illimitable resources. The purpose of the recent unprecedented demands of Japan was to secure a paramount position in China in this important work.

But Japan is not colonizing China or Manchuria or even Korea to any appreciable extent. Her position as exploiter is one of immense significance to her, to China, to the world at large, and to ourselves, as we shall have occasion to note, a position comparable to that of Britain in India, and perhaps destined to be as influential, but it does not solve the problem of Japan's redundant population. The Japanese organizer and the Japanese capitalist find their opportunity, but the coolie must look elsewhere.

And that great elsewhere is mostly,—almost wholly,—in control of one powerful and jealous race, the Anglo-Saxon. He has room and opportunity in plenty, but he reserves them for himself. Against the thrifty Japanese every door is closed. The American has spoken unmistakably. The Japanese may not come here as a labourer, or own land, or settle among us. Not less plainly has spoken the Australian or will speak the others as occasion arises.

The reasons alleged are partly true, partly specious and disingenuous. The assertion is that he is an "unfair" competitor. Unfair is a euphemism the world over for dangerous. When tacit agreement has established a level of prices or wages, it is "unfair" to disturb it. Possibly unlovely traits of Japanese character lend countenance to the charge, but they are hardly more than pretexts. The real objection to the Japanese is that he is willing to ac-

cept life and labour on less favourable terms than we are. If he stays, he gets our job, our farm, our place in the sun, by the working of an inexorable economic law, and the instinct of self-preservation compels us to resist. The more of a case we can make out against him, the easier it is to rouse the necessary spirit of opposition. So he is "dishonest," "tricky," "un-American," "immoral," objections too often urged by those not qualified to cast the first stone, and not more true of him than of other men. But the one thing that is true, and that is enough, if not to justify our opposition, at least to create it among any virile people on earth, is the fact that he can underbid us and so displace us and take our birth-right. Perhaps this does not justify us in excluding him, but the point is not worth discussing. We shall exclude him,—if we can.

The one remaining possibility for Japanese emigration is in Latin America, and this opening has not been overlooked. Nevertheless the opportunity is more restricted than it might seem. Most of Latin America is tropical and therefore little suited to Japanese colonization. Very much of it is peopled by an inferior race, and is therefore a field for exploitation rather than for colonization, for the same reasons that hold in China and Korea. The most attractive part of it, on the other hand, is in the possession of Europeans who will almost inevitably have the Anglo-Saxon's reasons for excluding the Oriental. Possibly Mexico offers the most favourable opportunity, and possibly here or elsewhere in Latin America Japanese settlement may be attempted.

Curiously enough, even here the Anglo-Saxon interposes his veto. There can be no question that the American people would look with extreme disfavour upon the establishment of Japanese colonies anywhere in the Western Hemisphere and especially in any proximity to our own boundaries. Nothing could at first sight seem more churlish than this attitude of universal opposition to the Oriental. Not content with keeping him out of our own territory, we threaten to pursue him far beyond it. We segregate him as we do the pestilence, drawing our cordon around his narrow domain. Yet there is a reason which is perhaps quite as imperative as that already noted. This reason is to be found in the connection which exists between emigration and political expansion. We object to the Japanese in California on economic and social grounds. In Mexico that objection does not hold. If the Mexicans do not object to Japanese competition, that is quite their affair. We do not object to the Japanese in Mexico.

But we do object to *Japan* in Mexico. If we knew that the Japanese settler in Latin America did not in any sense bring his country with him, that he would never claim its aid and it would never claim his allegiance, any objection on our part to his settling there would be an unpardonable impertinence. But there is an increasing tendency on the part of modern nations to retain the allegiance of those born under their flag, who take up their abode in other lands. The doctrine that the fatherland has a perpetual claim upon the allegiance of its sons, even when permanently domiciled under a foreign flag, has been asserted

of late with growing emphasis, and has given to emigration a sinister political significance. A settlement of aliens therefore becomes a foreign outpost and potentially a foreign fortress. All this is perfectly in keeping with the instinct of nationality which we have already considered. There is something that is dearer than the welfare of the individual,—dearer to those who stay, and dearer to those who go,—and that is the welfare of the nation and of the culture and life of the race. It is a degenerate and unworthy people that can expatriate itself without a pang,—without serious reservations. As the culture and spiritual life of the race find more and more perfect expression in the developing organ of the nation, we must expect the nation to make an ever stronger appeal to the individual whose spiritual heritage it holds in its keeping. We must expect, too, that the nation, ever more delicately equipped, will grapple to itself with hooks of steel all those who can serve its purpose in the strenuous competition of civilization with civilization. Each culture will claim its own and seek its own over land and sea. With the new facilities, none can elude its search, none can be deaf to its daily and hourly appeal. Increasingly, therefore, emigration loses its individual character and takes on the character of the national life. Every community in whose population a single alien element predominates, becomes a pawn on the political chessboard not to be overlooked by the master player. It is therefore with perfect reasonableness that we regard with interest, not to say with alarm, the establishment of Japanese communities in our neighbourhood.

But meanwhile the world is closed to the Japanese and to their neighbours and kin. It is a startling fact that they alone among civilized races are not welcomed in any part of the civilized world or its uncivilized dependencies. Every other expanding race is free to expand in any part of the world on condition of accepting foreign allegiance. The German, the Syrian, the Russian, the Jew, may settle and labour among us, may buy and sell and get gain, but not the Mongolian. This race alone, expanding in response to that universal pressure which so few races have been able to resist, and which they resist seemingly at their peril, must contain itself. Will it do so? Can it do so? Dull indeed must be the man who can not see in this repression of the irrepressible a mine laid for the explosion.

In the face of this world-wide ostracism of the most numerous and the most prolific of the races of men, how trivial seem the remedies so confidently urged. We should soothe and conciliate the Japanese. We should send visitors back and forth and exchange professors and promote an "understanding." Yes, of course. But this is no question of Japanese sensibilities. The trouble is due to no misunderstanding. The cause lies deeper and deeper must go the cure.

CHAPTER XV

GREATER JAPAN

IN considering the possibility of collision between America and the Mongolian East, we have thus far confined our attention to the physical or biological problem. This is primarily a problem of numbers, room, and sustenance. An excessive birthrate, for which satisfactory restraints are not yet available, produces a surplus which, unlike that of other overpopulated countries, is debarred by a world-wide opposition, from seeking relief in migration and assimilation into other races.

But Japan would not be satisfied with such a solution of her problem even if the world would allow it. Even Europe is beginning to realize that it is not satisfactory, and the present war is primarily a protest on the part of Germany against this method of maintaining the equilibrium. This surplus population is after all the growth of the people. To dispose of it by emigration to other countries is simply to give away and waste what ought to make the home country great. It costs a great deal to raise a man from infancy to manhood, and when he is grown and able to work, he ought to be worth something to his own people. It is quite a wrong view, so these reasoners tell us, to regard such a man as a burden, and his departure to another country as a good riddance. The

power of a race to maintain itself against the manifold forces that threaten its integrity and its existence, is not alone its power to multiply, or to conquer territory, or to acquire wealth. It depends quite as much on its ability to hold on to its offspring, to stamp them indelibly with its own character, and to retain their persistent allegiance. The race that consents easily to expatriation and assimilation may multiply and replenish the earth, but as a race and as the exponent of a distinctive culture, it will perish. Tenacity of race character and allegiance is therefore quite as important as numbers or extent of territory. As the nations become more conscious of this fact, they show increasing solicitude for those who go out from them, striving to discover some way by which their strength may still inure to the benefit of their race.

All this rests back upon the truth with which we are already familiar, a truth which we ought constantly to recall and emphasize, but which we are prone to overlook, that our human problem is very much more than a problem of the individual. There is for every people something much greater and more precious than the individual. There is the great structure of race custom, slowly built through the patient ages. There are sentiments and ideals which fill life with music and bathe with sunset glories the threshold of the inevitable night. There are symbols of faith and family and race, the cross, the flag, the marriage ring, by which the heart declares its allegiance and in which it recognizes its own. There are the laws, those curbstones which line the traffic routes of life and keep men safe in their goings. All this and more, that un-

counted wealth of the race which we call its culture, each race builds, enlarges, and protects as the heritage of the individual. He is nothing without it. He may perish and others will take his place, but if it perishes, all that is of value to him and to others perishes with it. Like a child born of a naked savage upon a barren heath he enters upon a life without content or rational justification.

Hence it comes that the object of supreme concern to every people is not its individuals but its civilization. If that is menaced, any number of individuals will be sacrificed unhesitatingly for its preservation. This is merely their emergency contribution to that which is their all. And for precisely similar reasons the normal contribution of the individual,—of every individual,—is service, service to the limit of his powers and under the widest possible range of conditions. What more natural than that any surplus of individuals above what can be accommodated in its present establishment and employed for its maintenance, should be utilized for its enlargement and exaltation!

Along some such line as this the half unconscious instincts of a people grope toward their goal, a goal which can never be mere provision for the individual, but must always have for its paramount aim the maintenance and aggrandizement of the culture of the race. And since race culture uses as its chief and most tangible agency the organization of the state, the race will always be jealous among other things for the power and extension of the state.

There can be no question that this conception of

race interest has grown rapidly in recent years. Half a century ago the older peoples viewed with little apparent concern the wastage of their human surplus, and even encouraged it by fostering emigration. Today scarce one of them is doing so. A few decades since Englishmen discussed with unconcern the probable graduation of the British colonies into independence. Today such opinions would seem almost treasonable. The race consciousness of all peoples now has the wider horizon of the imperial state. The old wasteful days, when nations looked on with indifference at the loss of the most enterprising of their citizens, are past and an era of culture thrift has begun. The emigrant goes out with a string to him. The nations are looking, not for the place where their colonist will be best off, but for the place where he will be worth most to them, a place where he can become a paramount influence, a country which he can make subservient, if possible a country which he may sometime bring under the control of his nation.

And for precisely this reason, the nations are watching immigration with a new solicitude. They see unpleasant possibilities in the presence in particular localities of aliens of a single nation so numerous as to keep one another in countenance and preserve their alien culture intact. Above all they watch with anxiety the formation of such alien communities in neighbouring and weakly governed states where the power to assimilate is small and pretexts for intervention are frequent. Our objection to the Japanese as individuals is thus reinforced by our objection to Japan as a colonizing and expanding state.

Any nation which is really alive and enterprising is in this sense a potential menace to other nations, but this menace is immensely increased if the nation in question is hard pressed. The Spartans were a harmless folk until driven from their earlier home and threatened with destruction. A nation menaced with political extinction or with serious curtailment of influence, will take risks in order to strengthen its position, which under other circumstances would be the height of imprudence. A nation so menaced thus becomes in its turn a menace to other nations.

Japan, like England, is situated close to the mainland in a position of wonderful strength. But even more than in the case of England, the disparity in size between the little island state and the mainland is enormous and is not offset by the divisions in the latter which have so long been England's protection. Japan faces on the continent only a single modern power whose area is nearly sixty times her own. Her relation to Russia well illustrates the complexity of modern international relations. There is little race antipathy between them, and Russia suffers from dearth rather than from congestion of population. Yet the conflict of interests between them is as marked and as irreconcilable as any in the world. So long as the control of necessary gateways is a part of the policy of enterprising nations, Russia will be impelled by the strongest considerations of commercial convenience and national defence to force her way through to the eastern sea. At present she has no satisfactory outlet. There is indeed but one really available outlet, alike serviceable to commerce and capable of de-

fence, the Gulf of Pechili with its great harbour at Dairen, its Gibraltar at Port Arthur, and its impregnable outposts in Korea and Shantung. Toward these Russia was pressing with all the force of her mighty energy when the nineteenth century closed.

Japan viewed this advance of Russia with the utmost solicitude. It is most important that we should understand the reasons for her anxiety. These are essentially two, political and cultural, though as we have seen, they are but different aspects of a single interest.

If Russia should advance a solid front clear out to the Japan Sea and intrench herself in Korea and Port Arthur, while ample communications were established with the populous districts of Western Russia and the regions of eastern Siberia were filled with Russian settlers, there could be no question but that Russia would dominate the entire East. China, for an indefinite period, would be unable to oppose any effectual opposition, and against a power so vast as Russia Japan could not protect herself. It is of course possible that Russia would never have attacked Japan, but the mischief would nevertheless be done. Between two countries so situated there are sure to be numerous questions on which interests and opinions would differ, questions of their commerce with China and with each other, questions of naval and maritime privilege, questions of every conceivable sort, the decision of which would make a great deal of difference to both citizens and state. Against this greater Russia little Japan could never make her will prevail. If she accepted in every case Russia's view of the situation, she would

be unmolested but would dwindle into insignificance. If she resisted she would be coerced and probably annexed and assimilated. Her fate would be that of docile Denmark or devastated Serbia. This was the political danger.

But something far worse menaced little Japan. The Japanese culture is one of the daintiest and most exquisite in the world. There is a porcelain-like delicacy and fragility to the wondrously beautiful civilization which the Japanese have inherited from old Japan and to which they are attached with passionate devotion. What would happen to this civilization if it were lined up in helpless subserviency to the huge raw-boned might of Russia? We will suppose the most favourable conditions, that Japan remains unmolested, that Russia is friendly and sympathetic, and even that Japanese culture becomes the object of patronizing recognition on the part of Russian aesthetes who should worship at the shrine of Kyoto as Cicero did at the shrine of Athens. What would come of it? Undoubtedly Japanese culture would enjoy a certain dilettante distinction and attain a wide vogue abroad, but it would die at home. It would still have partisans who would extol its merits and speak with fine scorn of its parvenu patrons, but the eyes of the people would turn with admiration to the culture of the race that had the power to do the thing that it willed. Nothing discredits a culture like impotence. Indeed the first marked effect of the opening of Japan and the revelation to her people of the power of the western nations, was an almost tragic disparagement of their own civilization accompanied by a domestic

vandalism and a tasteless foreign craze the results of which a generation of restored sanity has not been able to obliterate. No, it needed no invasion or conquest to destroy Japan as her wise leaders knew and loved her. Only let Russia build out in fulness of strength on the nearby mainland and the mischief was wrought. Little Japan could never exist alongside of Greater Russia.

What was the way of escape? There was but one possible answer. There must be no Greater Russia, and there must be a Greater Japan. This is the program of Japan.

The first part of the program was simple if not easy. Russia must be checked in her advance, kept out of the mountain fastnesses of Korea, expelled from her naval base at Port Arthur and driven back from the sea. That has been momentarily accomplished. Beginning by brushing out of her path the complacent Chinese suzerainty, Japan fell upon overconfident Russia with blows so sudden and so stinging that the colossus reeled back from Korea and Port Arthur, and the coveted Manchurian outlet was lost. The victory was indubitable but it was not decisive. It was a victory of Japan's uttermost against a fraction of Russia's strength. It was plain that Russia could and would and must come back, for the Manchurian outlet was as near a necessity to Russia as such things can ever be. Japan had taken successfully the first step toward Greater Japan, but now more than ever she needed to be,—must be,—Greater Japan.

The stars in their courses have fought for her, and

her momentary gain has been prolonged beyond her hope. Other and mightier enemies have smitten Russia and called all her forces into the supreme struggle for existence. The truce with Japan has been prolonged indefinitely and even masked with an alliance. And now revolution, with its orgy of destruction and fantastic reorganization completes the paralysis and prolongs the truce from which Japan profits so much. It may be long before Russia renews the challenge, but her need remains. In her moment of carnival she may forget it, but not for long. Japan does not forget it, does not forget that when that challenge comes she will need to be Greater Japan.

To be Greater Japan she must have more territory, more population, and more wealth. Where are these to be obtained?

There is first of all the Asiatic mainland. Of this she now holds Korea, is in virtual control of Manchuria through her ownership of the railroad and her possession of its terminals and defences, and last but not least, is in a position of paramount influence in China. Unless Japan suffers a great military reverse or fails in her far-sighted vision, her hold upon all these territories is likely to increase. She has recently protested in no uncertain terms against our sending a note to China without first consulting her, claiming thus a "paramount position" in China as a "necessity of her national defence." Having forced back Russia and expelled Germany, she openly asserts a protectorate over the entire East. She has thus taken a very tangible and considerable step toward Greater Japan, albeit a step which like the pre-

ceding, is immensely hazardous, and requires more than ever that she become Greater Japan.

What advantage can Japan hope to derive from her paramount position in the East if she can maintain it?

The first and most tangible advantage is that of defence. Japan has the same advantage from keeping Germany out of Shantung that we have in keeping her out of Cuba. She now holds Korea and Manchuria against Russia, and Kiaochow in the Shantung Peninsula against Germany, while her great island of Formosa further south (taken from China in 1895) now guards the coast of Southern China where she has put the Chinese government under bonds never to allow a foreign establishment. Finally, in these last days, she has acquired the famous Portuguese settlement of Macao, an island near Hong Kong. She thus has stations along the whole eastern coast which is brought under her effective control to the exclusion of all European rivals except her ally, Britain. The possession of defence stations does not insure defence, but it gives an advantage so enormous that it may be questioned whether any power is now able to challenge her control save only the single power with which she at present shares it.

As a refuge for her surplus population, we have seen that this great territory is poorly available. It has a vast population of its own which can not be displaced and which is yet but little likely to become Japanese. There are two requirements in this connection which must be separately considered. In the first place room is needed for Japanese who have

no place and whose coming Japan can not hinder. In the second place, Japan needs more Japanese to fill her armies, industrial and military, if she is to become Greater Japan. Neither of these are here satisfactorily secured. There is little room for the Japanese who are unprovided for. It may be doubted, too, whether the time will come in any near future when Koreans and Chinese can be trusted to fight the battles of Japan. So long as this is true, Japan can not be satisfied with a position, no matter how paramount, on the mainland of Asia.

One object, however, and that of great importance, Japan seems likely to realize in Manchuria and China. If she can not colonize them she can exploit them, and the yield should be enormous. Poor as they now are through ignorance and mismanagement, their mineral resources are among the richest in the world, while they teem with an industrious population capable of indefinite production under proper leadership, a population which furnishes from the outset one of the richest markets in the world for the varied industries of new Japan. These advantages, of course, Japan can not monopolize, but her nearness and the low cost of her labour give her advantages which come dangerously near to monopoly. These advantages she perfectly appreciates and seizes with disquieting alacrity.

But all this necessarily depends for its guaranty of final success, upon securing a broader basis for her own population whose patriotism must be the support of the imperial structure of Greater Japan. We may rest assured that Japan will not willingly

abandon the hope of finding a place where her people can multiply, and where they can still be her people. It is difficult to see where she can find that territory in the Eastern Hemisphere.

One more opening remains for Greater Japan, and this perhaps the greatest of all. As she becomes more and more conscious of the similarity of her position to that of Britain, she naturally inquires where the British live who back this tremendous power and on what fields they reap their harvests. The answer is *the sea*. The British red upon the map tinges the ocean's blue from pole to pole and drowns all other tints. Upon the sea many millions of Britons win their livelihood, and here are invested thousands of millions of British capital whose dividends put the world under tribute to Britain. Why may not Japan share this opportunity? This is in fact her most hopeful outlook and her most immediate ambition. It is one, too, which we have unintentionally done all we could to help her to realize. Driven by the clamour of a bullying minority of labour, we have enacted legislation which has handed our Pacific commerce to Japan on a silver platter. The commerce of Japan has gone forward by leaps and bounds, profiting enormously by her shrewd rather than disinterested attitude in the present struggle. Her vast fleet, supplemented by recent acquisitions from our own, is kept in safe and lucrative employment which it will doubtless continue, to enormous advantage in the early years of peace. There seems to be no reason why Japan should not dominate, not to say monopolize, the trans-Pacific commerce.

It seems a legitimate ambition, and if Japan can be bound over to keep the peace on such terms as this, America and the rest of the world may have reason to think the bargain a good one. But does it bind her to keep the peace? And if she breaks the peace, what of her ships in such an event?

We need not emphasize the obvious fact that as land empires are subject to attack by their land neighbours, so maritime empires are subject to attack by their maritime neighbours. If France has to be on her guard against the German army, so Japan has to be on her guard against the German navy. Thus the maritime state naturally becomes a naval state, developing her navy *pari passu* with her merchant marine and using it for defence or for offence as inclination or necessity may prompt. If any one doubts the necessity of this parallel development, it is sufficient for our purpose to note that Japan does not doubt it, and that her policy in these matters is not at all a matter of question. There are farther factors which tend in the same direction. A great maritime power implies great shipbuilding plants, and these can be turned to the building of ships of war when occasion demands. It implies the existence of large numbers of sailors, navigators, engineers and so forth who can be drawn upon in an emergency for naval warfare. It implies a vast transport service, for a merchant ship is at the call of its flag in case of war. When the present war broke out, the Allies are said to have commandeered thirty-two hundred ships of their several flags for the transportation of troops and munitions. What would

have happened if they had sold all their ships to Germany a few years before?

Most important of all, a naval and maritime state must have its stations scattered through the seven seas. Enough has been said to make clear the need of such stations for the navy in time of war. For reasons not so obvious but which are said to be quite as decisive, maritime commerce seems to require them in time of peace. A nation trading all over the world may theoretically have the facilities of all foreign ports at its disposal, but practically its ships are at a certain disadvantage in ports which are under the control of a rival trading power. The flag of the port will have precedence in numberless ways which in the end are apt to tip the scale against the stranger, not to mention the ever present possibility of national rupture when exclusion means capture and ruin. A chain of naval stations is therefore the necessary concomitant of maritime development. And once more, if we do not believe it, Japan does. She views with admiration and envy the wonderful chain of posts which like a string of jewels, Britain has flung around the neck of the world. She is duplicating it as fast as she can. Already her island empire stretches in unbroken chain from the tip of Kamchatka down to the southern tip of Formosa, and now by her latest acquisition, on to Hong Kong. It will go farther if Japan is able to carry it farther. There will be counterparts for Singapore and Colombo and more, if Japan can find them while England has her busy day. The highway of Suez from Yokohama to London will be dotted with her caravanseries.

But there is another route hardly less important, perhaps destined to be more important, a route that leads from Yokohama straight as the arrow flies to Honolulu and on, glancing along the Mexican coast, to Panama and past the Virgin Isles to our busy East and the great centres of European industry and trade. Oh, for stations along this route! And nature has been so thoughtful in the matter of Hawaii. Yes, and so has Japan, for she has peopled it with her children. And Mexico! Think of it. Colony, naval station, all she needs. And Colombia, sullen and venal, with harbours of refuge at the very gates of the Canal. Japan has thought of all this and has acted on the thought. She has no naval station in Mexico or Colombia as yet? Who knows? She has certainly negotiated for such, and if she has not yet succeeded, it is not from lack of desire, nor from fear of us or regard for us, nor from any love that our sister republics bear us.

This one fact must be borne in mind in discussing our relation to Japan. Japan is neither more hostile nor more unscrupulous than other nations, but she is a hungry nation, hungry beyond the measure of most. With a people banned by a world ostracism which the world has no power to lift, crowded into an inadequate territory which greater neighbours are forced to covet, and charged with the defence of a fragile and exquisite civilization which has no kindred among the civilizations of men, her course is dictated by an imperious necessity which laughs at our puny expedients and bids us look to our goings. We have not comprehended the problem before us unless we have

perceived that even a friendly Japan is still a menace.

Does this mean war with Japan? Not if we do our part like men. The push of life is eternal, but its power is finite. The greater power of growth will grow the lesser to a standstill. If we perceive the impact of Japanese growth and the direction of Japanese need, and stand stiffly over against them, opposing growth with growth, and claiming our reasonable heritage upon the sea, out to where we have placed our outposts in the Philippines and Samoa, Japan will not challenge our position alone.

Alone! Ay, there's the rub. When the painful pressure of her manifold need forces her to knock with importunity at our gates, will she knock alone?

NOTE. As these pages go to press come several significant utterances from the head of the Japanese Mission to the United States, utterances the most authoritative possible, since the head of this Mission is both the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Empire and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States. The most noted of these utterances is a categorical announcement that Japan will tolerate no aggression of the western powers upon China. This statement to which certain organs of public opinion here have had the bad taste to take exception, is a commonplace of the existing situation, and the only startling thing about it is its admirable candour. With it was coupled the pledge that Japan would adhere to the policy of the open door. This we may assume to be sincere. Japan is not generous but prudent. She could not close the door without immense difficulty and danger. Moreover, she is perfectly safe in leaving it open.

A far more significant statement, however, seems to have attracted little attention. This was to the effect that Japan had cast in her lot with the English speaking nations of the world. This statement, if true, is perhaps the most important that a Japanese statesman could utter. It is probably true. The supreme political fact of the twentieth century is the struggle between the Teuton and Anglo-Saxon for world leadership. That is the meaning of the present war, the meaning of the scheming and manœuvring of the last half

century. Many things incline Japan to take the Teuton's side,—similarity of organization and political faith, similarity of need, etc. If Japan has cast in her lot with us, it is not because she loves us or hates our enemies, but because she judges,—and none judge more shrewdly than she,—that we are to be the winners in the contest.

These statements were apparently intended to prepare the public for the announcement which followed a few days later, that the two governments had reached a definite understanding and embodied it in an exchange of notes. In this understanding we recognized for the first time the paramount position of Japan in the Far East and entered into a virtual undertaking to coöperate with her in maintaining the integrity of China and guaranteeing the open door, an undertaking in which China not unnaturally sees more of menace than protection.

CHAPTER XVI

THE UNFEARED POWERS

IT has been the declared policy of the United States from the first to minimize political relations with Europe. Washington's farewell advice to avoid entangling alliances with European nations, though aimed at a particular danger which quickly passed away, has received the broadest interpretation and the sincerest recognition as the foundation of our national policy. This policy was really reflected in the Monroe Doctrine which was in essence a declaration of the policy of America for the Americans, the negative implications being hardly less definite than the positive assertion.

This conservative political policy was paralleled and in some sense reinforced by our commercial policy of protection, a policy largely fortuitous in its origin, but speedily confirmed by the industrial conditions which it created. It can not be said that this policy has smoothed the pathway of our international intercourse, but it has had two important results which have coincided with our separatist policy in politics.

In the first place it has been in general non-discriminatory. Whatever tax was levied, was levied upon all producers alike. We did not charge more duty upon French woollens than upon British wool-

lens of like quality. To be sure, if we chose to levy a heavy duty on silk and a light duty on chemicals we could hit France and favour Germany, and such considerations were by no means always absent in framing our tariff laws, especially when we found it necessary to coerce a refractory nation into admitting our goods on more favourable terms. But the possibilities of discrimination in such ways were always limited by the exigencies of home industries. They have been as nothing to the discrimination practised under the system of commercial treaties where a country dickers with each country separately, granting better rates to one than to another, in return for like concessions. Such treaties come perilously near being national alliances and easily provoke military reprisals, as they are in turn the frequent result of military operations. The much talked of Economic Conference of the Allies and its alleged policy of "War after the War" illustrates this intimate connection. The United States has pretty uniformly held aloof from this policy of commercial alliance and in so doing has undoubtedly confirmed its policy of political aloofness.

A second result of our policy of protection has been to lessen trade relations with other countries, to force the development of industries temporarily and even permanently unprofitable at home, and so to foster the economic independence of the country. The economic advantage of this independence may well be doubted. Economic efficiency is attained by specialization, not by all-roundness, and there is no reason to believe that this law holds less of the nation

than of the individual. But economic efficiency is very different from human efficiency, and the advantage to the latter of this policy of national self-sufficiency is more plausible. In any case there can be little doubt that it has contributed to the policy of political aloofness which Washington enjoined, both by equipping us for a self-sufficient life and still more by creating a mental attitude favourable to it.

It is suggestive of the nature of the relations with which we have to deal, that despite the exceptionally favourable conditions, geographical, economic, and historic, under which this experiment of national aloofness has been tried, we are today active participants in the most stupendous European struggle ever known and in full alliance with nations whose immediate objectives have to do wholly with the Eastern Hemisphere. By almost universal consent, too, this participation was unavoidable. It is true that in deference to our tradition we have avoided the formalities of alliance, but we have not avoided its substance. We have refused to commit ourselves to the concrete objects of the various allies,—the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, the independence of Belgium and Serbia, the reconstitution of the Balkan States and Poland and the like, and have substituted glittering generalities instead. We are fighting “to make the world safe for democracy.” “We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples.” How different from those peoples who are fighting for provinces and strategic frontiers! Yet it must be apparent to the thoughtful that this program of gener-

alities must resolve itself into a program of concrete arrangements. The undictated development of all peoples will in the end depend on frontiers and other concrete arrangements of the sort that the Allies,—our allies,—are fighting for. And since they are our allies and the parties most immediately concerned in all these concrete matters, it is obviously impossible that our ultimate concrete program should be other than theirs. Equally, too, though we have not signed a treaty pledging us to make peace in common with the Allies (no entangling alliances for us) it is demonstrably impossible for us to do otherwise. We can not secure anything approximating to our declared aims until Germany submits to the Allies. We therefore cannot quit the war a day sooner than the Allies and we manifestly cannot continue it a day longer.

Then away with all illusions. We are back in Europe, back despite our stern resolve, our long tradition, our commercial aloofness, and our proud self-sufficiency. This is no excursion. We are back with bag and baggage, and back to stay. If we win what we are fighting for, we shall have to guard what we win. If Europe needs us now, she will always need us, and if we can not resist her appeal as an alien, how much more prompt our response when the graves of our soldiers have made her soil our shrine! What then of the new life in the old homestead of our race?

We may safely assume at the outset that with all their jealousies and grudges, the nations of Europe are, one and all, minded to be our friends. A single

prominent exception seems to exist at present, but it may be doubted whether even in this case the hostility is representative and ineradicable. Most of the European nations are conscious of certain unlovely traits in American character which they make the occasional object of criticism and ridicule, overlooking meanwhile, as is men's wont, some of our better characteristics, but these doubtful amenities do not mean hostility, and both the desire for our lucrative commercial patronage and a wholesome respect for our power incline them to friendship. In most cases, and especially in the case of the nations we are about to consider, hostility is a remote contingency. But that contingency, never quite excluded, is the subject of our present inquiry.

Of the score or more of countries which make up modern Europe, the majority are popularly regarded as negligible in any consideration of our national defence. They are too small, too poor in resources, or too handicapped by situation or other circumstance to give us any concern. Such are the Scandinavian countries, the Balkan States, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, and perhaps Italy and Spain. Our peaceable relations with these countries are important and mutually profitable. But if these relations should be strained to the breaking point, the advantage would seem to be overwhelmingly with us. No doubt this is the prevailing opinion in America. Our relation to the minor powers of Europe, as regards problems of national defence, gives us no concern.

It may be doubted, however, whether this com-

placency is justified. It is based on the mistaken assumption that these nations are separate units and to be dealt with singly in any emergency which may arise. They are, on the contrary, nearly all of special strategic importance in the European scheme of things. We have to deal, not with them alone, but with their backers. As regards the problem of our national defence, our interest in these powers lies in their relation to these backers, into whose plans they enter and whose bidding they are likely to do. Such states as Belgium, Portugal, Albania, and Turkey, are not natural states at all, but artificial creations or unnatural survivals maintained by the great powers in the interest of their national defence. The same is true, if in less degree, of nearly all the lesser powers of Europe. We are stronger than they, but we have not to deal with them alone. By themselves they are negligible, but as auxiliaries of the greater powers, willing or unwilling, they may turn the scale. Was not Belgium Germany's undoing? Did not Greece thwart the plans of the Allies?

There is more than one way in which a little nation may play the decisive rôle in great events. It may be the protégé of a great power, voluntarily making common cause with it. Such is Portugal in relation to Britain, such Germany asserts Belgium to be in regard to Britain and France. Again, it may be an inevitable victim in the line of imperialist aggression, and may yield, be it ever so unwillingly, a strategic site which is vital to the great schemes to which it itself is sacrificed. Such is the relation of

Belgium and Holland to Germany, of Serbia to Austria, and of Turkey to Russia. And finally, to vary slightly the case last mentioned, it may possess dependencies which it can not defend and which, when seized by a greater power, quite change the relation of the latter to other powers. Thus Denmark, though completely helpless as against Russia or Britain, was none the less their deadly menace by virtue of her possession of Schleswig-Holstein, so vital to Germany's schemes. Similarly, moribund Turkey held Egypt, and China held Korea, each indispensable to the supremacy of the powers into whose hands they have since fallen.

Are there more possibilities of this kind? Are any of these little countries that we do not fear, protégés of big countries whose purposes they are likely to serve? Are there any that are likely to be forcibly annexed and to furnish thus new avenues of aggression to the great? Above all, are there powers that hold in feeble hands weapons which may be taken from them and used in stronger hands to our undoing? In one or another of these ways, every minor power in Europe is for us a potential menace.

The problem here suggested is illustrated by our recent acquisition of the Virgin Isles, or the Danish West Indies. They are of insignificant extent and of no direct value. They give us nothing that we did not already possess in sufficiency. In the hands of Denmark they were innocuous. But it was all but certain that the islands, if left in possession of Denmark, would ultimately come under the control of Germany. This might happen by means of an

alliance based on some form of mutual interest, an alliance for which Germany could afford to offer Denmark large inducements. Or the islands might be ceded to Germany, either under compulsion, or for the large inducements which might be offered. Finally, and most likely of all, Denmark herself might be annexed, either abruptly, as in the case of Silesia or Alsace-Lorraine, or gradually, by the seductive method of a slowly tightening alliance. The method would matter little. The result would matter much, and we have wisely decided to forestall its possibilities. We are on the best of terms with Denmark, but Denmark can not be trusted with the custody of anything which Germany can not be permitted to acquire. The example of Schleswig-Holstein has not been forgotten.

It may be useful at a time like this to recall this famous case. In 1852 the five great powers, England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, at the Conference of London pledged themselves to respect the integrity of Denmark and to defend it against attack. Later, Prussia, till then without a navy, conceived the idea of becoming a naval power, and at once perceived that a canal across the neck of Denmark was necessary to enable her to use her navy as a whole against either a Baltic power like Russia or a western power like England or France, for the Danish straits would inevitably be blocked in case of war, and their navy would thus be divided and comparatively helpless in either direction. Schleswig-Holstein, the neck of land which joins Denmark to the mainland, must be secured. When, on a

trumped up charge, Denmark was attacked by Prussia and Austria, France, much occupied elsewhere, declined to interfere in a matter that interested her but little, England, much more concerned, threatened but at the last moment (as Bismarck had predicted) refused to go to war without France, and Russia, vitally affected by this project which transferred the control of the Baltic to Prussia, was helpless.¹

The menace of the Danish islands has been removed, but other possibilities remain. A similar but far more important case is that of Holland, the incorporation of which is a well known part of German policy. It is true that the Dutch do not share this ambition, and they have powerful backers, but it is by no means sure that Germany can be prevented from acquiring control of some sort over the little neighbour. It must be remembered that avowed annexation is not the only nor the most feasible method. Commercial dependence making it impossible for Holland altogether to oppose German designs, may be all that is necessary. It is perfectly possible, too, that a difference between the United States and Holland might find the latter the willing ally of Germany. In such a combination the weight of Holland would be tremendous. It is true that the menace would be much less to us than to a country like Britain which would be at the mercy of Germany, attacking through Holland, while the Dutch East Indies would present a like menace to almost the whole British Empire. But while we should face no such menace, a Dutch-

¹ This case is commended to the attention of the League to Enforce Peace.

German combination has its possibilities for us also. Dutch Guiana is not the equal of Danish St. Thomas, but it is not a place where we could see German power established without serious misgivings.

More general but not less real are the dangers involved in all those minor countries which are factors in the problem of the balance of power in Europe. Belgium does not threaten us, nor would her union with Germany give to the latter power any point of immediate vantage in a struggle with America. But the possession of Belgium would give Germany so great an advantage over France and England as to make her the paramount power in Europe and make it impossible for other powers effectually to oppose her designs. Such being the situation in Europe, it would be still more impossible for America to oppose her. What country could be more remote from American interests than Bulgaria? Yet the control of Bulgaria by Germany is an important link in the continuous chain which she expects to extend through the Balkans and across Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. Once again, the realization of such a scheme would leave Europe helpless and ourselves still more helpless to resist schemes the extent of which has never yet been fully realized. Bulgaria may be our undoing. Equally and more, Turkey has sites in her possession which are the key to the entire balance of the modern world. Our interests in Turkey are more than mission schools.

Broadly stated, the minor powers of Europe hold the balance of power in the world. Powerless for independent action, they are capable of tipping the

scale into which their weight is thrown either by choice or compulsion. In but few cases is it possible to anticipate their action, the more so as their freedom of choice is so limited. They remain as residual unorganized material among the growing aggregations of Europe. For the moment they are the object of the knight-errantry of Europe, guided, as humanity loves to be, by the instinct of self-preservation and the sincere pretext of generous chivalry. Their independence, tenaciously maintained and chivalrously upheld, has its place, but it can hardly continue. Slowly, involuntarily, imperceptibly, half unconsciously, it may be, these little peoples, scarce one of whom represents an ethnic unity or a seriously distinctive culture, will range themselves under the larger banners. The result is likely to be momentous. It is one to which we can not be indifferent.

Hardly to be classed among minor powers, yet far from attaining to the first rank, is Spain, a power with whose decadence we have had much to do. With her final expulsion from the Western Hemisphere our political relations with Spain are popularly supposed to have terminated. There can be no doubt that Spain has accepted her defeat in good part and that she meditates no reprisals, either alone or in alliance with others. If she finally decides to enter the present war, there can be little doubt that it will be as our ally.

But concurrently with her humiliation as a military and colonial power, Spain began to feel the stirrings of a new life which her humiliation did much to accentuate. It is the first condition of efficiency in the

nation as in the individual that it should be forced to earn its own living. For nearly four hundred years Spain had lived a parasitic existence. She had known the whole range from stifling affluence to abject squalor, but still clung to her choice to be ministered unto rather than to minister. With the final loss of her colonies came the final emancipation from her parasitic ideal. Forces already in operation now became the nation's chief reliance, and she joined the ranks of the renewed and progressive lands. There can be no doubt that her progress has since been steady and that it will continue.

If so, Spain can hardly fail to come again into relation with the many states to which she has given birth, a relation more vital than any she has hitherto known. As an absentee landlord rack-renting the country, Spain was odious, but as an intelligent industrial state she would be welcome in a way that we can never be. Community of civilization would be an immense advantage in commerce, for after all commerce and industry are only purveyors to civilization, and the stranger is much at a disadvantage as compared with one to the manor born. No doubt this tendency of the Spanish world,—or shall we say the Latin world?—to draw together again is incipient as yet, and other influences may neutralize it, but it is a factor not to be ignored. It must be remembered too that geography favours it. Spain is nearer to South America than New York. If ambitious projects lately attributed to the king and his advisers to tunnel the Strait of Gibraltar and carry a railway through Morocco to Dakar (all in Latin territory)

are completed, Latin Europe will be but three days by fast steamer from Latin America. It would be strange if so great an advantage were without substantial results.

There is in such a development nothing necessarily inimical to American interests. In her own way the United States would doubtless profit by so great an improvement in communication. Yet it can not escape the thoughtful mind that such a development would tend to make Latin Europe the ally of Latin America in more than a sentimental and cultural sense. It is much to be hoped and not unreasonable to expect that relations between the United States and the Latin world will remain friendly. But if our necessary domination of the Caribbean and the jealousy which the divided condition of Latin America tends to produce, should result in serious friction between these countries and ourselves, the backing of Latin Europe with its renewed energy and its closer communications would quite change the problem for us. The concept of a Latin Europe again making common cause with Latin America and working out a Latin destiny in common is an imposing one and one not to be dismissed as of no concern to ourselves.

The position of Italy in such a combination is less easy to forecast. That position would naturally be less central and significant. Italy is not in the direct line of communication, and her ambitions have of late turned in an opposite direction. Her first ambition is to dominate the Adriatic by controlling its head and its mouth, and to this end she is now bending all her energies. She has very declared ambitions how-

ever, in the *Ægean*, while her seizure of Tripoli, and earlier, of Eritrea and Somaliland indicate an eastward trend of her development. The French seizure of Tunis in 1881 perhaps determined this trend. Tunis is the natural point of contact for Italy with Africa, but a point from which the natural line of least resistance is toward the west as the history of Rome illustrates. Perhaps the fear of such an advance of Italy, impelled France, already in Algeria, to forestall Italy whose aspirations toward Tunis were well known. The forestalling was complete, for an advance westward from Tripoli is seemingly impossible. All later developments have accentuated this trend of Italy toward the east, a direction farthest from our own interests.

But the possibility of political complications with Italy, though slight, is not excluded. The Italians have become one of the great migratory peoples of the world. Immense numbers flock to our shores where their presence has already caused grave complications. Other streams go to South America where they are rapidly becoming a prominent element in the scantily Europeanized population. Recalling what has been said about the increasingly political character of immigration, it will be seen that here too is a potential protector of Latin America.

All such suggestions seem fanciful, and taken by themselves they are so. No country which is otherwise well disposed, will go to war or risk war on behalf of emigrant subjects. Nor yet will Italy, if ever so inclined to war, make war on us alone for any

pretext or any reason, even the most urgent. But there are other possibilities outside these. Excess population, dynastic embarrassments, entangling alliances, any number of things, may predispose Italy to action in conjunction with other nations, action of a kind for which the interests of her immigrant subjects would furnish the occasion. Suppose, for instance, that we had incurred the wrath of Germany at a time when the mob killed Italian subjects in New Orleans and Louisiana refused redress. What would Italy, at that time the ally of Germany, have done? It will certainly be a clumsy statesmanship which makes Italy our enemy, but then,— we might have clumsy statesmanship.

The case of France, while suggesting little save the association with Latin America already indicated, brings us into the class of the great imperial powers. No nation in any age has had vaster ambitions or seemed so often near to their realization. When we remember that her "sphere of influence" has at one time or another, included not only the great territories she now holds,— territories twenty times the area of France — but Egypt, Palestine, India, numerous islands in the East and West Indies and nearly all of North America, while under Napoleon nearly all Europe except England owned her suzerainty, it is hardly too much to say that France is historically the world power.

But equally, no nation has known such fluctuations of fortune. Her Napoleonic empire dissolved as quickly as it was formed. In the wars of the eighteenth century she lost her entire colonial empire, and

was obliged to build another in the nineteenth out of the left-overs, spacious but mostly inferior territories. There was a momentary vista of supreme opportunity when she recovered Louisiana, but she did not hold it long enough to raise her flag there. Not till the audacious Napoleonic attempt to dominate Europe was over did the work of patient imperial construction begin.

In the course of this arduous task several vast projects have been undertaken with varying degrees of failure and success. The most ambitious of these and the one which most concerns ourselves was the attempt to re-establish French rule in America by the occupation of Mexico. This was based on the belief, for a time general in Europe, that our own state was to be dismembered and so rendered powerless to protest. The occasion of our civil war therefore seemed opportune. It proved most inopportune. Had the attempt been made before the war our proverbial unpreparedness might have given a chance of success. But the war did not dismember us and it did prepare us. So when it was finished France recognized the hopelessness of the attempt and withdrew her army, leaving her chivalrous puppet emperor to his fate. There seems little likelihood that the attempt will be repeated. France has since become a republic, and while this, as we have seen, offers no guaranty of a peaceable disposition, it perhaps does insure a more serious estimate of ourselves. Furthermore the development of every part of America steadily lessens the likelihood of success in such an undertaking. Finally, as we shall see,

France has found other opportunity and has been obliged to concentrate her energies elsewhere.

The second great attempt was in southeastern Asia. After losing India, France looked around for another like opportunity. China was the only possible chance. The prospect was good that China would go the way of India. France determined to post herself in a position of vantage. In co-operation with Britain she humbled China, meanwhile establishing herself in Tongking and Cambodia. This was very strategic ground, adjoining the most populous part of China on the north and the rich Siamese-Burmese peninsula on the west. The "forward" policy was quite frankly inaugurated. Aggression on the west prompted Britain to precipitate annexation of Burma to her Indian empire. On the north it provoked bitter opposition from China at whose hands France suffered unexpected humiliation. Progress was stayed, and slowly it developed that China was not to fall an easy victim to Europe, but that, taking advantage of European jealousies, she was going to be modernized and possibly maintain her independence. With this decision of destiny, the great French scheme of an Asiatic empire miscarried. Tongking, splendid domain as it is, is but the wreck of an abandoned enterprise. Testimony from all sides is to the effect that the Frenchman no longer sees visions and dreams dreams of Tongking.

Throughout the century as in all preceding imperial periods, Africa has attracted the attention of the French. Napoleon's dream of an empire in the nearer East is well known. From an early date the

claim of France to Egypt was generally recognized, a claim forfeited to Britain in 1882 by the almost incredible caprice of France. Aside from this, however, and Britain's resolute exclusion of France from the upper Nile valley, her progress in Africa has been steady and substantial from her seizure of Algeria in 1827 to her final acquisition of Morocco in 1911. Broadly speaking, she has acquired in that period the great island of Madagascar and the great hump of western Africa with the seacoast nearly all the way from Tunis round to the Congo. As we round into the Gulf of Guinea, it is true, French occupation becomes intermittent. Her frontage upon the coast alternates with that of Britain, as formerly with that of Germany, thus making incomplete her occupation of this vast West African domain which she would fain call her own and in which she is plainly the dominant power. But if other nations hold portions of her Africa, she holds portions of theirs, while the reversion of the huge Belgian Congo is promised to France if Belgium parts with it.

This African domain is the living part of the French colonial empire, the part where France has her visions, and spends her enthusiasm and her money. It is well that it is so. It is the colonial possibility that is nearest to her shores. The coast from Tunis to Morocco gives her absolute control of the great western basin of the Mediterranean,—*her* Mediterranean,—and the resources of her tropical territories are illimitable.

And what of us? We had well-nigh forgotten America in this development. So has France.

There is but one country from which we have less to fear than France. As one already largely endowed, she has much to lose and little to gain from territorial readjustments. It is the dispossessed who make trouble. The possessors have given bonds to keep the peace. France, too, has demonstrated that she has but little aptitude for general commerce and maritime power. She helped Britain force open the ports of China to western trade, but the steamers she built to ply on the busy Yangtse now fly the British flag. An empire scattered across the seven seas would require a temperament and a navy which she does not possess. The vast domain bulked near her doors, furnishing alike the indispensable tropical products and the indispensable national defence, is the appropriate outcome of her four centuries of effort.

France still owns French Guiana and a few islets in the Caribbean. What is our interest in them? Will she use them against us? It is difficult to see her advantage in so doing under present or prospective conditions. Will she dispose of them to some one who will? Probably not, but it is a possibility. They can have neither economic nor political value to her, considering her other interests. The likelihood that she will transfer them to an unwelcome party despite our protests seems slight at present. But circumstances might change. She might have inducements to make the transfer. She might conceivably be compelled to make it. It behooves us to avoid the transfer, to avoid the compulsion, possibly to forestall it by their acquisition or by their transfer to our unavoidable partner in these parts.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BACKGROUND OF EUROPE

There are two countries which we seldom think of when considering the problem of our relation to Europe, Austria and Russia. They are geographically remote from us, and though both are credited with unscrupulous ambitions, the policy of each is so directed that it seems little likely to conflict with our own interests. Yet the nations are today so closely related that it can hardly be said that any move, even the most remote and unrelated, is a matter of indifference to us. Interests that do not concern us directly, often affect us vitally through some intermediary whom they touch. This is peculiarly the case with both the countries in question.

AUSTRIA

Austria (by which is here meant the Austro-Hungarian Empire) is not one country but two, each as distinct as it is possible for clever political device to make it, though the two confer their crowns upon a single person. In these days when even in autocratic states, monarchs are a very small part of the machinery of government, two states that refuse to combine in anything except the monarch, are very much apart, the more so, when, as in the present case, they cordially dislike each other.

But the anomaly does not end here. Each of the two countries is composed of several smaller countries, united, to be sure, as regards government, but divided in everything else. All told, there are ten fairly distinct units,—we can not do better than to call them countries,—in this partnership empire. There is a distressing diversity in this heterogeneous group. Thus, the Bohemians and the Galicians are racially close kin and they are all Catholics, but they are geographically very poorly united, and they have a separate history which they stubbornly refuse to forget. They both make fairly good connections territorially with Austria to whose empire they belong, and together with Hungary, they round out the Dual Empire nicely, but they could not make any sort of a working team themselves, even if they were so inclined, which they are not. They are equally disinclined toward the union with Austria to which they consent for the simple reason that they can not help it.

Or again, take Slavonia, Croatia, and Bosnia. These are all Serbian in race and language, and it is on this fact that Serbia bases her hope of a greater Serbia. But Slavonia and Croatia are Catholic, Serbia is Orthodox, i.e. adherent of the Greek or Russian faith, while Bosnia, or at least its aristocratic and influential element, is Mohammedan and very reactionary at that. So the Slavonians and Croats are ruled by the Hungarians who make the most of their privilege, while the Bosnians, whom neither of the great partners dared to take lest they have more aliens than they could handle, are managed by

a Bosnian Bureau connected with the joint army administration of the Dual Empire, and the Serbians maintain a precarious independence. Still other alien elements, like the Roumanians and Italians, present like problems of incompatibility and subjection.

Finally, it is to be noted that the two dominant races, the Austrians (who are Germans) and the Hungarians or Magyars, who glare at each other and yet co-operate with each other in order to hold down the others, are both in a minority in their respective countries. The Austrians number only about a third of the inhabitants of Austria, and the Hungarians are in much the same plight. And since neither of these races has the slightest intention of relinquishing control, various devices are adopted to maintain it. The other races are partially disfranchised and played off one against another with a skill which naturally develops under these conditions.

The empire thus created is in a sense an anomaly. We usually think of a nation as the political organization of people who are drawn together by some conscious bond of race, religion or common purpose. That is what a nation should be, and that is what the nations of the world for the most part now are. Nobody imagines for a moment that any part of the United States or of France or of Germany would withdraw if it could. It is probable that no part even of the vast British empire would vote to sever its connection with the empire if given the opportunity, though a noisy element in a single small part vociferates its desire to do so. But it is doubtful

whether a single one of the ten race elements in Austro-Hungary would vote for real union with any other on a basis of fair and equal privilege.

All this tends to alienate the sympathy of other nations, and more particularly of those that recognize more fully the principle of the rule of the people. The feeling is natural that a government based on universal constraint rather than on universal consent is illegitimate. It is well to recall, however, that this anomalous government represents an anomalous situation and that a change in the government might not help matters if the situation remained unchanged. There is much talk of dissolving this unhappy combination and giving self-government to each of its dissatisfied elements. But the trouble is that what these various peoples want is not to govern themselves but to govern one another. Thus, there are no peoples in the world that talk more of race integrity than the Serbians and Roumanians, since a large part of their people are under Austro-Hungarian rule, and they would like to add them to their own states. But neither of these territories hesitated a moment, at the close of the Balkan wars, to annex territory peopled almost exclusively by Bulgarians. There is every reason to fear, therefore, that if these people were given self-government, they would at once begin to encroach upon one another, for which the mixed character of the population, the strategic necessities of national defence and the convenience of commerce would furnish unlimited pretexts. The best thing that can be said of the Austrian government,—and that is very much,—is that it maintains a degree

of order and peace among peoples so divided and so circumstanced that they can hardly maintain those conditions for themselves. There is much talk just now of a different arrangement for maintaining order in this sorely divided region, but no proposal has yet been made which to the present writer seems very promising.

The peculiar character of the Austrian state has quite naturally prevented the development of a colonial empire along French or British lines. If foreign dependencies were acquired, the question would at once come up whether they should belong to Austria or Hungary, and with the jealousy between the partners, such a question might not be easy to settle. But more important than this is the fact that Austria has had her hands full at home. Not only has there been endless difficulty inside the jarring empire, but Austria has been deeply interested in the smaller countries to the south, all of them needing the same strong handling as her own troublesome family to keep them from flying at one another's throats. The relations between Serbia and Bulgaria in recent years help to reconcile us to the harsh measures by which Austria keeps her Balkan cousins in decent shape. Whatever we may think of it, that is the way Austria thinks of it. The Balkan States are to her just so much unfinished work. She has her hands full now and isn't looking for more trouble, but she undertakes the new task as opportunity offers. Serbia was next on her docket and the case in many ways was urgent. She set her hand to the task, and the world protested; even we protested.

Why?

The answer is to be found in one more peculiarity of this most peculiar situation. *The Austrians are Germans.* We have seen how the two great partners in the Dual Empire have each undertaken to hold down a lot of lesser peoples, more numerous in the aggregate than themselves. And as each has built his inverted pyramid about as high as he can manage, and still there is more balancing to be done, the two have joined in the farther task which neither dares undertake alone. Every precaution has been taken throughout to maintain the strict equality of the partner states.

But there is one fatal inequality which upsets everything. The one partner has powerful family connections, so to speak, and the other has none. Hungary has no backer, while Austria has a backer of overwhelming power. For a time this difference did not count, and the two partners managed their affairs, each in his own way. But slowly this condition changed. The big German family came to have need of the partnership to accomplish its purposes, and simultaneously the partners found themselves in need of backing. There was much reluctance to make the necessary bargain. The Hungarian partner was not at all happy that the backing should come wholly from his partner's family, for he distrusted his partner and detested the partner's family. The Austrian partner, too, was hardly less reluctant, for he was not in good standing with his family of which he represented the decaying aristocracy and they the parvenu branch, but need deepened into necessity,

and the necessity was not otherwise to be met. So the Austro-Hungarian partnership passed under the control of the younger but more vigorous branch of the German family whose purposes it was henceforth to serve.

It is this fact that makes Austrian affairs of interest to us. The maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is indispensable to the success of the German schemes which seem to menace our safety. As matters now stand Germany, through the agency of some ten million Austrian Germans, controls four or five times that number of aliens who are in no sympathy with her, and keeps open the road to the Balkans and the Dardanelles. If the Dual Empire were broken up, its Bohemians freed, and its Poles, Roumanians, Serbs and Italians united with the outside representatives of those races to form substantial independent states, all hope of uniting them in the interest of German expansion would be at an end. Fighting for Germany is the very last thing that Bohemians, Poles, Roumanians, Serbs, or even Hungarians would willingly do. But that is what they are doing today, thanks to the peculiar organization of the Austrian Empire. And if the issue of the present war is favourable to Germany, this system will be carried farther,—no one knows how far. Austria is thus, in the hands of Germany, a net that gathers fish of every kind, all for the German basket. If we are concerned with German plans of world dominion, we are concerned with Austria as the indispensable instrument of their realization.

RUSSIA

Even more remote from our national interests may seem to be the great Slav nation. It is true that in Behring's Sea we face each other across a comparatively narrow body of water, but since the acquisition of Alaska, the division is a natural one, and as these territories seem destined never to have a considerable population, a clash at this point or on grounds relating thereto seems most unlikely. Although Russia has been notoriously aggressive, her program seems to have to do exclusively with Europe and Asia, and nowhere threatens us. Probably no great power has of late given us so little concern. There have been strained relations, to be sure, about minor matters such as the validity of American passports, the Russian limitations upon Jewish citizens being in conflict with treaty guaranties between the two countries. As is well known, Russia formerly excluded all Jews from her dominions. When Poland was partitioned and the major portion assigned to Russia, it proved to be impossible to extend this exclusion to the new territory, one of the most Jewish in all Europe. Jews were therefore tolerated here but were not allowed outside of certain set limits. This was the origin of the famous "pale." The temptation to enter Russia and take advantage of its rich opportunities for gain constantly appealed to the Jews, and the alternate relaxation and enforcement of the rule led to those outrages upon the Jews which have shocked humanity.

When we negotiated with Russia the usual treaty

of amity and commerce with the standard proviso that citizens of each country should have the right to reside, travel, and do business in the other, the Jew saw his opportunity. He came to America, naturalized himself as an American citizen, and then returned to Russia armed with an American passport and demanded the privileges guaranteed by treaty. The situation was awkward. Russia regarded the device as a bare-faced evasion of her laws, as in many cases it was. If the Jew were allowed thus to get over the barrier by turning its flank, this road was likely to be a much travelled one, and the barrier would soon become useless. The United States, too, had reason to object to this abuse of its citizenship. But on the other hand, the Jewish citizen had a legal right to demand a passport, and our passport and our treaty were not things to be lightly flouted. Moreover, American sentiment was much aroused against Russia on account of her "pogroms" and flagrant injustices against the Jews. Last but not least, there was the American Jewish vote to consider. Neither side could very well yield and neither did yield. The treaty was abrogated and our relations with the great empire remained without its valuable guaranties. The revolution which seems to have removed the restrictions against the Jews, has apparently made possible the renewal of treaty relations, but that remains for the future, with all its difficult problems, to determine. It is utterly fatuous to assume that the destructive triumph of democracy has removed the causes of friction between Russia and other democratic states.

But it never entered into the head of any one, Russian or American, that a difficulty like this could be a cause of war between the two countries. Nations do not go to war thus lightly. If either were vitally menacing the interests of the other, a quarrel like this would have furnished an excellent *pretext* for war. Such pretexts as this, tangible and concrete things, though often inconsequential, are flaunted at the outbreak of every war. The superficial take them seriously, often decrying war on grounds so trivial, and devising elaborate peace programs designed to eliminate these baneful pretexts. It is only necessary to refer to a situation like this to see that the pretext is harmless unless it coincides with a deeper predisposition to war based on a fundamental menace, perhaps unconscious and instinctively resisted. When these great intangible issues call forth our instinct of self preservation, and yet fail to define themselves to our provincial thinking, these small grievances do duty in satisfying our minds as to the justice of our instincts.

The American people, as yet unconscious of any menace from Russia, has not felt the least disposition to resort to the ultimate argument. No number of passport quarrels is likely to incline us to do so until that menace appears. Is there a likelihood of such a menace?

Of direct conflict between the United States and Russia there seems to be no prospect. For a very long time to come at least, neither country can plausibly claim or covet anything that belongs to the other. We may reasonably assume that Russia has no de-

signs upon the American continent and that we, even in our wildest moments of inadvertence, are not likely to extend our sway over any part of the Asiatic or European mainland. There is no easier line of demarcation in the world than this. The ocean, to be sure, is no longer a barrier that armed nations can not across, but it is a barrier that they need not cross, which is saying much for the possibility and the probability of peace. To be sure, as our thought reverts to the Philippines, it gives pause to these easy conclusions. The Philippines remain the one conspicuous anomaly in our present geographical position, an anomaly which we must carefully consider in due time. But despite this seeming anomaly, the general relation is plain and as far as Russia is concerned, absolute. We belong to the Western Hemisphere, Russia to the Eastern, and if we clash it will be when the two Hemispheres clash. Will they clash?

It must not be forgotten that vast as are Russia's territories, she is under the imperative need of further expansion. She is still an interior country with no access to the sea under her control. Of the four natural gateways to her territory, the Baltic, the Dardanelles, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Pechili, not one is controlled by Russia. Even with these fully under her control, Russia would still be at a disadvantage in her industrial and commercial development and in her civilizing intercourse with nations. The expense of getting *to* the gateway from interior Russia is necessarily great, owing to the vastness of the land. To have this handicap increased by barriers at the gateway, by arbitrary closings,

formalities and the like is to increase her disadvantage into a guaranty of permanent backwardness and inferiority. No people has felt more deeply than Russia this need of national expansion. It is an absurd caricature of the national ambition to characterize it as "land hunger." Russia has land and to spare. What she seeks is certain points of vitally necessary control, points even more obviously necessary than those we seek to dominate in the Caribbean. The necessity of these points is more real and more obvious than those required by any other nation. That revolutionary and mob-ruled Russia that has "tasted of liberty and been made drunk," should momentarily renounce these national ambitions is not strange. The incredible thing is that the sober bystanders among the nations should take these drunken protestations seriously. Granted that circumstances may *possibly* make this renunciation permanent, we can not build our safety on possibilities. It is possible, even probable, that my house will not burn, but until it is sure, I must in simple prudence, insure against that catastrophe. The Russian is not done with imperialism, that impulse which in all ages and all lands has survived every change of government and resisted every appeal of sentiment and philosophy. Imperialism may learn to accomplish its purposes without war, but not to relinquish its purposes.

Unfortunately Russia can not obtain control of the desired gateways without virtually destroying certain nations and seriously menacing others. We have seen this in the case of Japan. It is even more

obvious in the case of Europe. The control of the Dardanelles means the annihilation or subjection of Turkey and the permanent subordination of a number of other nations in or near the Balkans. The control of the Baltic means the absorption of the Scandinavian countries and of all Germany east of the Elbe. Such programs seem utterly preposterous, but it is known that they have been long entertained and openly avowed. The worst of it is that if they were renounced and forgotten, the situation would of itself revive them. The present geographical situation of Russia is one of such very real helplessness that no year of national life could pass without suggesting the desirability,— the necessity — of escaping from these bonds.

To both Turkey and Germany, therefore, the menace of Russian aggression is a spectre, an obsession. The one is already helpless, the other is sure to become so if the forces of peace are allowed unhindered to build out the Russian people to anything like the measure of their territory and their resources.

Why is the world fighting Germany today? Not because she is an autocracy; not because she has sunk merchant ships; not because she has done this or done that. Germany, faced long ago with the danger of being crushed by Russia, realized that she must oppose a united Europe to Russian aggression if, a century hence, that aggression was to be stayed. With characteristic *maladresse* she has sought to organize Europe by brute force under her own leadership, with the result that she herself stands for the moment as

the menace of all other powers. That is why all other powers have combined against her.

But if the western powers will not accept the leadership and control of Germany, how much less likely are they to acquiesce in the leadership of Russia. And let us not overlook for a moment the fact that the realization of the Russian program, even in its minimal form, would give her that supreme position. Russia might stop at the Elbe, but there would be nothing to stop her. Conceding that the program of overt conquest would not be carried to its logical limit of world subjection, a greater Russia, peopled from the Elbe to the Pacific, as that vast expanse soon will be, would sit at the head of the table. Subserviency would be the sole alternative to subjection. And with habitual subserviency would come that loss of buoyant initiative, that toadying deference, which spells the doom of a civilization and which evokes the protest of our instincts almost as completely as does physical subjection. The world will be as unwilling to be Russianized as to be Germanized, and it will ultimately find it even more difficult to avoid it.

And since we have joined in the effort to avert German dominion, is it not likely that we shall join in an effort to avert a greater and a worse? The contingency is remote, perhaps, but not improbable. It is true we are far away from Russia and have a minimum of occasion to clash. It is true, too, that when Russia's day has come, we shall be a very different people from what we now are. It may seem that our growth in the next hundred years will put us quite beyond the need of deference toward any. Un-

fortunately we shall not be the only ones to grow. This great fact remains which nothing can change, which no other fact can outweigh. Russia has more power of growth and more room to grow in than we. Her territory is nearly three times as large, and the realization even in part of her ambitions would make it much larger. Its average productivity is probably greater than that of our own country. Her population is larger and the rate of increase higher. Her culture, though inferior, is but held in abeyance while are laid broad and deep the physical foundations of national life. It will match our own when once those foundations are laid. It is difficult to see what is to prevent Russia from distancing ourselves and others in the race. There are endless petty qualifiers of these broad relations, but they do not modify their essential truth, and insistence upon them only be-fogs the issue. These qualifiers may be all important in deciding the questions of the hour, but in a forecast of the remoter future the more completely we forget them the better. For that forecast one fact is all-important. *The power that acquires control of the Eastern Hemisphere, acquires control of the world.* Is it not plain that the policy of America must be to prevent the domination of the Eastern Hemisphere by any one power? The struggle is with Germany today. It will be with Russia tomorrow.

CHAPTER XVIII

GERMANY, THE STORM CENTRE

AT the moment of writing these lines, one country engages the attention of Americans. We are at war with Germany. The war has been slow in coming, and we have been enabled,—compelled,—to scan every step of the path which has led us to it. But probably there are few of us who do not feel a certain mystification about it all. It seems strange and unnatural still, a thing so out of our habitual reckonings, that though there is no mistaking the path ahead, we are puzzled and dazed to make out the path behind. How did we ever get where we are? Can it be possible that the path we have followed in all innocence and good will these many years led naturally and inevitably here?

This sense of mystification is the more pronounced because of the unexpected form which the war has assumed. There have been prophecies, of course, these many years, that war must sometime come between the United States and Germany. These prophecies have attracted little attention save as a subject for editorial pleasantry, but such slight impression as they have made has not at all prepared us for such a war as this. It has always been assumed that war with Germany, if it came, would come as the

result of German aggression in the Western Hemisphere, that it would be essentially a naval war or a war on American soil to repel a German invasion. That we could under any circumstances be induced to participate in a European war and to send an army to Europe, while as yet America was untouched and we were confronted with only the most hypothetical dangers, was a suggestion too preposterous for the most alarmist of prophets or the most credulous of his followers. Yet that is what we are doing, and doing with the almost unanimous approval of the American people.

Is this an accident, or is there something in the character and situation of the two peoples that made such a result inevitable? If it is an accident, there is little likelihood that it will happen again. We have but to see it through, or bring it to an end by the necessary concessions (we can concede much to end so painful an inadvertence) and then renew our care-free existence. But if there is something in the character and situation of the two peoples that made this war inevitable, then it may all happen again,—perhaps again and again,—unless radical remedies can be provided against it. In that case concession may be not conciliation, but suicide. No graver question than this confronts America among the nations.

To arrive at an understanding of our relation to Germany, we must, for the time being, quite forget our part in the problem and consider Germany's situation, endeavouring to ascertain the causes which tend to disturb the world equilibrium in that quarter. Obviously, Germany's immediate concern is not with

America but with the neighbouring countries of Europe. Our problem grows out of the European problem, and we can not understand the one without first considering the other.

The outstanding fact in the present war has been the insurgence of Germany. All efforts on the part of her apologists to represent her as essentially pacific and forced into the war by the aggressions of her enemies, have been unavailing. True, she has kept the peace for more than forty years, while her neighbours have engaged in bloody wars, but we cannot escape the conviction that during this long peace she has never been really pacific. Her excessive preoccupation with military affairs, her avowed discontent with her lot, and her constant assertion that her safety was threatened by the machinations of her enemies have kept the world nervous. Her case has seemed to be one of national paranoia, a disorder which no other nation has manifested in like degree.

The reaction of all this has been to put Europe on the defensive, and in this Germany has found fresh evidence of her allegations. This in turn has spurred her on to new efforts for self-defence, and these efforts have intensified the apprehensions of her neighbours and roused them to a farther effort in turn. When at last the great rivalry ended in the only way in which it could end, the first move again seems to have been with Germany.

In all this series of moves, the question of priority is a difficult one, and discussion leads to no compelling conclusion. Each move is motived by a preceding move of the rival party, and as always in the great

human game, we search in vain for a beginning. Nor is the question of much interest save to those who have need of exculpation. But to the dispassionate onlooker it is not easy at first to see the ground of Germany's obsession. Despite the historic antipathies of Europe, no one who has been long in touch with the nations of western Europe, can have failed to note their growing disinclination to war. They were absorbed in schemes of colonial development and industrial and social reorganization, and it was only by the most strenuous exertion, sometimes in excess of constitutional authority, that their more far-seeing leaders prevented a fatal ebb in their military enthusiasm. France, to be sure, had her grievance against Germany, but this grievance had so completely lost its hold upon the popular imagination, that nothing but the experience of what they believed to be a war of wanton aggression, could have revived it. England had no historic grievance and no conceivable reason for attacking a peaceable Germany. The allegation that England brought about this war as an occasion for destroying rival German commerce, is too much belied by her mature policy and by the inherent probabilities of the situation to impress the unbiased mind. The mere money cost of this war would have wiped out the gains of such a diabolical venture for a century to come, and this was perfectly foreseen.

The relation of Germany to Russia was less reassuring, but even here the danger was certainly not imminent. It is true that Russia chafes under her position of dependence as regards access to the sea, and

the full realization of her ambitions in this respect would ultimately endanger Germany, for Russia undoubtedly desires to have an access to the Baltic under her control. This can mean nothing less than the control of the Danish straits, and presumably the extension of Russia westward to the river Elbe, thus cutting Germany in twain. Such an extension would be a little less preposterous than it might seem, for the population is mixed and patchy, German and Slavic settlements alternating pretty much all the way between Petrograd and Berlin. There can be no doubt that the scheme finds a place in the extreme Russian program. But Russia's designs in this quarter are very remote. Her interest in the Baltic is as nothing to her interest in the Dardanelles, and the control of the latter would normally present no such difficulties as the control of the former. Upon this enterprise, therefore, all her effort has been and long will be concentrated. When the northern project comes up, a really peaceable Germany ought to be able to count on the solid backing of all Western Europe to protect her from Russian aggression, which, if successful, must in the end menace Germany's neighbours as well as herself.

The general assumption, therefore, that a peaceable Germany was in no danger of attack would seem to be justified by the situation in Europe. Germany had but to keep her place, and make it plain to Europe that she was content to keep her place, to insure immunity from attack, or overwhelming support in case of such attack. Germany has made no such impression upon Europe for the very good reason

that she is not content with her place and is resolved to better it at all costs, and that, before the development and union of neighbouring states shall make the task impossible. Germany demands her "place in the sun."

It is this discontent of Germany that endangers the peace of Europe. The powers lying farther west have reached what all regard as fairly definite territorial limits, and while minor conflicts of interest still exist, it is not too much to assume that the good sense of those immediately concerned and the pressure of other powers jealous for the general peace, are sufficient to prevent war among them. If Russia is less dependable, we may be certain that with the aid of Germany, she could be kept from endangering the peace of Europe and of the world. The discontent of Germany is therefore a matter of supreme concern. What is Germany's grievance? What will satisfy her and lead her to take her place among the peaceably disposed nations, the true guarantors of the world's peace?

First and foremost, she wants room. The German Empire is at present about the size of the State of Texas. While this area is larger than that of many nations, and quite sufficient, as the result has demonstrated, to support a highly significant national life, Germany nevertheless deems it inadequate. This demand for more territory can hardly be called unreasonable, at least by Germany's present enemies, but unfortunately Germany is a late comer, and she finds that all available lands have been taken or blocked by earlier takings. Her demands can be

met, therefore, only by despoiling those now in possession, a proceeding only to be justified by the most cogent reasons. Such reasons her destined victims declare do not exist. Thus, M. Guyot, a distinguished French authority, argues that despite her rapidly expanding population, there is no congestion in Germany. Emigration, once heavy, has virtually ceased, although nearly a million are added to the population every year. This does not look as though the population of Germany had reached the saturation point. M. Guyot believes the present population of sixty-eight millions could safely be increased to ninety millions, since even this number would give her a population of but 166 per square kilometre, as against 260 per square kilometre for Belgium. The conclusion is, of course, that her territory is ample for her people and that her restiveness is quite unjustified.

M. Guyot's estimate is very moderate. The writer has ventured in another connection to suggest two hundred millions as a possible maximum for Germany. But Germany can support two hundred millions or ninety millions or even sixty-eight millions, only on condition that like England or Belgium, she allow herself to become a specialized industrial nation, making things for others to use, and dependent upon other countries for her food and for the raw materials of her manufactures. Assuming M. Guyot's estimate, when Germany has ninety millions, she will be dotted all over with immense manufacturing cities, with hardly more people upon the land than now, and with at least one half her people de-

pendent upon foreign food and perhaps three fourths of her factories dependent upon foreign materials. Something like that is the condition of England to-day, while Belgium, whose example is cited as proof that Germany can support more than her present population, in normal times produces but 22 per cent. of her bread. In other words, while Belgium has a population of 260 per square kilometre, she raises bread for only 57 per square kilometre, less than half the number that Germany is already compelled to provide for.

This, of course, is a perfectly possible program. The economic dependence involved is common to many nations and has been accepted by both Germany and England as a condition of wealth and power.

But there is this immense difference between industrial England and industrial Germany. England *possesses* territories varied in character and distributed all over the globe, which can supply the necessary food for her people and the materials for her industries. Moreover, she has long maintained complete control of the routes leading to these territories and indeed to all other territories with which she can maintain profitable economic relations. Her colonies and her control of the sea completely emancipate her from what would otherwise be an abject economic dependence.

Germany has neither colonies nor control of the sea. Her economic development, therefore, tends to make her, not another England, but another Belgium. It is possible, and even probable, that if Germany would peaceably accept the situation, the other coun-

tries, always glad of a good customer, would never withhold the food and raw materials that she desires. We may be perfectly sure that Britain has never thought and would never think of doing so. But Germany does not feel safe,—honestly and truly does not,—and when England tries to reassure her, and in all sincerity bids her trust the friendliness of her kinsmen, she has an uncomfortable way of saying: “You try it for a while. Give us possession and control for a time, and we will see that you are looked out for.” Of course there are all kinds of reasons why such an exchange of rôles is impossible, but if it were ever so possible, it is to be feared that the Briton would feel,—would honestly and truly feel,—that it was not safe. Lord Morley and a few sanguine Englishmen have seemed willing to accept some such situation, but the British people have shown no inclination to adopt their view. If we are disposed to criticize this attitude as unworthy and ungenerous, it behooves us to remember that men have seldom been generous or just to those who were wholly in their power. Not that any nation would wantonly and without provocation cut off the food supply of another. But there is certain to be provocation. Rivalry and shortsightedness inevitably produce misunderstandings and mutual grievances, and the certainty that, if worst comes to worst, one party always holds the winning hand, counsels habitual submission on the part of the other. This habitual submission eventually modifies profoundly the national temper, stifling the imagination and stunting the faculties of the people and circumscribing their culture.

Our much cherished independence has, therefore, a very real and tangible value which it is futile to disparage.

This then is Germany's first fear, the fear of dangerous dependence as a specialized industrial nation. She is not big enough, in her present shut-in position, to assert a real independence like that of Britain, and yet she is too big to accept the abject dependence of Belgium, as she must do if she peaceably accepts the present situation. She must become bigger, and she must be quick about it, for the longer she waits, the more fatal becomes the weapon of hunger that her rivals in self-protection can turn against her. Even as it is, she has probably waited too long. M. Guyot's argument amounts to saying that Germany's economic dependence, though rapidly increasing, has not yet reached its maximum,—not a very conclusive argument.

Bearing in mind this general fact, the German program which at first sight seems so audacious, becomes intelligible. In the first place she wants colonies, great territories which can grow food and furnish rubber and the countless other tropical and local products which her industrial development necessitates. She wants sea power, if not enough to overwhelm her rivals, at least enough to deter them from trying to overwhelm her or close the sea routes against her. And partly because pretty much all the available colonies have been appropriated, and partly because her situation surrounded by powerful nations is so different from that of England, she wants more room near home, a consideration strongly emphasized

by her need of better access to the sea. Her natural sea coast on the north and all her best harbours are shorn away by two helpless little nations, peopled with her own kinsmen and maintained by her rivals for no other purpose than to keep her at a safe distance. To the south, where she justly foresees a vast future development, she has no outlet in her own right, and even her ally is but meagrely provided. The Adriatic, the Ægean, the Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf, each giving access to vast commercial areas, are the natural outlets of the great industrial region of Central Europe, of which in turn Germany is the natural dominant element. To extend her control, not necessarily by direct annexation, but by alliance, industrial penetration, and paramount influence of one sort or another, until she touches the English Channel, reaches down and grasps the mouth of the Adriatic, plants herself firmly on the Ægean, the Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf, and controls the Dardanelles, may seem a preposterous program, but Germany is convinced that nothing less than this will give her real independence. Whatever part of this program she omits will be only so much added to the program of rivals who may or may not be considerate, but who in any case will control. The hated dependence will remain, and the great border strongholds built by nature, being in the hands of her rivals, they will tighten the cordon about her and close its few remaining gaps whenever she refuses to meet their demands.

This, therefore, is the central and vital part of Germany's vast program; a greater Germany stretch-

ing from Antwerp to Avlona, to Salonica, to the Persian Gulf, to Odessa and Warsaw. But it is only the central part. Around this vast centre is to be formed a wide penumbra of tropical and other colonies, producers of food and materials, commensurate with the great centre which they are to serve. This secondary but larger part of the program in which we are plainly more immediately interested, and which for that reason we must reserve for special consideration, is quite as necessary as the other to that economic self-sufficiency which Germany seeks. An imperial program, truly, but one about which German statesmen seem to differ only as to which part it is better to realize first. All unite in the belief that Germany, by a prompt and colossal effort at expansion, should avert the calamity of economic dependence and insignificance.

But economic dependence is not the only or the greatest danger that Germany fears. There is another which, though remote, is really more serious and probably exercises more influence over the minds, — or let us say, the instincts, — of the German people. This is the danger of being reduced to relative impotence, not only politically, but culturally (a far more important consideration) by the sheer immensity of neighbouring races. The obvious menace is from Russia, but the more serious menace is from the Anglo-Saxon. *Not a military menace.* It can not be too strongly insisted that Germany has never been, and in all probability would never have been, in danger of attack from Great Britain. Her claim that she was so threatened before the outbreak of the pres-

ent war, has been rejected by the entire world. If the two powers are now at war, it is because Germany willed it so. But it is equally true that the terms of that peace which Britain sought only to maintain, were terms which insured the ultimate subordination of Germany, and the certainty that her civilization would play a lessening part in shaping the destiny of mankind.

There is a well established tendency of culture to follow the lead of the majority. Quality may offset quantity within certain limits, but quantity counts and counts enormously. So also superior power, military, political, economic. These impose upon the minds of men and win their suffrages. Big nations take the lead of little nations, big cities of little cities, and dominant political elements of subordinate political elements, not only in diplomacy and war, but in the subtler realm of the spirit. Thus parvenu Rome overshadowed incomparable Athens, and left the inferior Roman culture as the chief legacy of the ancient to the modern world. So the finer earlier culture of southern France yielded to the political supremacy of Paris and the cruder north. And so the superior culture of southern Germany is yielding to the political supremacy of Prussia and Berlin. There are many reasons for this, some of them subtle and elusive, but others mere questions of practical convenience. The matter of language is an illustration. Who takes the trouble to learn Dutch? It is not that the language or the literature of Holland are inferior (nobody takes the trouble to inquire about

that) but that it is so much easier for a few Dutchmen to learn English than for many Englishmen to learn Dutch. So the matter adjusts itself quite automatically. Every educated Dutchman speaks English, but almost never does an Englishman speak Dutch. The Dutch language thus slinks more and more into the background and tends to disappear, taking with it literature, folk lore and much else, the very soul of the nation's culture. So the German language, highly developed as it is and entrenched behind a magnificent literature, serves the German only for home purposes. There is scarce a community outside of little Germany where the German can use his own language, while he can use English over half the world. The German merchant in Shanghai or Yokohama finds English as indispensable as in London or New York.

Conceding, therefore, that Britain will never attack Germany, conceding even the far more doubtful proposition that Russia will never attack her,—a policy to which no friendliness of present government or present people can pledge its successors,—Germany still has reason to fear. The domain of the Russian culture is thirty-five times as large as Germany, that of the Anglo-Saxon culture sixty times as large. Making all allowances for quality and imperfect assimilation, the disparity is enormous. When there are ten Russians to one German, as there seemingly soon will be, when the Anglo-Saxon race, thoroughly united in its culture at least, and with the most strategic of all situations, also outnumbers the German

many fold and imposes its language and its ways upon the commercial world, men will not take their cue from Berlin.

Who cares?

Germany cares,—cares for this most of all. It is what all peoples care for, what only the would-be idealist forgets. Mere abstract considerations of material well-being appeal to men very little. Proffer them wealth, comfort, and power, but in unfamiliar forms, forms which do not bear the hallmark of their race, and you will tempt them but little. When old Wulf, the Gothic chieftain, was doffing his bearskin preparatory to being baptized into the faith that promised so much, he asked the priest where his ancestors were. The priest, with the untroubled positiveness of the earlier day, replied "In hell," whereupon Wulf replaced his bearskin, saying that he would "stay with his own folks." There is no hell like not being with our own folks. So all men reason, and Wulf's German descendants most of all. Doubtless few Germans have reasoned the thing out in this way, or in any way, but race instinct is busy in them all, and race instinct means that, *just that*. Germany must become big. It might do to be little somewhere else in the world, but not between the Saxon and the Slav. That is what the Germans are saying. Not a few of them see it; all of them feel it.

This, then, is Germany's program and the world's problem, Greater Germany. It is a perfectly natural program, the protest of a virile race against the stealthy encroachments of races more favourably situated and more amply domained. The fact that it

menaces our existence and compels us to the most strenuous exertion in self defence, should not blind us to its essentially normal character and to the permanence of the instincts and the interests which it represents. It rather emphasizes the necessity for their full recognition.

But with all its essential naturalness, there is an uncanny consciousness about this plan of Greater Germany as it lies in the mind of the German people. No great people ever before thought its thoughts out loud as the German people have been doing. Other empires grow, but the Germans are building theirs. The British Empire has been aptly described as "a series of inadvertences." Not so the German. Everything is foreseen, calculated and decreed, not by an Alexander or a Napoleon, but by the collective intellect of a great people. Nor was ever a plan of such magnitude discussed so openly or so frankly avowed. This has given to German action a deliberateness and a thoroughness of preparation for which history offers no parallel. Whether it increases the chance of success remains to be seen, but it certainly increases the redoubtability of the undertaking.

This redoubtability is further increased by the fact that the undertaking does not naturally lend itself to compromises or half measures. If there is to be a Greater Germany, there is no very natural stopping place till it stretches from the northern to the southern seas, and from the Black Sea on the east to the Adriatic on the west. To almost reach these limits would not almost accomplish Germany's purpose, but would spell essential failure. We must

expect that these limits will be sought with corresponding zeal. How many colonies and tropical dependencies will be required to supply such an industrial centre, no man can say. We shall not go far wrong if we assume that on this point the German people are in an attitude of unlimited receptivity.

The circumstances of the moment perhaps warrant a word of caution against an easy misunderstanding. We are at war with Germany. It is the time honoured custom of all peoples to disparage and vilify those with whom they are compelled to fight, a procedure for which the acts of Germany in the present war furnish additional incentive. There is something to be said for it. To hate a man helps you to hit him. At a time when everything is viewed from the standpoint of war necessity, a dispassionate statement of Germany's case may seem an unpatriotic act, giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Possibly some who thus reason may think the writer "pro-German." In the interest of their farther patient attention, he begs to disabuse them. None can feel more strongly than he the seriousness of the German menace or the necessity of resisting it by force. In all this his sympathies are as pronounced as his convictions.

But it may be doubted whether the popular patriotism above referred to will altogether meet the requirements of a struggle so fundamental and so long continued as this is likely to prove. There is need of much careful observation and cool calculation in dealing with such an enemy. The present inquiry is in the nature of a reconnaissance of the enemy's position. It is courting disaster to attack him with fury

without knowing where his strong positions are located. It is just because we are not Germans and can not by any possibility find our salvation in Germany's triumph, that it behooves us to know what Germany is planning and what are the permanent instincts and interests that are likely to give persistence to her purpose. Not until we perceive the reality of German need shall we be prepared for the terrible intensity of German endeavour.

CHAPTER XIX

THE STORM AREA

THE central feature of the program of Greater Germany, the consolidation of Middle Europe under German control and its extension through Asia to the Persian Gulf, has been sufficiently outlined. It remains for us to consider the program of outlying dependencies or colonies which may seem at first sight to concern us more intimately, as it is liable to bring Germany nearer to our borders. Whether we are in fact more concerned with this outlying portion of the plan than with its central features remains to be seen. Meanwhile we must locate German colonial ambitions as definitely as possible. Fortunately we are not left to speculation in these matters. The fields of practicable colonial enterprise are few, and conflicting interests are easily recognized. There is no vague unknown left in the world to embarrass us in reaching a conclusion. Moreover we are not compelled to speculate as to Germany's intentions. Representative publications, official utterances, and overt acts have clearly revealed the German attitude. Differences of opinion of course exist in Germany as elsewhere, but Germany has left us in no doubt as to which opinion is dominant. The war has also cleared the situation. Diplomatic denials and disguises still abound, but they no longer deceive.

Oceanica early attracted German attention. Most of these islands, and in particular, those best suited to whites, had been appropriated by other colonizing powers, but a certain number remained in which Germany, at last awakened to the importance of overseas possessions, saw possibilities. A number of these clusters of coral islands,—the Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Caroline Islands, and the Marshall Islands, and a part of the large island of New Guinea, were hastily annexed in 1884-5, while the major part of the Samoan Group was acquired in 1899 by the same treaty which gave the minor island and the chief harbour to the United States. All these island possessions were seized at the outbreak of the present war and assigned to Australia or Japan, thus incidentally relieving us of a neighbour in Samoa whom recent developments might have made uncongenial. It remains to be seen whether the present disposition of the islands is confirmed by the outcome of the war.

But it was lean picking at best which remained in this part of the world for a nation that began in 1884. Germany's hopes in this quarter are built on something very different from the left-overs of that date. Next to Britain whose continental possessions in Australia and New Zealand easily give her the first place, the great power in Oceanica is Holland. Her great islands of Java and Sumatra are among the most valuable tropical possessions in the world, and they have the farther great value that they control the vitally important passages to the Far East as completely as do Gibraltar or Suez. Germany has no

thought of disturbing Holland in her possession of these splendid dependencies. On the contrary she would be quick to protect Holland against any other power that might menace her control. The reason is that Germany looks forward to the ultimate inclusion of Holland in the German Empire, in which case Germany would automatically acquire these vast colonial possessions. This was bluntly urged by Heinrich von Treitschke, the most influential of all German writers on these subjects. "Why all this talk of building a colonial empire? Why not take Holland and get one all ready built?" Holland, of course, looks forward with very different sentiments to this possibility, and counts upon the support of Britain, who would be doubly menaced by such a union, to oppose it by every means in her power. On the other hand, it is impossible not to recognize a certain reasonableness in Germany's ambition. The separation of the Low Countries from Germany, containing, as they do, most of her natural seacoast and all her best harbours, and peopled as they are with a race essentially German, is one of the most obvious hardships in the present political arrangement of the world, while the great tropical possessions of Holland are far better suited to the needs of German than of Dutch industry. What a pity that Germany's temper is such as to utterly alienate her kinsfolk, and that her ambitions are so inordinate that she can not be trusted with reasonable access to the world! Germany should not have Holland and Belgium so long as she makes them hate her, and as long as she cherishes ambitions which deliberately contemplate the

ruin of the world's greatest peoples the world must barricade her own house against her.

Next in availability and perhaps even greater in importance as a field of exploitation is Africa. Here in 1884 Germany seized nearly a million square miles of territory, possession of which she confirmed during the next six years. These possessions were somewhat extended in 1911, especially by access to navigable waters, as the result of the protracted controversy over Morocco, and very large projects of linking up East and West Africa were at one time entertained. These plans were thwarted by the extension of the British possessions in South Africa up through the centre of the continent, thus separating German East Africa from the German colonies of South West Africa and the Kamerun on the West Coast. One of the conditions of peace suggested not long since by a conservative German of the highest authority, who was willing to surrender pretty much everything else in the German program, was the transfer to Germany of a strip of the Belgian Congo which should link together German East and West Africa. There can be no question that the project of annexing Belgium, so tenaciously urged by the leaders of German imperialism, was motivated quite as much by the desire for the vast Belgian Congo as by the need of a port at Antwerp and a fortress at Liège.

The division of Africa among the great powers has been perhaps the most fruitful source of friction in the whole range of recent colonial enterprise. The various foreign colonies began as small trading posts in some one of the protected landing places or

at the mouth of some river which offered access to the interior. From these points they were gradually extended by exploration and the development of trade until they came into touch with one another or crossed one another's routes. Friction was the almost invariable result. Gradually these disputes have been settled and boundaries have become definite, but the division is utterly fortuitous and sets at defiance all the requirements of administrative and economic convenience. The different powers have sandwiched their colonies in between one another in a way that now blocks railway development and the systematic organization of the country. Consolidation through exchange or some sort of redistribution has long been a recognized need, but international jealousies and mutually excluding ambitions have rendered it impossible. At the time of writing, all the German colonies have been seized by Britain and France. If this seizure is confirmed, the result may be as momentous for Africa as for the European states concerned. The exclusion of Germany from tropical Africa, unless compensated in other quarters, would have incalculable consequences for Germany, for it is here that she has seen the best prospect of realizing her colonial ambitions. Holland may come sometime and perhaps colonies elsewhere, but for the immediate future, Africa was the one hopeful prospect. The first statement of possible peace terms to come from a German official put in the forefront the necessity of a large and unified Germany territory in tropical Africa.

Quite distinct from the field we have been consid-

ering is northern Africa, a comparatively narrow coastland along the southern littoral of the Mediterranean which, though in the same continent as the region just described, is separated from it by the Sahara Desert, a barrier more impassable than any ocean, while its climatic and strategic character puts it in quite a different category. Northern Africa has valuable resources which appeal to German enterprise. It is situated on the great highway of the world, strategic alike for commerce and for war. Above all it is a land in which white men can live, perhaps the only one in the colonial market in which there is a reasonable chance that the people of a possessing race could establish themselves as the dominant element in the population. Nowhere in the world has Germany scanned the possibilities of colonial establishment more anxiously than here. Unfortunately she came too late. Algeria went to France in 1827, long before the German Empire existed. France acquired Tunis in 1881 and Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. Germany's colonial policy had not yet begun. The seizure of Tripoli by Italy in 1911 was undoubtedly motivated in part by fear of German aggression in this quarter, while the final establishment of a French protectorate in Morocco closed a prolonged diplomatic controversy in which Germany exhausted every resource to secure a foothold in this most coveted part of northern Africa. Her failure in this struggle was beyond doubt the precipitating cause of the present war, for it convinced her that nothing but the crushing of her rivals would secure the necessary opportunity. But Mor-

occo commanded Gibraltar and so might cut the British Empire in two. It must not be in the hands of a probable enemy.

Ever since the British occupied India, thus securing for themselves a dominant position not only in the Far East but in the world, the ambition of all colonial powers has been to find another India. The choice has never been difficult, for there is but one other country comparable to India in size, density of population, and natural resources. China has about the same area as India. Its population is generally supposed to be greater. Its resources are far superior. As the impotence of China became increasingly apparent during the nineteenth century, she became the object of jealous solicitude on the part of the colonizing powers of Europe, who encamped around her borders as anxious heirs wait round the bedside of a departing relative. Britain, as the first comer, naturally had the best location. Depending as always upon her navy, she had her great station at Hong Kong, at the convenient southeast corner where the population and the trade of China focus in the great city of Canton. Hong Kong which is both chief arsenal and chief commercial port, a marvel of natural defence, was the key to the situation, while the great cities of Shanghai at the mouth of the Yangtse and Tientsin in the Gulf of Pechili, both open to the trade of all nations but essentially under the commercial control of Britain, commanded the trade of central and northern China respectively.

France, as we have seen, seized Tongking farther south than Hong Kong, acquiring — not a fortress

and commercial harbour as Britain had done,—but a vast colony, which however was intended primarily as the base for an advance into southern China. She too had her “concessions” in Shanghai, Tientsin, and elsewhere, though the commercial results have been less satisfactory than in the case of the British.

With the sudden awakening of Germany to the importance of colonies and foreign trade, attention turned promptly to the Far East. German procedure was characteristically systematic and methodical in contrast with the fortuitous policy of Britain whose government action has always followed in the wake of private enterprise. There was little or no German commerce, but it was determined that there should be, and to this end a strong station and subsidized shipping lines were deemed essential. Government agents were sent out to study the situation. One reported favourably on the island of Yezo (northern Japan) as well suited to Germany's purpose and obtainable “by purchase or otherwise.” It was finally decided, however, that a position in northern China near the all important Gulf of Pechili was most desirable, and China was forced in 1897 to yield a commanding position on the peninsula of Shantung with valuable mining and railway concessions as penalty for the killing of two German missionaries belonging to an order that Germany had expelled. Too much attention should not be given to this circumstance. Germany certainly did little at this time to sugar-coat the pill, but the pill was not essentially different from that which other nations had compelled China to swallow.

The choice of northern China as headquarters of German influence, though inferior in some respects to Britain's position in the south, had its advantages. It was an advantage to be at the opposite end from Britain in the event of a division. It would then be possible to claim a large domain in northern China with less risk of British opposition, especially if German commercial effort were concentrated on this field in the meantime. It is noteworthy that Germany has acquired a large concession in Tientsin, the trade metropolis of northern China, but that in the treaty ports farther south she is less in evidence. The German was everywhere, but official emphasis was laid upon German enterprise in the north.

There was a further reason for this location. The capital of China is located in the north, and the presence of Germany in the north could not but exert a powerful pressure upon the Chinese government. This expectation was promptly realized. German influence became noticeably paramount in the years immediately following the occupation of Kiaochow.

One disadvantage of the location was not realized, or was at least underestimated at the time by Germany. The establishment in the nearby Shantung Peninsula of a strong post by a great military and naval power aroused the fear and the hostility of Japan, a country until that time in close sympathy with Germany. That Japan could be a rival of Germany hardly seemed likely in 1897, least of all that she could ever be a dangerous rival. Yet Germany had united with Russia to force Japan out of Port Arthur, thus robbing her of the fruits of her recent

victory over China. In a word, these two mighty powers had bidden Japan not to take herself quite so seriously, and in particular, not to get in the way of her betters. Japan has at least one attribute of true greatness. She knows how to take rebuffs and bide her time, a subject upon which it behooves us to reflect.

Once established in Shantung, Germany's policy developed rapidly. It suited her purpose for a time to enter into an agreement with Britain and France by which the three natural divisions of China as determined by the great river valleys, were recognized as "spheres of influence" of the three powers. The south fell to France, the great Yangtse valley, central China, fell to Britain, and northern China to Germany. Commerce was of course free to all, but railway and mining concessions and in general those major enterprises which do not admit of duplication and which imply the backing of a whole nation, were to be recognized as perquisites of the powers as stated. But this policy was abandoned almost as soon as started, and Germany embarked upon a policy of incontinent commercial conquest of the entire East. How far private enterprise was backed by government subsidy or other aid, and how far it was a preliminary to other and more serious designs we shall probably never know. Both beliefs were widely entertained before the war and subsequent experiences have gone far to confirm them.

At the outbreak of the present war, Germany was summarily ejected from Kiaochow by Japan who, for the present at least, usurps her place. The total in-

terruption of German communications and the prohibition by the Allies of trade with enemy subjects has dealt a staggering blow to German commercial interests. If the much discussed participation of China in the war should become a substantial fact, China could seriously injure her great antagonist in at least one way, the cancellation of her railway and mining concessions and an embargo upon her trade and banking. Thus would be effected the complete expulsion of Germany from the Far East.

There remains the American continent. North America offers little opportunity, being occupied by powers whose subordination is not at present to be attempted. Still, North America has not been neglected. Immense numbers of Germans have come to the United States, lost to Germany at first, but for the last twenty or thirty years, watched with assiduous care by the mother country. Much more than any other nation, Germany has adopted the new policy of retaining the emigrant by organization and propaganda. This war has been a revelation of the extent to which this policy has been carried and of the results attained, results astonishing to us, though disappointing to Germany. If this war accomplishes nothing else, it is much to be hoped that it will brand as an unfriendly act the effort of any nation to maintain its own organized nationality within the confines of another state. Such an organization, in itself potential sedition, becomes, when supplemented by the incredible espionage of Germany, a permanent invasion of neighbour states.

But it is in Latin America that Germany sees her

opportunity. In this area two or three times the size of Europe and twenty to thirty times the size of Germany not a single powerful state has developed. It contains the largest bulk of tropical land in the world except one, territories capable of producing everything grown in the tropics in almost limitless quantities. The valley of the Amazon alone is said to be capable of feeding the entire present population of the globe. It contains white man's land enough for half a dozen Germanys, not only the temperate regions of Argentina and Chile, but the plateaux in a large part of Brazil and other tropical regions. Finally it controls the second most valuable,—perhaps ultimately the most valuable,—trade route in the world, Panama. It would indeed be strange if Germany had not thought of these possibilities.

Americans have been loath to believe in the existence of German designs upon this hemisphere, partly because of our habitual over-confidence which has led us to overlook or misconstrue Germany's inconspicuous efforts here. We have assumed quite too readily that our Monroe Doctrine has deterred Germany from making any attempt to acquire a foothold in America. There is no warrant for such an assumption. Germany has not been deterred by any threat or fear of our opposition. Bismarck declared the Monroe Doctrine a piece of international impertinence, and German opinion, official and unofficial, has been unanimous in its repudiation. Germany has held in abeyance her designs affecting the Americas because they were of necessity late numbers on her

program. A great deal had to be done before the final issue was joined in America. It must be Greater Germany and not little Germany which should risk so vast an undertaking, and hence the consolidation of middle Europe must first be accomplished. Nor could such a venture be risked until Germany had acquired control of the sea, for the likelihood that Britain would oppose a move so prejudicial to her own American interests was one amounting to certainty. The defeat of Britain was therefore a necessary preliminary. Finally it must be a richer Germany that could afford such an undertaking, and hence the development of the industries, not only of Germany, but of that whole middle Europe that she counts on making into the Greater Germany of the future, must first be accomplished if the great penumbra of the mighty empire was to be complete. It is with these huge preliminaries that Germany is now busy. Her industrial development has been pushed with a feverish energy that knows no parallel, not merely by the stimulus of private emulation but by state pressure and state aid, as an indispensable condition of the state's aggrandizement. Even this war, so huge as to seem the end of all things, was begun and is even now regarded by Germany as a preparation for greater things.

But Germany has not been idle in America. It was necessary to create here the "interests" that the empire in due season would feel called upon to "protect." So German commerce with Latin America has been stimulated in every possible manner, and German emigration has been skilfully directed to locali-

ties where it could prosper and retain its German character. These localities have been chiefly Chile and southern Brazil. Argentina, the most promising of all, is too large, too populous, and too intensely Latin, to be readily influenced by German colonies. But Chile and Brazil both have a hybrid population with little power of organization or vigorous assertion. To these, therefore, and especially to the latter, German emigration has been directed. Here have grown up whole colonies numbering hundreds of thousands of Germans and controlling whole provinces. German is the language spoken and German customs are carefully retained. Brazilian citizenship has been generally refused.

What reason have we to believe that Germany contemplates anything more than legitimate commerce and emigration? This to begin with (not to mention published proposals and discussions) that every effort is made to keep these settlers from becoming Brazilian. When Germany encourages her people who settle in foreign lands to cast in their lot with the people of those lands and to give to the new land of their adoption allegiance of both lip and heart, learning its speech and its ways, and identifying themselves with its civilization, then we may assume that Germany loyally recognizes the integrity of these countries and their right to a permanent place in the family of nations. Her policy in Latin America has been conspicuously the reverse of this, while unofficial utterances, at least, have been of a nature to confirm the most extreme conclusions. Official disclaimers made at a time when Germany was straining every nerve to

prevent our joining the Allies, will deceive none but the willing.

As these words are written, however, more positive proof comes to hand. The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs announces that the German ambassador to Argentina has urged his government that the time has come to "reorganize" southern Brazil with a view to the realization of German purposes, a charge substantiated by the publication by our government of the dispatches of this ambassador. This confirms the deepening suspicions of recent years.

Mention of Latin America in this connection with its custody of the Panama Canal, brings us to another phase of German expansion, and that not the least important, the annexation of the sea. It is extremely difficult for those who have lived their lives on land and are unable to imagine a habitable earth without terra firma under their feet, to think of the sea as a territory which millions of human beings can inhabit and make yield them a livelihood. But this is literally true, and an expanding population in this age finds few better opportunities than to launch out upon the sea, put the world under tribute for its carrying service, tap the distance reservoirs of energy to which it gives easy access, and bulwark land and empire behind its redoubtable defences. Like Japan and for like reasons, Germany long ago saw her opportunity and expressed her decision in the words of the Kaiser: "Our future lies on the sea." We are not here concerned with the inevitable conflict with Britain which this policy of Greater Germany foreshadowed, though that conflict is one which must ultimately decide our

own fate. But we must remind ourselves of the oft repeated truth that such a development of maritime interests means a corresponding development of naval power, with its inevitable naval stations and its ambition to control strategic waterways. The bearing of this upon our problem of the Caribbean hardly requires elaboration. We at present possess the Panama Canal and a few miles of adjacent territory, but the possession of any defensible site on the borders of the Caribbean would jeopardize our possession of the Canal and might absolutely paralyse its commerce. With the present status of submarine warfare, it would reach much farther and might destroy all commerce on our Atlantic seaboard. When we recall Germany's determined attempt to intervene in Venezuela, her former opposition to the cession of the Danish Islands, her notification that she would not acquiesce in our intervention in Hayti, and the recent rumour of negotiations for a submarine base in Venezuela, the danger of German intervention in Caribbean affairs ceases to be speculative. Fortunately, the apathy and incredulity of recent years has begun to disappear, and it now seems possible that America will safeguard her interests before it is too late.

The danger to America of a German settlement south of the equator is less evident, but perhaps not less real. A German colony in the rich uplands of southern Brazil would inevitably push northward, precisely as an English colony in New England pushed westward till there was no more land to occupy. The indolent Brazilian tropics, despite their veneer of western civilization, would oppose no more

effective opposition to advancing Germany than the English encountered from the followers of Massachusetts, while the lure of their coveted products would tempt eager industrial Germany more than the treasures of Peru tempted the covetous Spaniard. The mastery of South America by the German would be as inevitable as was the mastery of North America by the Anglo-Saxon.

The German advance, however, is likely to take a more insidious form. The creation of an avowed colony may be deemed inexpedient, as likely to invite opposition. A possibly wiser policy may be to acquire influence in Brazil while leaving it nominally independent, the policy which Britain has so long successfully maintained toward Portugal. This in any case is one phase of German policy. To this end, large settlements of Germans, extensive investments of German capital, the development of commerce with Germany, and the financing of the Brazilian state, may all be made to contribute. Few persons are aware how far this policy had been advanced toward complete control before the outbreak of the present war. The decision of Brazil to enter the conflict on the side of the Allies is for that country a declaration of independence.

The dispassionate reader can hardly have read the foregoing pages without the mental query: "Why should Germany not finance Brazil and capture her trade? Why should she not possess South America as the Anglo-Saxon controls North America?" That such control would mean immeasurable improvement, no one acquainted with present conditions in South

America can for a moment doubt. It is the tragedy of civilization that the Anglo-Saxon can not bid his Teuton cousin godspeed in so beneficent an undertaking. Alas, the German is not content to control South America, and such control attained or even begun, could not fail to precipitate a struggle between these two virile peoples which could end only with the destruction of one or the other. The Anglo-Saxon is hardly ready,—can hardly be expected,—to give the Teuton a place in the sun at the expense of himself retiring into the shade. In the interest of Teuton and Saxon alike, this internecine struggle should be avoided. In due time the writer will venture a suggestion as to the possibility of a happier outcome. For the moment there can be for the Anglo-Saxon but one duty, to resist unsparingly the unsparing Teuton advance.

As we have passed in rapid survey over the different fields of German imperial enterprise, Oceanica, Africa, North Africa, the Far East, America, one statement closes every account,—*lost in the present war*. Lost are the coral islands and Samoa. Lost are German East Africa and West Africa, Togo and Kamerun. Lost, even before the war, were Morocco and the coveted Tripolitan port. Lost are Kiaochow and the mines of China. Lost, in all probability, are the Balkans and Bagdad, the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Lost,—but no. Here the list ends. In one quarter German interests have received no serious check. Against German aggression in America, the war has as yet furnished no effectual guaranty. And assuming that present results forecast the

final settlement, what is the prospect? Germany, effectually checked in every other quarter, can not fail to see in America her only opportunity. As yet America has been spared because other opportunities were more promising or more immediate. What will be her fate when she becomes the *only* opportunity? Already there have been intimations that Germany would gladly meet the wishes of her European enemies if they would give her a free hand in America, a proposition to which one power is both shrewd enough and generous enough to oppose an unalterable negative. This negative is the only protection which America has, outside of its own as yet inadequate forces, against the aggression of the most powerful and the most unscrupulous nation in the world, a nation which war will neither crush nor conciliate, and whose energy,—only briefly spent,—will be the more effectually directed toward these shores.

Japan and Germany are the two hungry nations, hungry from a vital need. Cramped in their little lands, they live in a world that everywhere obeys the pitiless law of growth. Only a growth which their present territories do not permit can prevent their being grown off the face of the earth by peoples like unto themselves but blessed with broader lands. They will dispossess by any means rather than tamely acquiesce in such a fate. Can we resist Japan? Yes, if we will. Can we resist Germany? Yes, if we put forth our utmost. But neither is the ultimate issue. Can we resist them *both* should hunger compel them to make common cause? This is a perpetual possibility.

CHAPTER XX

THE GREATEST EMPIRE

THE British Empire holds a unique place not only in Europe but in the world. Unlike other great empires, past and present, it has its seat in a small island from which centre it asserts an almost incredible authority. Japan alone among the great powers is somewhat similarly situated, but the authority of Japan extends but little beyond her own islands, while that of Britain covers an area a hundred times that of her island, a quarter of the entire globe, while about a third of the human race own allegiance to her flag.

But the nature of this authority is more remarkable than its extent. Closely scrutinized it seems to fade away and leave nothing tangible, seems in short, not to be authority at all. Some one has said that if the words "British" and "empire" were stricken out of the English language, the British Empire would cease to exist, in other words, that the British Empire is only a name which is backed by no substantial reality. Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the British Empire was "a sham," and punctuated his anti-British propaganda by the assertion that it was not in the nature of things human that a sham should endure for ever. Yet despite this absence of anything like authority as the world has known it, the fact re-

mains that Britain's children come when she calls,—that they scarce wait for her calling. They refuse to recognize her right to command their services. They even refuse to promise voluntary assistance in case the mother country should be in straits. Yet that service is rendered and that assistance is granted with a unanimity and a heartiness which no other power can surpass. It is this inner character of the British Empire rather than its peculiarities, geographic, ethnic, or political, which we need to understand.

The nucleus of the British Empire consists of the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. It is here that the chief dissonance in the empire is found. Great Britain, though peopled by different races, has become unified in a very high degree. It is hardly surpassed by France, the recognized model of race unity. But Ireland has neither entered that unity nor formed a unity of her own. Former misrule in Ireland has wrought mischief which has not been removed by over-representation in the British Parliament and other substantial if tardy concessions. Differences of religion have sharpened and embittered the conflict. But in this and in other respects Ireland is divided against herself. A minority of the Irish people, of earlier British origin, share the religion, the industrial character, and the wealth of the larger island, and insist upon retaining the closest connection with it. The less affluent majority, differing in temperament, in religion, and in economic status, desire partial or complete separation,—for here again there is no agreement. Local autonomy would seemingly be the reasonable and easy solution of this problem

were it not for these deepening clefts in Ireland itself. The British sympathizing minority not unreasonably fear that a majority from whom they have been separated by one of the bitterest feuds that history records, will so adjust taxation as to burden those forms of industry of which they are the chief owners, or otherwise discriminate against them, while the majority naturally feels that an Irish state can not afford to lose its only wealthy constituencies. In turn this majority itself is divided into moderates who desire autonomy and extremists who desire complete separation. Probably nowhere in the world can persons of alleged intelligence be found who have so little consciousness of the realities of the world situation as these Irish extremists. In our own country especially, where irresponsibility is naturally most complete, their representatives exhaust the possibilities of political impracticality. The effort now being made to effect a degree of union among these discordant elements,— a union which must naturally precede any concession on Britain's part,— would be of absorbing interest were it not overshadowed by the tragedy that threatens to engulf humanity.

It may be noted that Ireland as regards area, wealth, and population, is a negligible factor in the British Empire whose serious interests it continually jeopardizes. But the location of Ireland is such as to make it the most strategic of all British possessions. Upon its absolute control depends the very existence of the Empire. Not the British Parliament but the maker of the planet decreed the dependence of Ireland.

Outside this central nucleus the British Empire contains a large number of elements differing widely from one another in almost every conceivable respect. First, there are stations which are essentially fortresses, like Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden. These are necessarily under military government (though not under martial law), their population, itself little more than a camp following, having all necessary safeguards, but no direct voice in matters affecting imperial interests.

Then there are crown colonies inhabited by populations of low development, especially in the tropics. These are administered directly by appointees of the British Government, a service now governed by traditions which are one of the most valuable products of human experience. Some of these like Nigeria and Guiana are vast territories where native populations are and ever must be the chief consideration. Others like Singapore and Hong Kong, are mere trading posts where a cosmopolitan and exotic population soon overshadows the native element. The government makes as much or as little use of local citizenship as its character permits, a very considerable use in the examples last given, although imperial interests are still controlled from the imperial centre.

Rising higher in the scale, we have dependencies whose people have developed some capacity for self government with the inevitable pride in their own forms and outward manifestations which such capacity implies. With incredible deference, the fruit of long experience, Britain preserves these native institutions, even their excrescences and defects in which

too often a people recognizes its individuality and defends its self-respect. But justice and efficiency beyond anything the native ever knew, are secured by the simple device of the "resident" whose unobtrusive admonitions come weighted with the awe of Britain. Such are Egypt, the native states of India, and the Federated Malay States.

But interest chiefly centres in the great self-governing "dominions" of Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. These include nearly two thirds the area of the empire and are peopled with men of the British race or men capable of easy assimilation. These five dominions have acquired *entire independence*. It is difficult to see wherein the independence of Canada differs in any essential respect from that of the United States. It has its own Parliament and passes its own laws on all subjects. It is true that a governor is appointed by the British crown, but he holds his office on the strict condition that he will do no governing. He has the privilege of signing bills passed by Parliament, but unlike our president, he has not the privilege of *not* signing them. There can not be the slightest doubt that an attempt to veto such a bill would necessitate his instant recall, or failing that, the result would be that Canada would withdraw from the empire, as we are assured she is free to do at any moment if she wishes. No doubt an able governor may be a very influential person, but hardly more so than an able British ambassador at Washington, such, for instance, as Viscount Bryce. In a sense his influence is distinctly less than it would be in private station because

of the embargo laid upon all direct political activities on his part.

This obviously gives Canada complete autonomy, or freedom to manage her own affairs. But Canada has more than autonomy. She has independence. She levies her tariffs against Britain quite as against other countries. When some years since there was an agitation in favour of a lower tariff within the empire, Canada was careful to remind the British agitators that that was a matter for her to settle. She ultimately made the desired concession, but nothing would have extorted it if Britain had questioned her right to withhold it. This proud assertion of independence is celebrated in Kipling's poem, *Our Lady of the Snows*.

"A Nation spoke to a Nation,
A Queen sent word to a Throne:
'Daughter am I in my mother's house,
But mistress in my own.
The gates are mine to open,
As the gates are mine to close,
And I set my house in order,'
Said our Lady of the Snows."

In the more vital matter of military co-operation Canada has equally asserted her independence. When the question was raised in the Canadian Parliament whether Canada would pledge her aid to the mother country if the latter should be involved in war, the subject was debated and the vote was *in the negative*. Canada reserved the right to pass judgment on the war in question and to help if she felt the war to be justified. She none the less was prompt to

send troops in the Boer war, and in the present war her exertions have surpassed the utmost expectations of the empire.

Finally, Canada reserves independence in the matter of treaties with foreign powers. She has repeatedly negotiated treaties with the United States without British intervention. No doubt this right has been exercised with much discretion and with deference to British opinion, but hardly more than would be shown by any power sustaining close relations of commerce and friendship with Great Britain. The limit of this freedom has never quite been tested, simply because there has been no inclination to test it, but British assurance has been publicly given that Canada is free to withdraw from the Empire and continue as a separate nation or even join the United States if she wishes. It would be difficult to imagine independence going farther. No doubt if Canada should enter a combination hostile to the Empire, Britain would take prompt measures in self defence, but only as she would do in like case with any state.

The foregoing applies substantially without change to the five "dominions." All are independent nations held together in a tacit league which does not limit in the least their independence or do violence to their individuality, but which none the less secures the most substantial advantages to all participants. It keeps a third of the human race in peace among themselves and united in defence against outside enemies. It provides a court of arbitration for all differences that may arise among the component states, a court of immense experience and unrivalled pres-

tige. And above all it furnishes to a group of growing and naturally diverging peoples, a vast unifying influence, an imperial oversoul that saves them from the pettiness, the provincialism, and the hostilities which would otherwise be the inevitable incident of their separate development. If Britain finally succeeds in lifting such dependencies as India and Egypt up to the status of self-governing dominions, the goal toward which all effort is at present directed and toward which clear progress is being made, she will crown an achievement which has no parallel.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this, the supreme political achievement in the history of the world. The problem of the ages has been to unite men without crushing them. Union with subjection of body and spirit and consequent stagnation, has been a commonplace of history. Egypt effected it four thousand years ago, as China has effected it since. Greece escaped it by a strenuous endeavour, risking and ultimately losing her all rather than surrender her individuality. But union which should secure peace among men, yet leave the varied life of every community and every individual unrepressed in all its infinite suggestiveness, this, though sincerely attempted by Rome, has first been measurably accomplished by Britain.

The system has its foundation in the great English speaking dominions planted in the four corners of the earth. Each of these is free to observe and criticize the rest, free to experiment, and to copy or reject the experiments of others. The reaction of these independent dominions, one upon another, gives

a dynamic quality to Anglo-Saxon civilization which all widely disseminated civilizations have hitherto lost. The stagnation which inevitably follows the standardizing of human institutions has hitherto been the most serious and the most legitimate of all objections to the policy of imperialism. At all costs,—yes, even at the cost of world wars,—civilization must remain dynamic. The instinctive revolt of the world against German *kultur* is due, not to its frightfulness or to any other inherent defect, but to its pitiless intolerance. Germany Germanizes whatever she acquires. She has sought to Germanize every colony, to standardize all her component states. She at one time standardized all her universities with the result,—as expressed by one of their professors,—of “immense immediate improvement and no progress since.” Progress was secured by the sacrifice of progressiveness. In a less degree Americans make the same mistake. With a fatuous trust in the universal applicability of American adaptations, we are Americanizing the Filipinos. We have presented them with a miniature copy of the American government, Senate, House of Representatives, Cabinet and all, which they will wear as a Hottentot wears a top hat. We can admire but we can not yet emulate the amazing live-and-let-live principle of British organization.

Not less wonderful than the dominions with their utter freedom and their elusive spiritual bond, are the great dependencies, like India and Egypt, in their embodiment of the same great principle. They are not independent like the dominions simply because they

can not be. "Liberty is not a gift; it is an achievement." It is not a thing to be granted, but a thing to be wrought out in the structure of the body politic. If independence were granted, they could not maintain their position in the peaceable family of nations. They could not even maintain coherence within their borders. Independence with rapine and famine within and war without, is not an achievement. Of that the world has known no lack. If these desolating experiences are to be avoided, these fundamental conditions of peace must be imposed where they can not be self-developed, as they are imposed upon the backward individual by those who are compelled to accept his companionship. Bengali and Mahratta must not fly at each other's throats nor wreck the land and waste the folk with famine. The needful contribution of the tropics to modern civilization must not be interrupted. But these fundamentals once guaranteed, the vast routine of administration is left to the native machinery. It is not only permitted to do this work, it is encouraged to do it, helped to do it, made to do it, saved from the mistakes that would wreck it or turn it into an engine of destruction. Britain could do the work better, but only with the destruction of that vital principle upon which all growth depends, the people's consciousness that the work is theirs, theirs with its privileges, theirs with its responsibilities, theirs with its opportunities and its door into the limitless future. Said an Indian native prince to a Briton: "You British would administer this country much better than I do, but my people would rather see me ride into town on my elephant

than enjoy the best administration on earth." And his people made the natural, the inevitable, choice.

With all its marvels, however, the British Empire has long been recognized as an unfinished structure, and with the development of its dependencies and the growth of its dominions, that incompleteness has become more apparent. The task of arbitrating the differences that arise between members of the imperial family,—differences as serious as those between any nations in the world,—and of championing their cause against outsiders, necessarily devolved at first upon the mother country. In the helplessness of infancy and childhood, parental arbitration and protection are appropriate and inevitable, but as youth strains toward manhood, restiveness betrays the consciousness of new powers and new needs. As the parental sphere becomes more restricted, its task becomes more delicate. The same great ends must still be accomplished, but by indirection, by counsel rather than by authority. Nor is the need one-sided, but rather mutual.

The growing need in Britain has been for some organ suitable for the exercise of truly imperial authority. The British Parliament, theoretically the source of all authority, represents in fact only the British Isles. It is suited for the management of their affairs and is more than needed for them alone. To add representatives from the dominions would unfit it for the management of local affairs, while giving it doubtful fitness for imperial functions. The spiritual bond of the empire was ideal in its way, but there were concrete things of an imperial sort to do,

and there was need of a concrete instrument to do them.

Yet imperial federation, though a recognized need in some form, has been dreaded alike by England and by the dominions. England has been too long the acknowledged ruler of the empire to take very kindly to the idea of sitting in council with her colonies as equals. There seems to be an element of presumption in such a proposal. On the other hand, the dominions are too jealous of their independence to willingly submit to any abridgment of it, even by a council in which they have a share. For instance, India insists on the right of her people as British subjects to travel and settle anywhere in the British Empire, while Australia absolutely refuses to admit Asiatics to the dominion. Suppose a council of the Empire should decide in favour of India's contention. The bare possibility of such a decision is sufficient to assure Australia's veto. For remember, no dominion can be coerced into such a union.

The impossible seems nevertheless to have been accomplished by this war which has dissolved so much of the older fabric of civilization. When the British Cabinet was reconstituted and five members became the real rulers of the British Empire, the astute Lloyd George, perceiving that the paternalism of England and the provincialism of the dominions had alike dissolved in the fiery ordeal of war, summoned the prime ministers of the dominions to London to an "Imperial Conference" to consider plans for the conduct of the war and decide upon the terms on which the Empire would be willing to make peace. It was an

innocent and natural looking proposal. What more reasonable than that these partners in the struggle should deliberate regarding their common and vital interests. Yet it was an immense innovation. It was England that had made plans for other wars and decided the terms of peace. But now it is the Empire. With a great price the dominions had bought their citizenship.

This Council once brought together and the British mind wonted to its obviously reasonable task, the bold premier quietly announces in a newspaper interview that the prime ministers of the dominions will remain in council after the war; that their countries will miss them, but that they must get along without them; that they must stay in London and help govern the British Empire. In such unobtrusive fashion does this greatest of empires announce the revision of its venerable constitution and the inauguration of a new era. Later reports are to the effect that the Council will meet annually hereafter. Imperial federation is an accomplished fact.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GREAT FELLOWSHIP

THE relation of the United States to a power which holds a third of humanity in fief could not but be a fact of the first importance, even without kinship or close historic connection. But when it is remembered that it is to this empire that we owe our origin, that we are one of its seceding members, that its language, its literature, its institutions, its entire civilization are essentially identical with our own, and that the relations between the two, commercial, political, and cultural, have always been of the closest, the importance of this relation easily overshadows all other facts of a political order in the world. This relation is of course a historic product, a thing made possible by the events of three hundred years. Equally, any future relation which may exist between the two countries must be an outgrowth of the present and the past. There is talk from time to time of an Anglo-Saxon alliance. The reader will perhaps have discovered ere this that the writer has very little faith in our power to institute vital relations of helpfulness between nations by formal agreement. For thirty years Italy was in league with Germany and Austria, yet when the crisis came, she took the other side. Why? Because she was on the other side all the

time. Historic conditions had created between herself and Austria a relation of antagonism which no formal league could remove. This war has been a continuous revelation of the inability of formal agreements to modify the actualities of historic evolution. In the light of these facts, the desirability of an Anglo-Saxon alliance is a question of minor interest. No matter how desirable co-operation between the two great Anglo-Saxon groups might be, a formal alliance will not secure it. It is but a moderate hyperbole to say that if we haven't a union, we can not get it, and if we have it, we can not get rid of it. The real question is, therefore, what has been and what is the relation between the two countries. We have not to do with formal and official relations except as they, like straws upon the surface, sometimes betray the direction of deeper currents. Even overt acts, friendly or hostile, are of secondary importance. The important thing, if we can discover it, is the mutual reaction of race instincts, past and present, for upon these alone can be based a safe prophecy of the future.

As we glance backward over our mutual history the first facts that obtrude themselves are the two wars which we have fought with Britain. It is a significant fact that Britain is the only country with which we have been twice at war. A closer inventory discloses numerous points of friction, involving more or less prolonged periods of strained relations, the Maine boundary, the Oregon controversy, the long drawn out Isthmian Canal dispute, the Venezuelan boundary case, the Behring Sea controversy, and

others. There was decided friction between the two powers in Hawaii and Samoa before the final settlement, with occasional acts far from creditable to either side. Finally, and perhaps more unpleasantly remembered that anything else, there was unfortunate hesitation on the part of the British government during our civil war, with much private aid and some official encouragement to the Confederacy. These facts, hardly to be matched by any like array in connection with any other nation, have impressed the popular imagination and given colour to the belief that Britain was our traditional enemy. This tradition continued with us until our war with Spain, when for the first time incidents of the dramatic sort that the popular imagination loves, began to array themselves on the other side.

Despite these facts and in the face of this long-standing tradition, it may safely be asserted that the relation between the two countries,—and more particularly the attitude of Britain,—has never been one of serious hostility, nor has our membership in the Anglo-Saxon fellowship (which is the substance of the British Empire) ever been cancelled. We have become independent, but so have Canada and Australia. We have declared our independence, but so have they, over and over again. We fought for our independence,—and for theirs,—and Britain fought for it too, fought with us against a king who acted without her warrant and against a theory of government that she had repudiated with the sword a century before. Britain protects Canada and Australia, but she also protects us. She has stood by us

from the first, and in every crisis of our history she has tipped the scale in our favour. Canada and Australia, uncoerced, proffer their aid to Britain, and so do we, in this, the first crisis sufficiently serious to require our aid. Granting that the relation is less close than in the case of Canada, that we have more distinctive symbols, and that our political and social forms are more divergent from the original type, these facts qualify but little the general truth of our essential oneness as manifested in the history of the last hundred and fifty years. The superlative importance of this fact warrants a brief but careful inquiry.

The seeming hostility between the two countries is most in evidence in our war of independence. Yet it is not too much to say that the loyalty of Britain was never more manifest than in that very struggle. It is a truism of history that the British king at that time was engaged in a last forlorn attempt to rule without the consent of his people. This policy, enjoined upon him by a masterful but imprudent mother, was resented in England and the colonies alike. It was too late in the day for the monarch to attempt a *coup d'état* and abolish representative institutions. What he tried to do was to corrupt them. In theory the responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament and through it to the people was respected, but a parliamentary majority was maintained against the will of the people by bribery. It was this anti-English government which attempted to govern both colonies and England without their consent, and was resisted by both and at last overthrown by both.

Not that the English people had as yet formulated the principles of their present imperial policy. The empire as a fellowship of uncoerced states had come into being unawares, a thing without precedent. Its essence was intangible and elusive. There were no names for it. The traditions of government did not fit it, and inevitably led to misapprehension. The seers were few who recognized in the accident of frontier independence united with the tradition of allegiance, the principle of a new world order, but still there were seers. When this principle was put to the inevitable test, what more natural than that each party should at first construe independence as the end of union? But because in advance of this assumed separation they had not appreciated the bond that bound them, so afterwards they did not appreciate that it bound them still.

But the crowning proof of the attitude of Britain at this time is to be found in the peace negotiations following the surrender of Cornwallis. France and the colonies, allies in the war,—which was in fact but a frontier episode in a great European struggle,—had made the usual agreement not to make peace except in co-operation. When the time for peace came, the real race instincts asserted themselves.

It seems ungracious, at a time when the world unites in homage to French heroism and unostentatious sacrifice, to question the tradition,—never so acceptable as now,—of the friendship of France in the days of our need. It may lessen our scruples somewhat to recall that the France with which we had then to deal was not the free France of our day,

was indeed hardly France at all, but the government of Louis XV and Pompadour which with little warrant assumed to act in her name. That this government gave us help is not to be questioned. That it did so from friendship is much more doubtful.

France had been at war with England for a century over India, America, and other dependencies. She had lost everything on the heights of Quebec only a few years before. She was not ready to accept that verdict as final, and seeing an opportunity by a powerful European alliance to reverse it, she attacked once more her redoubtable foe. To detach the American colonies was but one of her many objects. It was the only one in which she succeeded. Her further object was to so detach them that they would be dependent upon herself, a plan unpleasantly suggestive of reconquest. For this she relied upon the peace negotiations. When the time came she procrastinated and manœuvred to secure American subserviency before entering upon the negotiations. It was even suggested that the colonies should not ask England to recognize their independence, but should allow France to guarantee it instead, a suggestion the purport of which hardly requires discussion.

Meanwhile the English king had failed in his attempt to rule without consent, and the English people had come into their own. At once the friendship which they had manifested toward the colonies throughout the war made itself felt in the councils of government. And now comes one of the most astounding paradoxes of history. *England connived with her rebellious colonies to rescue them from the*

clutch of France. The story of that clandestine peace forced upon the French minister, despite his undisguised indignation, perhaps reflects little honour upon our plighted faith at that time, but it reveals as hardly anything else could have done the underlying bond between Anglo-Saxon kin. The secret clause in this treaty by which it was agreed that the northern boundary of Florida was to be latitude thirty-two thirty if Florida was finally assigned to Britain, and thirty-one if Florida went to Spain, was a further indication of Britain's willingness to favour the colonies, though independent, as against any other power.

After this peace events moved rapidly in Europe. The fountains of the great deep were broken up in the French Revolution, and from the turmoil emerged Napoleon. England was the supreme obstacle to his plan of world empire, and against her he hurled all his might. Her supreme reliance was her fleet which held the "tight little isle" inviolate. Never since its history began has Britain's navy been subjected to so rude a test. Not a ship or a sailor could be spared, if the great fabric of Britain's empire was to escape a destruction that should leave not one stone upon another. But these were days of harsh discipline and imperfect patriotism on both sides the Anglo-Saxon sea. American ships became harbours of refuge for deserting British seamen, their patriotism being matched by that of American soldiers at that time, of whom we are told that 400,000 were drafted during the ensuing war, while never more than 6,000 were under arms at one time. In her attempt to suppress desertion, Britain resorted to the high-handed

measures that any nation will adopt when its existence is at stake. We were too far away to feel our interests involved in the struggle and too much under the influence of recent war traditions to feel the bond of kinship. The result was one of the most imprudent as it was one of the most inglorious wars of all history. Despite brilliant isolated combats on the sea, the result was for us humiliating defeat. Our territory was invaded, our army defeated, and — in symbol of subjection,— our capitol was burned.

It is difficult to say to which side this war was the more distasteful. All kinds of motives mingled to produce the increasing disgust which led both parties to seek a shamefaced peace. Among these motives, however, there was not wanting the consciousness that the war was fratricidal and an ethnic absurdity. There was no weak sentimentality about it, but a masculine disgust at the nagging family feud which far more wholesomely betrayed the sense of essential community of interest.

It is interesting, however, to note the terms of peace. There can be no question that America was beaten, no question that we might have been forced to acknowledge British suzerainty. Britain was overwhelmingly superior, and in December, 1814, when peace was made, the menace of Napoleon seemed at an end. Both the navy and the armies employed against that supreme antagonist might have been turned against us. Yet the first article of the treaty stipulates for mutual restoration of territory and property taken during the war, while its one constructive article is a pledge of co-operation in sup-

pressing the slave trade. The issues which had caused the war were not mentioned. They had passed with the emergency that created them.

The terms of this treaty are astounding. Britain had us, and she gave us back to ourselves. And forthwith the two resume their co-operation in the great work of humanity which stands primarily to the credit of the Anglo-Saxon, all as a matter of course. Amazing that it should be so; still more amazing that it should not amaze us.

It is appropriate to bear in mind this common effort against the slave trade, when we note that in the next conspicuous episode of our history Britain was unsympathetic. The annexation of Texas which resulted in war with Mexico, was opposed by Britain and France. It is perhaps of all our imperialistic moves the one which commands least sympathy among ourselves. The reason is that it was avowedly a movement for the extension of slavery. Doubtless later events have reconciled the Anglo-Saxon family to the action of its one-time black sheep, but we can hardly wonder that at the time it met with reproof. Not that British coldness at this time was purely ethical or philanthropic. The Oregon feud was at its height. Nations like individuals, and even more than individuals, are always largely influenced by considerations of self interest. But moral sympathies are always a powerful factor, and often turn the scale, as they did in this case when we forfeited them, and as they did in the next crisis when the life of the nation depended upon them.

Probably no single situation in our national history

is the subject of more misapprehension than our relation to European nations during the civil war. The legend is that Britain and France were hostile to the Union cause, and that only the intervention of Russia prevented their recognizing the Confederacy and deciding the war in its favour.

The myth of Russian friendship may be readily disposed of. There can be no question that the visit of the Russian fleet to New York at a critical moment in the war was a most fortunate accident, and that it exerted much influence upon nations whose interference we had reason to dread. But it seems to have been proven beyond question that the coincidence was an accident, and that Russia was unaware of the crisis in which she so fatefully intervened. Nor is there anything in her attitude, before or since, to warrant the assumption of friendship toward the United States.

We are chiefly concerned, however, with the attitude of Britain. It is well to remember at the outset that this was a civil war, not a war between ourselves and a foreign state. Hesitation was therefore natural, even to one committed to sympathy with America, for both parties were American. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the southern states were at that time the sole purveyors of raw material to one of the greatest of British industries,—cotton. Whole districts in England were devoted to this industry, and failure to get cotton condemned the operatives to idleness and almost to starvation. Yet our blockade closed southern ports and cut off the supply almost absolutely. Men would

be superhuman who would acquiesce without protest in such a situation, and a government that did not try to secure the conditions of existence for its people would be guilty of a breach of trust. The British government did try by every available means to open the southern ports, and considered seriously the question of recognizing the Confederate government.

It was in the face of this imminent peril that our government sent its ambassadors, not to the British government, but to the English people. The eloquent Henry Ward Beecher in particular was charged with this delicate mission. The story as told to the writer by a contemporary, is more than a romance. Landing at Liverpool he appealed at once to the cotton operatives of Lancashire. They were hungry, sullen, and boisterous. The great orator was greeted with a shower of venerable eggs. Nothing daunted, he cracked a joke at the expense of his ungallant opponents, and was rewarded by a laugh. That was his opportunity, and building upon this moment of fleeting sympathy, he launched out upon his defence of the Union cause and his plea for human freedom. There was silence, then applause, then an ovation. Fame preceded him to the next town, and the next, until his journey toward London became a triumphal progress. *And following him came a petition from these operatives of Lancashire to their government, praying that they should not recognize a government based on human slavery.* Much has been said of the British statesmen of the time, of Mr. Gladstone and his momentary defection from the high principles to which his life was devoted, but what

shall be said of a nation that pours out its gratitude to an autocracy whose navy strays in unwittingly at an opportune moment, and withholds it from a free people who will to hunger for its sake?

During the years that followed the civil war, there was a strange dissonance between the two peoples. American cockyness was much in evidence in the political rally, the partisan press, and,—most regrettable of all,—in those travesties upon fact, the textbooks of our public schools. The writer recalls the time when certain American statesmen, who for the last twenty years have been staunch friends of Britain, were making their bid for favour by the ever popular method of twisting the lion's tail. In England there were few such utterances,—and no such textbooks. It is difficult to say whether friendship for America was purposely fostered or was a spontaneous manifestation, but fostering is impossible without a measure of spontaneity. The important thing is that British friendship was a fact.

The Spanish war was a revelation to the American people of its status with European nations. The writer had the misfortune to live in Germany during that period. To enlarge upon his experiences and observations at that time would be unpleasantly instructive. His command of the language saved him from the worst of that brutal browbeating which sent back most of his fellow American students of the time embittered for life against the nation which seemed to be leagued to a man in a campaign of misrepresentation and slander against a nation which they had elected to hate. Time and time again he

has witnessed from his window a squad of newsboys go dashing down the street crying: "Extra! Extra! Great Spanish victory," and the diminutive sheets were sold for ten pfennigs each, as fast as they could be handed out. Never was an American victory announced. Never did one of these announcements contain even a nucleus of truth. All were utter inventions. Yet the hoax never failed to work. A press venal beyond anything we know, coined thus the hate of the people for its nefarious gain. Americans in Paris in those days were not much happier than those in Berlin. Not until a boycott was instituted against the gowns and millinery of this capital of fashion was civility in some measure restored.

It was all very natural. America was suddenly emerging from her isolation and appeared upon the scene as a disconcerting factor in the plans of Europe. But why this instant brace against us? Why not at least an attempt to win our favour, to make us subservient to their own far-reaching designs? The answer is simple. They were then enemies of Britain, and *they* knew, when we did not, that the Anglo-Saxons were one.

They knew, and Britain knew. Nothing could be more striking than the contrast between her attitude and that of the countries noted. Popular manifestations of sympathy were innumerable, and there was now no reason why government should not follow suit. This it did in many ways, and with results that we can hardly yet appreciate. We have recently learned from Lord Cromer, at that time British administrator of Egypt, how he "stretched" British

neutrality in such a way as to prevent the reinforcement of the Spanish fleet at Manila. Doubtless other British authorities did the same as occasion offered. Neutrality is an imperfectly defined thing and leaves a wide margin of liberty to those who are called upon to interpret its obligations.

Britain's attitude, however, is best revealed by the famous incident of Manila Bay which, though elaborated by the inevitable myth faculty into a picturesque and symmetry somewhat in excess of fact, none the less represents, perhaps even more truly than mere fact, the actualities of the situation. This indeed is the very function of myth. Actual happenings usually interpret but partially the logic of the situation. Myth gives to fragmentary fact the logical completeness necessary for interpretation. Cambronne is recorded as saying at Waterloo: "The Guard dies but never surrenders." He did not die but lived to deny that he ever said it. But that is what he ought to have said, for the Guard refused to surrender and perished, leaving their leader wounded in their midst. Myth puts in his mouth the appropriate words. This is said to forestall the inevitable criticism that the incident is a "Dewey myth." Be this as it may, it is certain that it essentially records the facts concerning one of the most critical situations in which our country was ever placed. The story is here given as it is told in Manila.

It was foreseen in Europe that America must needs destroy the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay as a protection to her Pacific commerce. It was also realized,—better in Europe than with us,—that this would para-

lyse Spanish power in the Philippines and leave the islands to be appropriated by any power so minded. One power, for reasons already stated, was decidedly so minded. A powerful German fleet was dispatched to Manila Bay with instructions which may be surmised from what follows. It is said to have been far superior to the fleet of Admiral Dewey.

The Spanish fleet was destroyed as expected, and the expected situation resulted. The Spaniards, in ill favour with the natives, would have perished if left to their fate. Dewey, perceiving their danger, remained and sent for assistance. Meanwhile, his fleet policed the bay and protected Manila. Anchorages were assigned as usual by harbour authorities, and movements in the harbour were forbidden after nine o'clock at night. Here was a test case for the German commander. To obey these instructions was to recognize, tacitly at least, American authority in the Philippines. This authority was precisely what the German fleet had come there to challenge. The German fleet ostentatiously shifted its anchorage after nine o'clock. The next morning Admiral Dewey, who is believed to have conferred in the meantime with the captain of a single British cruiser then in the harbour, sent peremptory word to the German admiral bidding him keep the anchorage assigned and adding,—popular report may have modified the phraseology,—that “if he wanted fight he could have it at the drop of the hat.”

It was now the German's turn to visit the British captain of whom he is said to have asked: “What would you do in the event of trouble between Ad-

miral Dewey and myself?" To which he is said to have replied: "What I would do in that event is known only to Admiral Dewey and myself." It was further noticed that the British cruiser had taken a position exactly between that of the German and the American flagships, symbolical of the position so long occupied by the navy which it represented. There was no trouble between the American and German fleets.

Whatever criticism may take from this expressive story, the main facts are certain. The German fleet was sent to Manila, and its purpose can have been none other than that here indicated. That there was friction between the two commanders is also certain, as is the fact that the commander of the more powerful fleet backed down before the commander of the weaker fleet and the representative of the weaker power. That this was done through either fear of or regard for the United States, is unthinkable in the light of recent events. Whether Germany had a right to seek to annex the Philippines, or whether we did wisely in annexing them, is not now the question. The moral of the story is that to accomplish her own ends, Germany was willing to risk war with the United States, and that Britain interposed her veto. Germany has always been willing to risk war with us to accomplish her ends, and Britain has always interposed her veto. We have ample assurance that Germany has intimated to Britain her willingness to concede all demands in the old world on condition that she be allowed a free hand in the new, and that the offer has been summarily rejected. Britain is pour-

ing out her blood to win what she could have had long ago by bartering our safety. That she has had her own interest in view in protecting our interests, does not lessen the value of that protection.

It seems clear that in the years immediately preceding the present war Britain has been far more conscious than we of the essential unity of the Anglo-Saxon world. Her dealings with the great dominions which despite their stoutly asserted independence are so indisputably one with herself, have doubtless accustomed her to the idea of an underlying unity as nothing in our experience has done. Moreover, her position in Europe, on the firing line of the great race struggle, has taught her, as we have not been taught, the necessity of race solidarity, if the Anglo-Saxon civilization is to resist the dangers which threaten it. Of the whole Anglo-Saxon fellowship, none have felt so little, or had so little occasion to feel, the reality of that fellowship as ourselves.

Yet there are plain indications that through all the years we have unconsciously recognized it. Said an educated German in the first year of the war: "I can not understand you Americans. You are a perfect riddle to me. *To think that you do not see your chance now to seize Canada!*" The writer was simply stunned by a remark so stupid. What reply was possible to a man who could talk or think like that? He tried in imagination to carry the conversation further. "But we do not want Canada. We have room enough." Imagine his German scorn. "You do not want Canada, you who grasped at New Brunswick and wrangled for Oregon, and defied your

constitution to get Louisiana and made war to get California? You want the earth. You have room enough? Did you need room when you got Louisiana or Florida?" "But Canada is distinct in institutions and in her unassimilated French population." "But haven't you the same population and institutions in Louisiana? Are they more alien than the Mexicans of New Mexico? And how about the Porto Ricans and the Filipinos?" "But strategic considerations played a part in some of these annexations." "Strategic considerations! Is there a frontier in the world so exposed as your northern frontier? An arbitrary line which is neither defended nor defensible, you should annex Canada for that reason alone, even though all else forbade. No, your policy remains a mystery. You have been the most aggressive and imperialist nation on earth. No nation has annexed so often, so indiscriminately, so heedless of race or sentiment or defence, as you. And here you have your one supreme opportunity, an opportunity favoured by every consideration, a territory indissolubly united with your own and crippled for lack of you as you for lack of it, a territory which links up your present domains, a territory peopled with your own race, largely with your own emigrants, the chance of all chances, and you do not take it, do not see it. It is strange."

And slowly the realization came that it *is* strange. Yet it is true. We do not want Canada. Nothing is surer than that. It isn't simply that we do not want to coerce her. That of course. But we do not even wish that she wanted to come. It is a marvel

that we feel so, when we remember how we have felt toward all other neighbours. Why is it?

The answer is simple, but one which our keen-witted German could never understand. *We have Canada.* The arbitrary line which separates us is at once the most indefensible and the safest frontier on earth. The historic accidents that separate the two countries have given one more precious centre of individuality and race initiative, that anti-toxin for the stagnation which is too wont to follow the union of the families of men, but they have in no way jeopardized that fundamental unity which has its seat,—not in that consciousness where we coquette so often with fickle fancies, but in the deep unconscious instincts which guard our being.

For us the supreme phenomenon of the present war is the lifting of this unconscious sense of race unity up into the light of consciousness. We were united before; now we know it. For years we have dwelt care-free within the precincts of our race. We have put our unthinking trust in its far-flung battle-line and thought only of the prowess of our own right arm and its wooden sword. With a confidence born of long immunity, we have indulged in doubtful amenities, our heads given up to little feuds, while the heart kept the citadel. And now of a sudden the citadel is assaulted by a host that has sworn not to leave one stone upon another. At the call of the heart we recognize that it is our citadel. We have found ourselves and the race has saved its soul. There was no other salvation.

CHAPTER XXII

FORECAST

IT is difficult to see whence we came, but far more difficult to see whither we are going. Yet whence we came matters little save as it tells us whither we are going. History is nothing if it does not end in prophecy. With all deference these slight suggestions are offered in an attempt to complete our task by projecting somewhat into the future the movement which we have been following.

We face the future always with two questions, what is going to happen, and what can we do to make things happen right? To the novice the second question seems the more important. The need for intelligent intervention and constructive mechanism is urgent. There is a temptation to overlook or undervalue the unobtrusive building forces of life, and to put our trust in contrivance and device, in things that men have thought out and determined upon, instead of things wrought unawares by instincts that ask no sanction of intellect or will.

With the new consciousness of this larger race unity something of this spirit comes upon us. What can we do to hasten a consummation so devoutly to be wished? Would it not be well to have an Anglo-British alliance duly documented and attested to de-

fine our mutual obligations? Is it not highly important that we mutually pledge ourselves to arbitrate our differences and prescribe in advance the procedure to be followed? Would it not be desirable that we should have a representative in the Imperial Conference, that council of our race? These and other well-meant suggestions which are increasingly heard, are the natural expression of this new consciousness that we are one race and that we stand or fall together.

The writer will hardly be suspected of unsympathy or indifference if he confesses his doubts as to the efficacy or the need of these devices. A little reflection on the proposals here suggested will be peculiarly enlightening as to the nature of the forces with which we have to deal.

Arbitration is the most obvious possibility, a possibility long since recognized. There can be no question that the two countries have now reached a point where they can arbitrate their differences, or better still, where they can settle them by the simpler process of friendly conference. How much does it help under such circumstances to promise that we will so settle them? It is a little like asking gentlemen and friends to promise to be mutually polite, harmless perhaps, but superfluous. Nor is a prescribed procedure so likely to fit the case as an improvised one, for it must be made by guess before the circumstances are known.

A formal alliance, too, even though aimed at the very thing that all desire, would probably hinder union rather than promote it. Co-operation in

minor matters in which the two countries are unequally concerned, is obviously undesirable. An alliance could cover only matters of supreme importance. How draw the line? The trouble is that the line must be drawn in the dark. When we plan beforehand, we have to deal with hypothetical situations. But real situations, when they appear, have a perverse way of not fitting into prearranged schedules. It is always the unexpected that happens. When this war broke out, Italy and Roumania were in alliance with the Central Powers, and Greece with Serbia, all sincerely enough, no doubt, but the situation developed so unexpectedly when the time came, that all disposition to keep their promises vanished. In such cases, nothing is easier than to find a pretext for breaking them, and the only result of the alliance is to give to the injured party a new and more tangible grievance. This war is in a sense a war of principles as well as of peoples. The Central Powers were bound by alliances. They had it all nominated in the bond. The others had an entente, an understanding, which specified little and was hardly more than a common consciousness of a developing situation. The entente has suffered no disillusionment, while the alliances have largely broken down.

Formal representation in an Imperial Council which should thus become both the organ and the visible symbol of our race unity, is an attractive proposal, the more so as it would not necessarily lessen our effective independence. There is little question, too, that opportunity for such co-operation will present itself in the near future and that it can be made per-

manent if we so desire. It seems inevitable, too, that there will be intermittent occasion for these deliberations of the great family from this time forth. The temptation to make of such a council a standing board of directors to manage the largest body of political interests in the world appeals strongly to those who welcome this great unity.

But it is all but certain that such an arrangement, if formal and authoritative, would produce friction rather than harmony between the two peoples. Adjustments which are now possible and which should become increasingly easy through mutual concession, would be resented if imposed by an Imperial Council. Independence is still the paramount sentiment, not only with us, but with every Anglo-Saxon people. The suspicion that it was limited by the new arrangement would at once operate as a divisive force.

It can not be denied that there would be some ground for such a suspicion. It must not be forgotten that, with all their unity, the Anglo-Saxon peoples bristle with differences, and that it is to these very differences, in large part, that they owe their dynamic character and power. It is the glory of the Anglo-Saxon that he has discovered the secret of unity without uniformity, and that secret consists largely in the avoidance of mechanism. A mill is always looking for grist. Create an organ of imperial unity, and it will inevitably be tempted to magnify its function. Local eccentricities of healthy growth to which evolution must look for its "useful variations," would be the subject of its unconscious disparagement. The tendency would be toward assimilation, toward the

elimination of annoying dissimilarities, above all, toward the extension of general jurisdiction over local interests, a tendency toward that mechanization which the Teuton calls organization, and which it is the glory of the Anglo-Saxon to have avoided. It is to be hoped and it is to be expected that in any emergency which may arise American interests will be represented in the great Anglo-Saxon council, and that the influence of this greatest of the Anglo-Saxon nations will be measurably proportioned to its importance. But for the present at least it is better that that representation should be informal and of an emergency character, and that Anglo-Saxon unity should wear the aspect of a supreme privilege rather than that of an irksome obligation.

What, then, shall we do, we who are reconciled to Anglo-Saxon solidarity, as it emerges from the troubled twilight of our earlier history into the full light of our larger morning? Simply, *recognize it as a fact*. It will be a shortsighted statesmanship that forgets even for a moment that we are but a part of a larger people, that imagines that Britain can be for us merely a nation among the nations. Doubtless in the great majority of our affairs we shall be, and should be, as independent of Britain as New York is independent of California, but in matters that concern the fate of our race and our common civilization, such independence will be impossible, for it would be suicidal. To distinguish between these two classes of interests is one of the nice questions which will more and more be the test of American statesmanship.

It is in the light of this larger unity that we must settle certain vexed questions that from a purely American standpoint seem to admit of no satisfactory solution. Such is the presence of Britain in the Caribbean where her possessions completely dominate the situation. In view of our anxiety to exclude Germany and possibly other powers from this region, it has not unnaturally occurred to some whose vision is bounded by a purely American horizon, that it would be well to secure the withdrawal of Britain as well. And since an American occupation of the Philippines is utterly unstrategic from an American point of view, what more natural than to arrange an exchange of the latter for Jamaica, British Guiana, and the numerous other British possessions in this quarter? This would complete our control of the Caribbean and would relieve us of dangerous obligations in the Far East. The argument is conclusive if we accept its initial assumption that we are a separate people, destined to work out our salvation in equal aloofness from all other peoples. To an isolated America the Philippines are a weakness, the British possessions in the Caribbean a menace.

But while these possessions do not fit at all into an American scheme of things, they fit perfectly into an Anglo-Saxon policy. The divided ownership of the West Indies simply insures so much the more perfectly that both peoples will guard this vital point in their communications, while the Philippines, standing as the natural outpost of British Oceanica as it faces the great Mongolian East, again assure joint protection of interests vital to the Anglo-Saxon unity.

But is this solidarity of the Anglo-Saxon race the end of the unifying process? Is the rest of mankind to be forever gentile, a menace to the unity and to the civilization of our race? Or is the process to go farther and a larger unity to result, and if so, how; along what lines; with what inclusions? Above all, what of the Teuton? Is his menace to be perpetual, or can he be crushed, or won over, or placated with some still unoccupied place in the sun? It is impossible to avoid these questions,—equally impossible to give them more than the most tentative of answers. But even such an answer may have its value.

The feeling is well nigh universal that the world tends toward some form of unity. Constructive thought simply balks at any other hypothesis. If it could be demonstrated that all unity was transient and that men were gravitating apart rather than together, it is doubtful if the men of our day would take much interest in the outcome. The fact that men feel this way does not quite guarantee that it will work out this way, but it rather necessitates this idea as our working hypothesis, a hypothesis, moreover, to which any rational interpretation of history lends its support.

There are two ways in which progress toward unity may be conceived and possibly promoted. The one is to assume all nations as equal and equally eligible, to take them, big and little, young and old, Barbarian, Scythian, bond and free, and get them to pool their issues, not all issues of course, but a few issues, the most vital and obvious, and then slowly to progress by getting more issues into the pool and tightening

its grip upon them. *That is a worthy Teutonic conception of political evolution.* It is based on coercion, not on cohesion, on legal fiction, not on living fact. It makes no allowance for differences of character or situation. It covers with its guaranty alike those nations that stand as pillars of the firmament and those whose very existence is a stumbling block to civilization. Men are equal before the law, but does that make them equally eligible for membership in church or club or in the councils of industry or science? It is equally preposterous to assume that the nations can be united for the very practical and perplexing purpose of maintaining the world's peace, on an assumption of equality and universal eligibility. If such a "league" is to succeed, some nations must be left out. Nations must grow together, not be handcuffed together, and only a union of those that have developed a cohesion of vital tissue can give the slightest promise of permanence or usefulness. These vital cohesions will be as unequal as the nations that they unite. The dream of a universal bond, slight at first, but slowly strengthening until it unites the weird medley of existing accidents into an all-embracing human brotherhood is a dream as delusive as it is unlovely. It can not be and it should not be. It would but perpetuate a vast aggregate inconvenience and misfit, the very existence of which is a sufficient guaranty that it can never be.

Progress toward human unity does not come that way. Cohesion develops, here a little and there much and here again none at all. Nations will unite when they feel like it, and when they do not they will

stay apart, will even drift apart, for cleavage will be an occasional incident of cohesion, with discipline for the froward and destruction for the hopelessly perverse. In the great arena of competition nations must demonstrate their capacity for nationhood and win the right to be. It is by the growth of such aggregates as the British Empire with admission from time to time of new candidates for its fellowship, whose vision has broadened to its world horizon and who have developed a fellowship of spirit with its live-and-let-live principle, that we shall progress toward human unity, not by such baseless artifices as a "league to enforce peace."

We are then not to regard the Anglo-Saxon unity as a finality. That unity is even now not exclusively Anglo-Saxon. The Anglo-Saxon is paramount, but two thirds of the human material in the great combine are of other races. There is,—or will be,—room for more. Already there are signs of cohesion with other elements. Ignoring the present co-operation with Latin and Slav, a co-operation which nothing but long centuries of unforced continuance can possibly develop into true cohesion, there are such obvious cases as Norway and Holland, countries intimately associated with Britain in the intercourse of life and drawn to it by the constant menace of an aggression which they can not resist. Doubtless the last thing they are thinking of is entering the British Empire, but it should be clear by this time that the cohesion of which we speak involves no such effacement of state or institutions as it would to become a province of the German Empire.

But our thought hurries incontinent to Germany, the supreme problem of the hour. Germany sees in herself, not in Britain, the nucleus of the new world order. She unhesitatingly decides that the British combination must be subservient or be dissolved and its elements regrouped into a new formation. Never was a struggle so vast or so fundamental. Seldom have antagonists been so determined. What will be the outcome? Can Germany be crushed or democratized into peace? Is there room for two such powers in the world? Must the struggle be postponed only to be resumed with fuller resources in a greater Armageddon?

Undoubtedly Germany will be democratized, possibly is being democratized as these lines are written, but will that bring peace? Possibly for the moment, for the nations are weary, and internal changes might easily be made acceptable pretexts for calling a halt. But the hope at which men seem to be grasping that democracy will remove the cause of conflict is a delusion. The nations are not fighting for democracy but for existence and for dominion. The most imperialist countries of the world during the past century have been the great democracies. Democracy is only a method of expressing the will of a people, and unless human nature has utterly broken with its past, the things that have looked good to men since history began are likely to seem good to them still. No passion has been more constant in the human race than the desire of peoples to extend the sway of their own ideals and their own ways as far as possible in the world. To assume that democracy will extinguish

this passion is to assume that it will extinguish human nature. Are not the democracies of the world even now fighting to discredit autocracy and, indirectly at least, to impose democracy, their way of governing and doing, upon a people for whom democracy is not as yet a necessity of self-expression? Democracy will not remove the Teuton menace.

Can Germany be crushed? Perhaps so, but to what purpose? Germany is used to being crushed. Germany was crushed in the Thirty Years' War as no nation could now bring itself to crush another. In parts of her territory the population was reduced by ninety per cent. The whole land was devastated and the race began again at the bottom. Yet in the following century Frederick the Great led this people to victories which threatened to shatter Europe. A few decades later Germany was ground under the heel of Napoleon until every spark of vitality seemed extinct. Yet Germans turned the tide at Waterloo and paved the way for the uprising of half a century later and for the world menace of today. As compared with these ordeals, the punishment that Germany is receiving today, the utmost that decent enemies can inflict upon her, is little more than a passing smart. Her population is essentially intact, the loss being hardly more than the normal increase of recent years. Her cities are uninjured, her factories are standing, and her whole industrial life essentially undisturbed. They will remain so, no matter what victory the allies may win. Nor is it at all probable that the much talked of policy of later economic repression will be attempted, or will succeed if attempted.

No, there is nothing to be hoped from crushing Germany. Crushing will keep her quiet for a season, but not for long. If the crushing that she got in the Thirty Years' War did not put a quietus on her effort, no subsequent crushing is likely to do so. With each rebuff she will only draw back into her shell, study the lesson of her defeat, recuperate her forces, organize a larger portion of the vast raw humanity beyond in support of her cause, and return to the charge with increased momentum and unabated purpose. It is not sure that she will ever succeed. It is not sure, alas, that she will not succeed. The one sure thing is that she will keep trying. Those who dream of a quiescent Germany as the result of anything the present war can accomplish, military triumph, political reform, or paper promise, are cherishing a perilous delusion.

What can save us from that perpetual and ever increasing menace from across the Channel? No power on earth save Germany herself. She will not accept the lot of a dependent power, nor would we in her place. She is too big to become a second Belgium. Her culture is too distinctive and too powerful to be extinguished or surrendered for another. It is useless to tell her that she still has room, that we bear her no malice. She must have more, must get it seemingly at our expense. And yet she must not, *must not*. Hence these forays that never conquer and these crushings that never subdue.

Suppose a single authority were recognized from Inverness to Bagdad, through this danger zone of the world. What problems it would solve! Belgium,

Holland, the Channel tunnel, the Balkans, the Dardanelles, the Bagdad Railway, Persia, India, Egypt, the Suez Canal,—the list is endless. There is scarce a problem that vexes the Foreign Offices of Europe which it would not eliminate or simplify.

Fantasy, of course. No such thing seems within the range of practical policy. Yet along the road that leads that way we must travel toward safety and power. Nothing else will save us from suicide; nothing else from being engulfed by the swarming East. No evil designs are imputed to Russia, China, or Japan, but designs have very little to do with it. Those great peoples, illimitable in numbers and endowed with resources unmatched in the west, must inevitably pass through stages in their development in which war will be not uncongenial, stages in which the *Zeitgeist* will laugh at treaties and coronation oaths, and in which no mysticism of temperament or kindliness of heart will insure against the adolescence of their culture. What will these vast masses of humanity, with their redundant energy and their rudimentary scruple, do to a Europe engaged in the game of the Kilkenny cats?

If this war is not to be fought utterly in vain, it must not preclude,—it must in some degree further,—an understanding between Teuton and Saxon. It would be, in the phrase of Thucydides, the saddest war in history if it jeopardized or postponed that result.

But does it jeopardize or postpone it? On the contrary, this war is the indispensable preliminary to an understanding. We know little of the negotia-

tions looking to that end which have passed between the two countries in recent years, but it is inconceivable that any such negotiations should have been successful under the conditions that have hitherto prevailed. A temper, the most insufferable that history records, has obsessed the German nation, and that increasingly, for more than a generation. The term, Prussian militarism, by which it is popularly known, does not adequately express either its extent or its character. It is a temper that knows no co-operation except vassalage, no leadership except domination, no graciousness except patronage. In the historian and the diplomat, as in the soldier, it is a temper of bullying insolence. All round the planet during thirty years of travel the writer has watched this unspeakable rudeness of the German to those to whom deference and protection was due, has seen him oust women from their seats, bully the weak, and win by his fists what any but a Hottentot would disdain to accept save as the gift of courtesy. It is one of their own publicists who has said that the Germans are the best hated nation in Europe because they have no manners.

It is the same in the field of intellect. There is an insolent cocksureness about German estimates of men and nations which hides under the mask of scholarship the most abysmal ignorance in the civilized world. It has vitiated the most laborious historical research on earth by making all the past a preparation for the Hohenzollern apotheosis. This is hammered into the German all the way from the primer to the doctor's thesis. As an inevitable corollary,

the history of other nations is travestied and their portrait drawn in caricature. Writes Professor Rudolph Huch in closing a summary of British and French civilization: "There are races which are incapable of attaining a high humanity, incapable of influencing the world. Such nations are destined to hew wood and draw water for the dominant nations. If they can not fill this inferior office they must perish." This appreciative estimate of Germany's rivals may well be offset by Germany's modest estimate of herself, as expressed by Professor von Stengel, the eminent German authority on international law. When asked whether Germany would participate in conferences at the Hague after the war for the development of international law, he said "No"; that such conferences would be unnecessary under a "German peace." "The one condition of prosperous existence, especially for neutrals," he said, "is submission to our supreme direction. Under our overlordship all international law would become superfluous, *for we of ourselves and instinctively give to each one his rights.*"¹

It is this spirit of arrogant provincialism, organizing with perverse ingenuity its laboriously gathered facts, which has given Germany a diplomacy without finesse, a knowledge without insight, a cleverness without wisdom, and a might without dominion. Germany needs seaports and colonies and broad domains, but most of all she needs a change of heart.

From this spirit which is as hated on the banks of the Danube as it is on the banks of the Thames,

¹ The italics are the writer's.

nothing can save her except the chastening of overwhelming defeat. Lloyd George was right when he said that it was not enough to conquer Germany by hunger; that she must be beaten on her chosen ground and with the weapons in which she trusts. With this German temper there can be no compromise. Let us hope that its enemies will not falter. Woe to the man or nation that calls an untimely halt to this war so necessary for the Allies, for us, and for Germany herself.

But when this spirit is exorcised, Germany will remain,—prostrate, it may be, like the demoniac from whom the unclean spirit had been cast out,—but still there, always there, and holding, despite herself, the fate of Europe in her keeping. With such a Germany we must have an understanding. Political union is unthinkable, alliance probably impracticable, but somehow the habit of concert, the instinctive sense of common rather than of opposed interest, must grow up and come to dominate this danger zone of the world. Somehow this race which the world can not endure, and which yet the world can not spare, must learn to “accept equality and not seek domination.” The task is arduous and the consummation remote. The hardest part of the doing is the getting willing to have it done. *But there is no other way.*

It is important to anticipate an objection which, despite all that has been said in the foregoing pages, is likely to suggest itself, an objection which the German is sure to express with lofty scorn. “What then is the superlative merit of your scheme of unifying the Germanic races as contrasted with ours?

The difference is merely that you want the Englishman on top instead of the German." No, what we want is the English *principle* on top instead of the German. That principle is the principle of fellowship, not of feudalism. It leaves each one free to live his own life and think his own thoughts and go his own ways, and sees the power and the greatness of the fellowship in this liberty of its members. It is not as hewers of wood and drawers of water to a dominant nation that the United States and Australia and Canada take their place alongside Britain in the great Anglo-Saxon fellowship. It is not "submission to our supreme direction" to which Germany must consent as a condition of making common cause. Only under this freer organization of which Britain has given to the world the first working demonstration, can we hope to be ourselves,—can Germany herself hope to find her place in the sun.

For there are no more vacant places. Germany has said it. A schoolboy can see it. If Germany is to play that part in the world which her rich racial endowment warrants, it must be in the territories now occupied by the Anglo-Saxon race or within its sphere of influence. They are enough for both. Again Germany has said it, for she declares that under her leadership and organization all these peoples can find there happiness and prosperity. Let us hope as much under other leadership and with another and freer organization. For though the world must be subdued to order, humanity must somehow still be free.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Allusion has been made in the Preface to the article by the Earl of Cromer in the *Yale Review* for January, 1917. This article is essentially a review of my earlier volume, of which this book is a sequel. The attitude of my distinguished critic is sufficiently indicated by his first reference to my book. Speaking of the problem of war and peace he says: "Nowhere is it discussed with greater thoroughness and acumen than in a very able work, entitled 'The Things Men Fight For,' written by Professor Powers. . . . His book may, therefore, usefully be taken as a text upon which to dilate upon some of the proposals which have recently been under discussion." This favourable attitude is amply confirmed by the discussion which follows. It is in grateful appreciation of this estimate rather than in the spirit of controversy that I venture a few words of explanation.

He begins with a kindly correction of "some minor errors of fact" which he generously adds "in no way detract from the value" of the work. I had spoken of a plebiscite having been taken in the Ionian Islands in 1864 previous to their surrender to Greece and he says: "I was at that time on the staff of Sir Henry Storks, the last of the British Lord High Commissioners. . . . Although I am only speaking

from personal recollection of events which occurred more than fifty years ago, I think I may state with confidence that no plebiscite of the whole population was taken." To be set right by such a man, himself an actor in those far away events, was an unlooked for honour. I accepted his statement at once as wholly conclusive, the more willingly perhaps, that this supposed plebiscite had seemed to lend colour to a modern proposal in which I had no confidence.

Curiously enough I chanced to be reading at the time the "Memories" of Lord Redesdale, which had recently appeared, followed almost immediately by the author's death. Lord Redesdale was for more than half a century in the service of the British government, most of the time in the Foreign Office. Almost simultaneously with the reading of Lord Cromer's article I came upon the passage (Vol. I, pp. 324-7) in which Lord Redesdale describes his visit to Corfu in November, 1864, the year of the British withdrawal. In this brief passage he refers three times to the "plebiscite," using that term, and even reports at some length the reasons given by a local priest for voting as he did. Here we have the testimony of two contemporary witnesses, both of the highest competency, yet in direct disagreement. Such is the problem of the historian.

More significant is Lord Cromer's criticism of my suggestion that the Italian expedition against Tripoli was undertaken with the connivance of Britain. As the point is of some importance, I venture to quote the statement to which exception is taken.

"Tripoli was a nominal dependency of Turkey,

and its seizure by Italy involved war with that country. Egypt, though under British control, was also in name a part of the Turkish Empire, and as such, pledged to support the cause of its suzerain. The position of Britain in Egypt was peculiarly calculated to show her hand. If she wished Tripoli to remain Turkish, she had but to permit Egypt to aid Turkish arms, or merely to open Egypt to the passage of Turkish troops, and Italian conquest would become impossible. Britain could have plausibly explained that she was merely permitting an unquestioned right, and refraining from interference in a matter in which she had no concern. On the other hand, her actual control of Egypt enabled her to close that country to the passage of troops under the equally plausible pretext of insuring its tranquillity, and her own neutrality, thus assuring Italian success in turn. She chose the latter alternative, against strong pressure from both Turkey and Egypt itself. Britain did not disapprove the seizure. Indeed, when we recall the fact that the masterful Lord Kitchener, whom the Egyptians were wont to obey, was sent by an unfriendly British cabinet to rule that country, and that the Italian expedition was launched immediately after his arrival, it is difficult not to see in the move the masterly hand of British diplomacy."

To this last statement Lord Cromer takes exception. "Nothing is more certain," he tells us, "than that Italian policy in connection with Tripoli was wholly due to Italian initiative, and that the British government, far from encouraging, rather discouraged the project." To have allowed the passage

of Turkish troops through Egypt "would have constituted an unfriendly act to a nation to whom we are bound alike by past traditions, political sympathy, and present interests, whilst on the other hand, events in Turkey had wholly alienated British sympathies from the Ottoman government."

Yes, beyond a doubt. I should be the last to suggest that Britain ought to have favoured Turkey. She has done that once too often as it is. My suggestion that Britain had a hand in the transaction was not in the least in the nature of a criticism. No British government in its senses could have decided differently. But I submit that if Britain's interests and sympathies had inclined her toward Turkey, she would have had a perfectly plausible excuse for construing Egypt as a part of the Turkish Empire as in theory she had always consistently done, and using it to Italy's undoing. She showed her hand by her decision in this matter, a perfectly right decision, but none the less one that revealed her policy. If her hand was not in the transaction, it should have been there.

But Lord Cromer says the move was made wholly on Italian initiative and that it was rather discouraged than encouraged by the British government. Lord Cromer certainly knew, and his word is unimpeachable. Does this contradict my assumption?

It has been settled at least since 1881 that Italy had a reversionary right to Tripoli. All Europe knew the decision. The time and manner of occupation of course would depend on circumstances. The habitual attitude of Italy was that of straining at the leash. That of Europe, and particularly of France and Eng-

land, was one of caution. They feared trouble with their Moslem populations. No doubt the proposal to seize Tripoli emanated from Italy, and no doubt Britain advised caution. None knew better than Britain that whatever the immediate outcome, the policy of excluding Germany from northern Africa must ultimately result in war with that country. She foresaw and accepted these consequences, but she deferred the catastrophe by every means in her power. Is it unplausible to conclude that Britain both welcomed and dreaded the seizure of Tripoli by Italy, that in common with other powers, she had long been committed to that arrangement, and yet that when the moment came she always saw reasons for caution and "far from encouraging, rather discouraged the project"? If statesmen are at all like other mortals, such a contradiction between permanent policy and the policy of the moment would be most natural. Moreover Lord Cromer's statement implies but a very mild dissuasion on Britain's part, and one which undoubtedly yielded to Italian argument and importunity long before the blow was struck. When that moment came, the coincidence of British and Italian action was one not easily explained as the result of accident.

The remaining strictures of the article may be summed up in the single statement that I have made out too much of a case for Germany. This Lord Cromer attributes to my excessive desire to be impartial, since he recognizes that my sympathy for the cause of the Allies is in no doubt. In particular my recognition of a certain reasonableness in Germany's

claim to Holland and Belgium because their ports are the natural outlets for her industrial districts and because their population is Germanic, arouses his British susceptibilities. He characterizes the ethnological argument as "miserably weak" and asserts that it does not justify German annexation. He curiously overlooks the fact that I reach the same conclusion in the passage referred to, where I express the opinion that "the two countries (Holland and Belgium) offer a base of possible offence against Britain which must not on any account be allowed to pass into German hands." I have been emphatic throughout my book in asserting that the ethnological argument is always weak when it is in conflict with the more permanent fact of geographical unity, or the vital needs of commerce and national defence. Significantly enough, when the argument gets away from Belgium, my distinguished critic thinks that I "exaggerate" "the difficulties of drawing ethnic frontiers," and urges that "if Italians ruled in the Trentino, and Austria were no longer to be allowed to exercise its Germanizing influence over unwilling Slavs, one cause of European disturbance would be eliminated." Yes, and another cause of disturbance would be introduced, whether less or greater, only experience can teach us. That Italy should have the Trentino, I have emphatically maintained. The ethnological argument here coincides with the great interests of commerce and defence. All argument is one way. But whether the break-up of the Austrian empire and the formation of ethnic states in that much troubled region would conduce to the world's

peace I very much doubt. A glance at the ethnographical map of the Balkans is not reassuring. The trouble is that ethnic interests are here not in harmony with commercial and strategic interests, but in conflict with them. Moreover ethnic frontiers here are not definite. Perhaps some one can tell where the line comes between Greek and Bulgarian, between Hungarian and Roumanian, between Slav and German, but it is doubtful if any one could persuade the peoples themselves to accept his conclusion. My statement that the Austrian government is "indispensable" is criticized as unproved. The proof is in the obvious fact that it normally keeps ten quarrelsome nationalities at peace, which would otherwise almost certainly be at war.

My great critic is after all British, and I respect him for allowing his patriotism to colour his reasoning. If Britain is to exist, Belgium must be kept from German control and the great scheme of *Mittel-Europa* must be checkmated. This last can be accomplished, so the Allies believe, only by dissolving the polyglot state which Germany has made subservient to her ends. The ethnic argument here favours Britain's contention and Lord Cromer looks upon it with favour. In the case of Belgium ethnic considerations favour Germany, and he considers the argument "miserably weak." I believe it to be weak in both cases. If the temporary playing up of the ethnic factor in the Balkans can help to thwart the most baneful designs that have ever menaced humanity, I most willingly subscribe to it, but though that may save the world, it will not save the Balkans.

Their hope lies, not in the maintenance of perfectly inconsequential ethnic differences which are at odds with both commercial and strategic interests, but in assimilation and union. I wish a single power ruled every inch of territory from Bohemia to Constantinople, but I do not wish Germany to be that power, nor any state that is, or may become, subservient to her. The ethnic argument may be good policy here, but I believe it to be fundamentally unsound. The formation of ethnic states in the Balkans can be at best only a temporary expedient, a concession to race individuality in a situation where counter claims overwhelmingly predominate and where, in the interest of civilization, these claims must eventually be recognized. It is infinite pity that Germany can not be permitted to unify, even with a degree of compulsion, this divided and yet indivisible outpost of Europe. Yet nothing is more certain than that she cannot be trusted with this task and with the guardianship of our citadel until she can cease "swash-buckling through the streets of Europe." Until then we must temporize. Perhaps, too, it is a necessity of our nature that we should urge our makeshifts under the sanctions of a general philosophy, however fallacious. The unqualified endorsement of ethnic claims seems to me to be such a procedure.

One suggestion of Lord Cromer fills me with the keenest regret that his thought could not have been more fully disclosed. I was on the point of asking for this fuller statement when I learned that his voice had passed into eternal silence. He speaks of himself as "an Englishman, who would certainly not, in

the ordinary colloquial language of the day, be classed as a democrat by his own countrymen, but who is, nevertheless, a strong supporter of those liberal institutions which are the outward and visible signs of every democratic form of government." Referring to my statement that "modern peoples are more belligerent than their governments, for their passions are less restrained by knowledge of difficulties," he says: "If this view be correct, it, of course, cuts away the ground from under the feet of those who look to an extension of democratic institutions as the best safeguard against the occurrence of war. But is it correct? It certainly can not be proved to be false, and the experience of history rather points to the conclusion that it is true. Nevertheless, it is not unduly optimistic, to hold that present symptoms appear to indicate that the trend of democratic opinion will in the near future be peaceful rather than bellicose."

I know no more fascinating subject for speculation than that suggested in this last sentence. Nor do I know any man who has lived in my day whose opinion is entitled to more respect in such matters than England's greatest administrator whose judgments were based on half a century of successful experience in the governing of men. What were the "symptoms" which led him to hope that democracy was about to reverse the teachings of history and become "peaceful rather than bellicose"? He has given us no hint, and I strive in vain to discern them. The democracies of Athens and Rome, of Britain and France and America, have all been aggressively imperialist. Class struggles for the moment absorb the

attention of modern democratic peoples, and war is decried, not in the interest of peace, but in the interest of other war. I can not believe that peace so motivated is really peace, or that the shifting of the struggle from race to class is any great gain to contemporary humanity. I believe in democracy, but not as a panacea. It gives us freedom, but it does not give us peace. It so happens that in the present struggle democracy is lined up against autocracy. The coincidence is impressive but I believe it to be accidental. In a war between the democratic and the autocratic powers, democracy is incidentally at stake, but democracy is not the issue. With all deference to Lord Cromer's opinion, I can not resist the conclusion that here as in the "ethnic argument," he is unconsciously influenced by considerations of policy. Chance has willed that at last the slogan of democracy should appeal to all the Allies. But I believe that Raemakers, the most scathing critic of German autocracy that the war has produced, was nearer right when he said that if Germany were a republic tomorrow with Liebknecht or Scheidemann for president, her relation to the other powers would not be essentially modified. A change in the form of government neither creates nor indicates a change of heart in the matter which here concerns us. Democracy and imperialism are concurrent movements in the life of our time, perhaps of every progressive time. They compete actively for the interest, the sympathy, and the finite energies of their constituencies, but the two movements are not logically opposed,

and it is vain to attempt to stay the one by hastening the other. The temper of democracy is neither concessive nor altruistic. What reason is there to believe that it will prove pacific?



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